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Abstract
This qualitative legal study explored statutory immunity protection provided to Texas educators
under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512. The Texas legislature enacted the
statutory immunity provisions as part of House Bill 4 and tort reform in 2003. Researchers have
called for more balance when providing immunity protections for educators. The researcher
limited the study to Texas Commissioner of Education decisions and Texas appellate court cases.
The study utilized a legal framework to determine under what circumstances the rulings of
statutory immunity shields educators from liability. The findings in this study provide evidence
that Texas educators have more immunity protection than before the passage of House Bill 4.
The study revealed that the adoption of the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 has
led to additional immunity protection for educators. The findings are consistent with previous
research demonstrating it is a misconception that educators may never lay hands on students. The
data provided evidence that Texas educators may use justified force against students to control,
train, or educate a student. Further, educators with tenure and no prior reprimands are shielded
by immunity if they use reasonable force protected under the Texas Education Code §22.0152.
The findings also suggest appellate courts do not want to interfere in employee discipline issues.
The study indicated appellate courts did not rule in favor of a disgruntled employee who sues
supervisors or other district employees. The passage of Texas Education Code §22.0511 and
§22.0512 achieved the legislature’s goal of providing additional immunity protection for
educators.
Keywords: statutory immunity, teacher tenure, sovereign immunity, contracts,
commissioner decisions, appellate cases, appeals, nonrenewal, termination, use of force
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Chapter 1: Introduction
News stories relating to public school teachers’ wrongful behavior toward students are
common (Shine, 2017). From inappropriate relationships with students to teachers using too
much force while disciplining a student, teacher misbehavior incidents appear within news
cycles regularly (Zirkel & Johnson, 2011). The perception that educators face potential legal
liability daily is not surprising since educators spend more time during the school day with
students than their parents (Daniels & Martin, 2018; Zirkel & Holben, 2017). However, suing a
school district and its employees is not as easy as suing a private company or a private citizen
because of the legal doctrine of sovereign immunity (Buckley, 2017). This chapter begins with
the background of the study and provides the statement of the problem, purpose of the study,
significance of the study, research questions, legal framework, and definitions.
Background of the Study
Sovereign immunity shields the government from lawsuits (Phelan, 2011; Rich, 2017;
Schaefer, 2013). The doctrine of sovereign immunity traces back to England and the “king can
do no wrong” (Entrikin, 2018, pp. 364-365). Since the king made the laws, a citizen could not
sue the king or hold the king liable for his actions without the king’s permission (Schaefer,
2013). Sovereign immunity exists because of the belief that governmental entities, such as school
districts, would be paralyzed and unable to do the work of the people if they faced potential
liability for all of their actions as government employees (Hendrick, 2016).
Researchers have disagreed on the need for sovereign immunity for the government
(Buckley, 2017; Carlson, 2005; Daniels & Martin, 2018; Hendrick, 2016; Hull et al., 2005;
Maher et al., 2010; Phelan, 2011; Schaefer, 2013). The consideration for sovereign immunity
involves weighing the importance of protecting the government at the expense of a harmed
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individual citizen versus holding government actors accountable for injurious conduct (Buckley,
2017; Schaefer, 2013).
Proponents of immunity protections claim public policy reasons require immunity
protections for the government (Raboin, 2016). Lawsuits against governmental entities, such as
schools, waste taxpayer resources defending legal claims (Buckley, 2017; Nockleby, 2007;
Schaefer, 2013). A need for immunity exists to allow for the continuation of the work of the
government without its actors fearing litigation while working for the benefit of the state
(Buckley, 2017; Daniels & Martin, 2018; Schaefer, 2013).
Opponents of sovereign immunity maintain these protections put the government and its
employees above the law since they are unlikely to be held accountable for their actions
(Buckley, 2017; Logan, 2015). According to Hendrick (2016), sovereign immunity protections
have an astounding effect on citizens. Sovereign immunity leaves many victims of injuries
without any viable remedy (Buckley, 2017; Daniels & Martin, 2018). Phelan (2011) questioned
whether the broad immunity protections insulate the government and their employees from
honest and ethical behavior.
Despite its broad protection power, sovereign immunity is not always guaranteed to
protect the government and its employees from every lawsuit or claim (Maher et al., 2010;
Phelan, 2011). In certain circumstances, sovereign immunity protections are waived, thereby
exposing the government to liability for their actions (Hendrick, 2016; Schaefer, 2013). For
instance, federal and state governments have abandoned their immunity protections and provided
consent to sue the government and its employees for some torts (Maher et al., 2010).
Tort law “holds defendants responsible for injuries they have caused others through
wrongful conduct” (Goldberg & Zipursky, 2010, p. 925). DeMitchell (2006) aptly defined a tort
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simply as a wrong. The principle behind tort law is the victim can get a judicial remedy, usually
in the form of money damages, for the injuries caused by the tortfeasor (Duncan & Turner,
2012). Goldberg and Zipursky (2010) maintained tort law punishes wrongful conduct by
reallocating the costs of the plaintiff’s loss back to the wrongdoer defendant. The intent of tort
law is to correct and deter certain tortious behavior (Buckley, 2017). If a person who causes
harm knows they could face potential legal liability for their actions, tort law consequences
should stop that behavior.
Congress realized the government should have accountability for some injuries against
citizens (Hendrick, 2016). Thus, Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1946
(Phelan, 2011). The FTCA provides victims redress for torts caused by federal government
employees by waiving sovereign immunity in certain circumstances (Schaefer, 2013). The FTCA
allows victims harmed on federal property or by federal employees to sue the federal government
(Phelan, 2011). After the passage of the FTCA, states also began adopting their own versions of
tort claims acts to waive immunity for certain tort injuries (Buckley, 2017; Hendrick, 2016).
Maher et al. (2010) discovered the tort claims acts adopted in each state had substantial
differences “of general rules and exceptions to immunity or liability for public school districts
and their employees across the United States” (p. 245). In 1969, the Texas legislature adopted the
Texas Tort Claims Act (Forgey, 2018). The Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) amended state law
to allow individuals to file lawsuits against government entities and their employees for torts that
result in harm (Carlson, 2005; Daniels & Martin, 2018). Under the TTCA, government agencies
are liable for property damage, injury, and death if it was the result of (1) a motor vehicle
accident and (2) if the government employee responsible would be personally liable as a private
citizen under Texas law (Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, 2019).
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Despite the passage of the tort claims acts at the federal and state level, the tort reform
movement has diminished the ability for victims to recover in a lawsuit against the government
or its employees (Daniels & Martin, 2018; Hull et al., 2005). Daniels and Martin (2016)
described tort reform as a “war on civil justice” (p. 1490). Tort reform attempts to limit the
number of frivolous lawsuits (Hull et al., 2005). Additionally, tort reform seeks to cap the
amount of damages a plaintiff can recover in a lawsuit (Buckley, 2017; Carlson, 2005; Raboin,
2016). Many states across the country, including Texas, have adopted tort reform legislation that
limits tort victims’ ability to sue in civil courts (Carlson, 2005; Phelan, 2011; Raboin, 2016).
In 2003, the Texas legislature adopted House Bill 4, the most sweeping tort reform
legislation to date (Carlson, 2005; Hull et al., 2005). Texas Representative Joe Nixon
summarized the legislative intent of House Bill 4 as “establish[ing] an equitable and efficient
system of justice in Texas that provides meaningful remedies for individuals wronged while
protecting the rights of those who have done no wrong” (Carlson, 2005, p. 247). House Bill 4
significantly limited, and in some instances eliminated, lawsuits permitted against various groups
or entities, including physicians, hospitals, and nursing homes, to name a few (Daniels & Martin,
2018; Hull et al., 2005; Nockleby, 2007).
The passage of House Bill 4 significantly altered the litigation environment in Texas
(Forgey, 2018). Texas tort reform affected the ability of citizens to sue for tort injuries against
many groups, including educators (Flynt, 2005; Forgey, 2018). Daniels and Martin (2018)
argued the passage of House Bill 4 detrimentally affected a victim’s meaningful access to the
rights and remedies available in the court system. House Bill 4 has closed the door to the courts
for many citizens by cutting off legitimate lawsuits under the guise of tort reform (Daniels &
Martin, 2018).
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House Bill 4 significantly benefited Texas educators (Chriss, 2005; Hull et al., 2005;
Smith, 2017; Texas Education Code, 2019). Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 were
two new statutory immunity provisions created under House Bill 4 (Flynt, 2005). Section
22.0511 expanded educator’s previous statutory immunity protections (Flynt, 2005; Texas
Education Code, 2019). Section 22.0512 allows educators to shield themselves from certain
adverse employment decisions or disciplinary proceedings for the “use of physical force against
a student if it is justified under Section 9.62, Penal Code” (Chriss, 2005; Texas Education Code,
2019, p. 185).
Athletics, shop class, school buses, and student discipline are a few areas that raise a
question of legal liability for school districts and their employees (Holben & Zirkel, 2011; Payne,
2012; Popham & DeSander, 2014; Zirkel & Holben, 2017). Historically, courts have been
sympathetic to school districts and public school employees in lawsuits (Mayger & Zirkel, 2014;
Payne, 2012). Yet, immunity protections do not deter victims from filing lawsuits for tortious
injuries in schools (Zirkel & Holben, 2017; Zirkel & Johnson, 2011).
Texas requires students to attend school under compulsory school attendance laws
(Buckley, 2017; Texas Education Code, 2019). School districts and educators are responsible for
the care and teaching of these school-aged children (Hendrick, 2016). Hendrick (2016) argued
unfettered immunity protections for school districts and educators create insufficient protection
for the children. Opponents of broad immunity for educators maintained these protections do not
account for the devastating effect the limitation of liability has on students who may be injured at
school (Buckley, 2017; Hendrick, 2016). Buckley (2017) asserted immunity protections and
limitation of liability keep educators from acting in a manner that reduces the risks to others in
schools, particularly students.
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Proponents of educator immunity, on the other hand, claimed school districts and
educators must be shielded from legal liability (Flynt, 2005; Hendrick, 2016; Hull et al., 2005;
Popham & DeSander, 2014). Educators need additional protections since they have a much
higher level of scrutiny than other professions (DeMitchell & Onosko, 2016). Finally, school
employees have a fear of becoming a defendant in a lawsuit; thus, educators must have immunity
protections to be drawn to the teaching profession (Flynt, 2005; Holben & Zirkel, 2011; Payne,
2012).
Statement of the Problem
Researchers, politicians, and lawyers have disagreed on the amount and the extent to
which the government should enjoy sovereign immunity protections (Buckley, 2017; Carlson,
2005; Hendrick, 2016; Phelan, 2011). Buckley (2017) reasoned tort law theory should “represent
a better balance between the potential costs of liability and the potential costs of immunity” (p.
1015). Liability for torts can deter wrongful conduct and force the government and its employees
to act in a manner that prevents risk and limits loss (Buckley, 2017; Schaefer, 2013). Buckley
(2017) argued greater immunity protections for the government and its employees undermine the
purpose of tort law, which is to correct and deter injurious and tortious behavior.
State legislatures have to balance the use of immunity protections to reduce public
exposure to liability and the need to correct and deter injuriously wrongful conduct (Buckley,
2017; Hendrick, 2016). Legislatures need to take into account the need for immunity, which is to
protect the government from large judgments (Hendrick, 2016). However, lawmakers also must
consider the policy implications for not holding the government and its employees liable for
harmful conduct (Buckley, 2017; Hendrick, 2016; Phelan, 2011).
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Researchers have called for limiting the liability of school districts and their employees
(Buckley, 2017; Hendrick, 2016). Laws need to balance the values of correcting and deterring
wrongful behavior with the amount of immunity protection provided to educators (Daniels &
Martin, 2018; Hendrick, 2016; Schaefer, 2013). There is a call for a balance between fairness, on
the one hand, and the economic soundness of taxpayer money on the other (Centner, 2007).
Fairness entails holding governmental entities responsible in the same ways businesses and
individuals are held accountable for their wrongful conduct (Buckley, 2017; Centner, 2007).
Economic soundness, according to Centner (2007), provides the government with a defense in
tort lawsuits to avoid payment of taxpayer dollars. Buckley (2017) advocated for treating school
districts and their employees comparably with private actors under state law. While Buckley
(2017) did not support the complete elimination of immunity, he did promote narrowing the
definition of immunity.
In 2003, Texas passed sweeping tort reform under House Bill 4. The legislation led to
greater immunity protections for Texas educators with the passage of the Texas Education Code
§22.0511 and §22.0512 (Carlson, 2005; Flynt, 2005; Hull et al., 2005; Maher et al., 2010). The
Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 created a legal framework that protects public
school districts and their employees from liability in certain instances (Texas Education Code,
2019). To date, no research examined the application of the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and
§22.0512 regarding educator conduct. The call for research of immunity protections provided to
educators in the various states has, therefore been made (Buckley, 2017; Maher et al., 2010).
Many questions remain about the impact of the increased immunity protections provided to
Texas educators since tort reform in 2003.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to describe how the Texas Commissioner of Education and
Texas appellate courts have attempted to apply statutory immunity protections provided to
educators under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512. The study determined under
what circumstances the ruling of statutory immunity shields Texas educators from liability. The
goal of the study was to determine the rulings, patterns, and themes found in appellate cases and
state agency decisions (Webley, 2010). The analysis of the decisions made by the Texas
Commissioner of Education and in Texas appellate cases provided insight and guidance for educators,
administrators, school boards, lawmakers, parents, and other Texas public school stakeholders.
Analyzing Texas Commissioner of Education decisions and Texas appellate cases
provided an understanding of immunity protections awarded to Texas educators and the
victims injured by these government actors (Hendrick, 2016). Buckley (2017) called for
research assessing the rulings on immunity defenses and an assessment of the extent that
educators are shielded from liability. In order to determine whether the immunity protections
provided under the Texas Education Code are too broad or too narrow, an assessment of the
extent to which educators currently are shielded from liability is required (Buckley, 2017;
Daniels & Martin, 2016; Maher et al., 2010; Payne, 2012).
Significance of the Study
The findings of this study provided valuable insight into the legal questions, decisions,
and trends associated with the use of immunity defenses under the Texas Education Code
§22.0511 and §22.0512. An understanding of these statutory immunity protections provided to
educators might be gained by those who work in Texas public education and may affect day-today practices. The findings might offer practical guidelines that enlighten educators, school
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administrators, school boards, parents, and attorneys who represent school districts and
employees about current legal interpretations of immunity defenses and enable effective
administrative practices in Texas schools (Dagley, 2012; Newton, 2019).
Research Questions
The study focused on answering the following research questions:
RQ1: What were the legal questions in cases decided by the Texas Commissioner of
Education and Texas appellate courts where educators invoked statutory immunity protections?
RQ2: What were the decisions made by the Texas Commissioner of Education and Texas
appellate courts in cases where educators invoked statutory immunity protections?
RQ3: What were the trends in the decisions made by the Texas Commissioner of
Education and Texas appellate courts where educators invoked statutory immunity protections?
RQ4: What legal principles for Texas educators can be discovered from the decisions
made by the Texas Commissioner of Education and Texas appellate courts where educators
invoked statutory immunity protections?
Legal Framework
The study utilized a legal framework to determine under what circumstances the rulings
of statutory immunity shields educators from liability. This study aimed to understand the
statutory immunity protections provided to Texas educators (Texas Education Code, 2019). The
research was centered on a black letter law methodology, also known as doctrinal research,
seeking to “identify underlying legal principles on which legal decisions are based”
(Lammasniemi, 2018, p. 72).
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Definition of Key Terms
The terms operationalized in this study were defined in Black’s Law Dictionary: Pocket
Edition (Garner, 1996).
Actual damages. “An amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a proven
injury or loss; damages that repay actual losses” (Garner, 1996, p. 163).
Administrative adjudication. “The process used by an administrative agency to issue
regulations through an adversary proceeding” (Garner, 1996, p. 17). In the current study, the
Texas Education Agency represented the administrative agency overseeing the adversary
proceedings.
Administrative hearing. “An administrative-agency proceeding in which evidence is
offered for argument or trial” (Garner, 1996, p. 17). In the current study, the Texas
Commissioner of Education represented the administrative agency holding the hearings.
Administrative law. “The law governing the organization and operation of a branch of
government” (Garner, 1996, p. 17).
Administrative law judge. “A person resides in an administrative hearing, with the
power to administer oaths, take early testimony, rule on questions of evidence, and make agency
determinations of fact” (Garner, 1996, p. 17). In the current study, the Texas Commissioner of
Education represented the administrative law judge.
Appeal. “A proceeding undertaken to reverse a decision by bringing to a higher
authority, especially the submission of a lower court’s or agency’s decision to a higher court for
review and possible reversal” (Garner, 1996, p. 36).
Appellate court. “A court with jurisdiction to review decisions of one or more lower
courts” (Garner, 1996, p. 149).
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Common law. “The body of law derived from judicial decisions and opinions rather than
from statutes or constitutions” (Garner, 1996, p. 113).
Damages. “Monetary compensation for loss or injury to person or property” (Garner,
1996, p. 163).
Defendant. “A person sued in a civil proceeding” (Garner, 1996, p. 175).
Educator. This term refers to a professional employee of a Texas public school district
under the Texas Education Code (2019), which was defined as the following:
A superintendent, principal, teacher, including a substitute teacher, supervisor, social
worker, school counselor, nurse, and teacher's aide employed by a school district, a
teacher employed by a company that contracts with a school district to provide the
teacher's services to the district, a student in an education preparation program
participating in a field experience or internship, a school bus driver certified in
accordance with standards and qualifications adopted by the Department of Public Safety
of the State of Texas, a member of the board of trustees of an independent school district;
and any other person employed by a school district whose employment requires
certification and the exercise of discretion. (Chapter 22. Subchapter B. Section 22.051)
Excessive force in discipline. In determining whether excessive force in discipline was
used, “courts must inquire into the need for the application of force, the relationship between the
need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for
the very purpose of causing harm” (Hall v. Tawney, 1980, p. 609).
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Force. Moderate restraint and correction used by a school district's professional
employee “to prescribe reasonable rules for the government of children under their charge and to
enforce obedience to such rules” (Williams v. Spring ISD, 2017, p. 8).
Holding. “A determination of a matter of law that is pivotal to a judicial decision; a
principle drawn from such a decision. A ruling on evidence or other questions presented at trial”
(Garner, 1996, p. 291).
Immunity. “Any exemption from duty, liability, for service of process; especially such
an exemption granted to a public official. In tort law, a doctrine providing a complete defense to
a tort action; like a privilege, immunity does not negate the tort, and it must be raised
affirmatively or it will be waived” (Garner, 1996, pp. 297-298).
Jurisdiction. “A government’s general power to exercise authority over all persons and
things within its territory; a court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree” (Garner, 1996, p.
350).
Motion for summary judgment. “A request that the court enter a judgment without a
trial because there is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided by the fact-trier. In a motion
for summary judgment, the movant claims an entitlement to prevail as a matter of law” (Garner,
1996, pp. 426-427).
Plaintiff. “The party who brings a civil suit in a court of law” (Garner, 1996, p. 482).
Plea to the jurisdiction. “A plea asserting the court lacks jurisdiction either over the
defendant or over the subject matter of the case” (Garner, 1996, p. 483).
Precedent. “A deciding case that furnishes a basis for determining later cases involving
similar facts or issues” (Garner, 1996, p. 491).
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Punitive damages. “Damages awarded in addition to actual damages when the defendant
acted with recklessness, malice, or deceit; such damages all are intended to punish and thereby
deter blameworthy conduct” (Garner, 1996, p. 164).
Reasonable force. Any force used must be that which the educator “reasonably believes
is necessary (1) to enforce compliance with a proper command issued for the purpose of
controlling, training, or educating the child, or (2) to punish the child for prohibited conduct; and
in either case, the force or physical contact must be reasonable and not disproportionate to the
activity or the offense” (Williams v. Spring ISD, 2017, p. 8).
Sovereign immunity. “A government’s immunity from being sued in its own courts
without its consent. A state’s immunity from being sued in federal court by the state’s own
citizens. Also termed governmental immunity” (Garner, 1996, pp. 297-298).
Statute. “The law passed by a legislative body” (Garner, 1996, p. 592).
Statutory immunity protections. In the current study, statutory immunity protections
refer to the immunity defenses for Texas educators under Texas Education Code §22.0511 and
§22.0512 (Texas Education Code, 2019).
Statutory law. “The body of law derived from statutes rather than from constitutions or
judicial decisions” (Garner, 1996, p. 593).
Subject-Matter jurisdiction. “Jurisdiction over their nature of the case and the type of
relief sought; the extent to which a court can claim to affect the conduct of persons or the status
of things” (Garner, 1996, p. 352).
Summary judgment. “A judgment granted on a claim about which there is no genuine
issue of material fact and upon which the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law”
(Garner, 1996, p. 606).
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Tort. “A civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained, usually in the form of
damages; a breach of duty that the law imposes on everyone. The branch of law dealing with
such wrongs” (Garner, 1996, p. 629).
Tortfeasor. “One who commits a tort” (Garner, 1996, p. 630).
Tort reform. “A movement to reduce the amount of tort litigation in the judicial system.
Tort reform usually involves legislation that restricts legal theories in tort, or that caps damage
awards” (Garner, 1996, p. 630).
Trial court. “The court of original jurisdiction where all the evidence is first received
and considered” (Garner, 1996, p. 152).
Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the study, background information relating to
sovereign immunity and immunity protections for public school employees, research questions,
definition of key terms, and a summary of the legal framework. The next chapter is a
comprehensive presentation and synthesis of the applicable literature.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Students lack sufficient protection when immunity protections shield school districts and
educators from liability (Hendrick, 2016). Hendrick (2016) argued the protection of school-aged
children must be a consideration by the Texas legislature when providing governmental
immunity protections to educators. Recent policy changes nationwide have centered on the
misperception that there is an explosion of education litigation that results in enormous liability
for school districts and school employees (Hull et al., 2005; Lupini & Zirkel, 2003; Zirkel, 2015;
Zirkel & Holben, 2009). Tort reform groups, and others who benefit from educators’ fear of
litigation, actively promote potential litigation and crippling liability educators could face in
schools (Holben & Zirkel, 2011; Zirkel, 2015). Politicians respond to these outcries by
implementing new legislation, including statutory immunity protections, to safeguard educators
from liability (Hull et al., 2005; Zirkle, 2012).
Texas has not been immune to these misperceptions and misinformation of liability
exposure of educators (Adams-Valdez, 2005; Hull et al., 2005; Linares, 1997). In 2003, the
Texas Legislature amended the education code to extend and broaden existing immunity
protections for professional school employees (Flynt, 2005). The Texas Legislature adopted the
Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 as a way to attract and keep teachers in the
teaching profession (Hull et al., 2005). Section 22.0512 of the Education Code now provides
school professional employees immunity from any disciplinary proceedings for the “use of
physical force against a student if it is justified under Section 9.62, Penal Code” (Texas
Education Code, 2019, p. 185). Whether the expansion of immunity protections for Texas school
districts and their employees is too broad is still uncertain (Buckley, 2017).

16
The objective of this literature review is to examine sovereign immunity and the call for
more balance when providing immunity to educators (Buckley, 2017; Daniels & Martin, 2018;
Hendrick, 2016; Phelan, 2011). The literature review examines immunity protections, due
process rights of educators, and teacher tenure. Additionally, there is an overview of legal
liability, tort law, tort claims act, tort reform, immunity protections, sovereign immunity, Texas
teacher contractual rights, and appeals to the Texas Commissioner of Education. The literature
review concludes with an overview of findings from recent studies involving sovereign
immunity, adverse employment actions against educators, and student discipline disputes.
Tort Law
A tort involves a civil wrong where the victim files a lawsuit against another person to
recover damages for injuries (Thorn, 2015). Injured parties bring tort lawsuits seeking
compensation from wrongdoers, also known as tortfeasors, for damages. Tort laws compensate
the victim rather than punishing the wrongdoer. Tort law centers on injuries caused by
intentional, reckless, or careless actions of an individual (Thorn, 2015). Tort law cases occur in
civil courts, as opposed to criminal courts (Walsh et al., 2018).
A tort lawsuit is brought by one person against another and typically include monetary
damages (Walsh et al., 2018). A victim of a tort has several different options for damages against
a tortfeasor, including compensatory damages, punitive or exemplary damages, or nominal
damages (Thorn, 2015). Compensatory damages allow the victim to recover money damages for
the actual loss, which may include medical expenses, lost wages, court expenses, and physical or
mental injuries (Thorn, 2015). Punitive damages, also known as exemplary damages, are
damages awarded to a victim that proves the tortfeasor acted recklessly and disregarded the
safety of the victim (Raboin, 2016). The purpose of punitive damages is to prevent or discourage
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others from that wrongful behavior in the future (Raboin, 2016). Nominal damages are awarded
to victims when the damages are minimal. Courts award nominal damages when a victim has
suffered nominal harm (Vacca & Bosher, 2003).
Tort law is created by the courts when a judge hands down a decision in a lawsuit (Smith,
2016). While legislatures are responsible for creating statutes, judges have shaped the boundaries
of tort law when they make rulings on individual cases (Duncan & Turner, 2012). The collection
of the various cases decided by judges create precedent for other courts to follow. These judgemade laws are known as common law. Common law differs from laws created by legislatures,
which are known as statutes (Duncan & Turner, 2012).
The two purposes of tort law are corrective justice and deterrence (Buckley, 2017).
Corrective justice, according to Buckley (2017), “focuses on correcting the wrong a particular
tortfeasor committed against a particular victim” (p. 4). Corrective justice seeks to remedy the
wrong by returning both parties to their positions before the wrongful conduct (Buckley, 2017).
Buckley (2017) emphasized both parties are required to return both parties to the status quo
because one party committed the injustice, and the other party suffered from it. Buckley clarified
that corrective justice is meant to make the victim whole again by “exact[ing] a price roughly
equal to the suffering experienced by the plaintiff due to the injustice committed by the
defendant” (p. 10).
Tort law, as a deterrent, can prevent harm by forcing a tortfeasor to pay damages for the
injuries they caused (Essex, 2012). When a court requires a tortfeasor to pay a victim of a tort
monetary damages, these damages are a deterrent to others to avoid risky behaviors. Buckley
(2017) stressed that courts only hold tortfeasors liable for wrongful actions that are foreseeable.
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The purpose of torts is to deter wrongful behavior (Duncan & Turner, 2012). Thus, individuals
should prevent foreseeable wrongdoings.
Tort law should encourage potential tortfeasors from causing injury to another by
avoiding wrongful and negligent behavior that could cause harm to another (Buckley, 2017).
However, legislatures and judges have removed the deterrent impact of tort law for the
government and government employees with the implementation of sovereign immunity
(Hendrick, 2016). Hendrick (2016) noted legislatures continue to provide sovereign immunity
protections to protect governmental entities from large tort judgments in courts.
Negligence
Negligence is the most common type of tort (Buckley, 2017; Holben & Zirkel, 2011).
According to Eckes et al. (2012), negligence is the tort that most concerns educators. Negligence
is a “failure to do something that a reasonable person would do or something that a reasonable
person would not do” (Eckes et al., 2012, p. 506). Negligence cases also focus on whether a
reasonable person in that position would have anticipated the harm. Courts have held that school
employees are not required to anticipate everything that could happen in the school setting
(Eckes et al., 2012). In addition, courts recognize the inherent risk of accidents happening with
children playing at school, so not every accident can be prevented.
If a victim in the school setting intends to sue the school district or an educator for
negligence, the victim must prove the following four elements to prevail on their negligence
claim: (1) that the district or the educators owe a duty to the injured student, (2) that the district
or educator breached this duty by failing to exercise the appropriate standard of care, (3) that the
negligent conduct was the proximate cause of the injury, and (4) that actual damages, such as
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physical injuries, have occurred (Alexander & Alexander, 2019). Without proof of all four
elements, the victim will not prevail on the negligence claim (Vacca & Bosher, 2003).
The law is clear that educators owe a duty to properly supervise their students, provide
appropriate instruction, and adequately maintain the classroom (Thorn, 2015). The extent of a
duty that the educator owes to a student depends on the age and maturity of the student (Walsh et
al., 2018). Whether an educator owes a duty to a student will be determined on the facts and
circumstances of each case (Alexander & Alexander, 2019).
Courts have determined that educators owe students an ordinary standard of care when
supervising and disciplining students (Buckley, 2017). A breach of the duty of care happens
when an educator fails to act reasonably under specific circumstances (Hendrick, 2016). The
victim has to show that the tortfeasor’s conduct caused the harm. Causation means the victim
must show a causal link between the negligence and the harm. Finally, the victim must have
evidence of an actual injury to win a negligence lawsuit (Buckley, 2017).
Immunity Protections for the Government
Throughout the history of the United States, immunity defenses have shielded the
government and its employees from liability (Smith, 2016). Different categories of sovereign
immunity describe the protections afforded to federal, state, and local governments and their
employees (Hendrick, 2016; Phelan, 2011; Schaefer, 2013). Sovereign immunity is a blanket
term used when referring to immunity protections for state and federal governments (Hendrick,
2016; Schaefer, 2013).
Sovereign immunity is “a complete barrier to suit, designed to save the government
institution or [its] employees from the burdens of litigation” (Dougherty, 2004, p. 36). Sovereign
immunity provides legal liability protections to the government (Hendrick, 2016). It protects the

20
government from lawsuits and liability (Walsh et al., 2018). The protections from sovereign
immunity allow the government to function without the threat of liability that could lead to
enormous damages and fees (Buckley, 2017; Daniels & Martin, 2018). Sovereign immunity
limits the government's exposure to tort claims, which indirectly protects taxpayers from paying
damages in lawsuits against the government (Blank, 2015).
Forgey (2018) described sovereign immunity as a tangled web and a firm foundation.
Forgey regarded sovereign immunity as a web because “the intricacies associated with the
threads of sovereign immunity - federal, state, constitutional, common law, statutory, inherent,
derived, contract, and tort - work together to create a potentially sticky trap that will ensnare the
unaware and unwise” (p. 637). Sovereign immunity stands for the bedrock principle that people
must act in a way that upholds their interests (Forgey, 2018).
Courts, through judicial actions, have ruled that entities created by the state and federal
government also qualify for immunity protections (Blank, 2015). Governmental immunity is the
term used when applied to local governments, including cities, counties, and school districts
(Hendrick, 2016). Official immunity protects government employees from personal liability
(Blank, 2015).
Immunity protections vary from state to state based on state court decisions and state
legislation (Maher et al., 2010). The varying degrees of immunity in each state make it difficult
to ascertain when immunity may apply (Smith, 2016). All state legislatures have determined that
school districts, cities, counties, and other arms of the state, need some form of immunity for
some of their duties (Centner, 2007). States have adopted various constitutional provisions and
statutes that include degrees of liability for the government (Maher et al., 2010).
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Immunity protects the government at the federal, state, and local levels from lawsuits
unless the government consents to the lawsuit (Forgey, 2018; Phelan, 2011; Schaefer, 2013).
Stated another way, for the plaintiff to sue the government, the government must first grant the
plaintiff permission to file a lawsuit. Forgey (2018) questioned whether sovereignty is still
effective in modern society. The demand for fairness has led to tort claims acts that reverse
immunity protections and command the government to be responsible for injuries in some
instances (Centner, 2007). Legislatures and courts began to acknowledge absolute immunity for
the government is unfair to victims injured by the negligence of the government and its
employees (Forgey, 2018).
Blank (2015) affirmed numerous defenses and burdens arise when a plaintiff wants to sue
a governmental entity or its employees. Research indicates courts of appeal have muddied
immunity defenses for the government and its employees over the years. With blanket immunity
protections, there is no incentive for the government or government employees to act in a manner
that provides safe activities and services (Buckley, 2017). Yet, providing no immunity
protections exposes the government to too much liability (Centner, 2007).
Centner (2007) determined that placing damages on innocent persons led to the
abolishment of immunity in many circumstances. The awarding of damages can hold
wrongdoers accountable for their actions. Even the prospect of damages may be enough to force
wrongdoers to comply with the law. Congress and state legislatures have enacted legislation,
including tort claims acts, to make the government responsible for negligent activities (Centner,
2007). Legislation can waive portions of immunity protections, or it can limit situations where
entities are immune (Rich, 2017).

22
History of Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity began in Great Britain as part of English common
law (Forgey, 2018). Sovereign immunity originated from the belief that “the king can do no
wrong” (Phelan, 2011, p. 748). The principle of sovereign immunity began in an English court
decision, Russell v. Men of Devon (1788), over 200 years ago. Russell v. Men of Devon (1788)
involved a wagon owner who brought a lawsuit against Devon County employees responsible for
maintaining the roads. The wagon owner maintained the disrepair of the bridge caused the
wagon to break down (DeMitchell, 2006).
In Russell v. Men of Devon (1788), the court ruled in favor of Devon County since no law
supported the wagon owner. The court reasoned that a decision in favor of the wagon owner
would lead to other plaintiffs filing suits against the county, thereby placing a tremendous
financial burden on the county’s residents. Therefore, the court concluded it was better for an
individual to suffer an injury rather than inconveniencing the public (Vacca & Bosher, 2003).
English common law became the foundation of the American legal system during the
founding of the country (Entrikin, 2018). In 1787, Alexander Hamilton defended the essential
nature of state sovereign immunity in the Federalist Papers (Rich, 2017). Hamilton wrote in
Federalist No. 81 that “it is the inherent nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
individuals without its consent” (Forgey, 2018, p. 487). Hamilton maintained sovereign
immunity stands unless the state expressly waives it. He further wrote that sovereign immunity
was protection enjoyed by every state in the Union (Forgey, 2018).
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the legal principle of sovereign
immunity in Cohens v. Virginia (1821). Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in Cohens v. Virginia
that the government must consent to any lawsuits brought against them. Sovereign immunity was
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reaffirmed in 1869 when the Supreme Court again determined sovereign immunity “is a familiar
doctrine of the common law, that the sovereign cannot be sued in his courts without his consent”
(Jackson, 1988, p. 76).
Sovereign immunity protects governments by prohibiting plaintiffs from suing the
government in the courts established by the government (Walsh et al., 2018). In Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank (1907), the United States Supreme Court determined,
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. (p. 349)
Sovereign immunity also reduces the lawsuits in court, thereby saving the time and effort of
judges to hear these cases (Centner, 2006). Moreover, sovereign immunity allows elected
officials to make unfettered decisions without the fear of liability (Smith, 2016).
Sovereign immunity protections extend to government entities in the United States (Rich,
2017). It not only protects governmental agencies, but employees of governmental organizations
also enjoy immunity protections (Walsh et al., 2018). Governmental entities are immune from
tort and statutory cases except in instances when a statute waives sovereign immunity (Hendrick,
2016). However, the number of statutes waiving statutory immunity is limited (Walsh et al.,
2018).
Opposition to Sovereign Immunity
Even though the government needs some protection from lawsuits, overly broad
immunity protections are not always in the public's best interest (Simmons, 2013). Sovereign
immunity leaves some victims with serious harms caused by the government with no redress for
their damages (Buckley, 2017). Blank (2015) contended tradition is not enough to continue
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sovereign immunity. Conflict over providing immunity protections stems from the tensions
between fairness and economic soundness of the taxpayers' dollars (Buckley, 2017). The
decisions to expand or eliminate immunity protections have consequences for governmental
budgets and injured persons (Blank, 2015).
Chemerinsky (2001) vehemently opposed sovereign immunity because no one is above
the law, not even the government. He questioned whether it is “better to spread the costs of
injuries from illegal government actions among the entire citizenry than to make the wrong
individual bear the entire loss” (p. 1217). Chemerinsky (2001) pointed out that the founding of
the United States stems from the rejection of a monarchy rule; therefore, there is no justification
for sovereign immunity under American law. Chemerinsky maintained that without damage
awards, there is “no incentive for state compliance with the law” (p. 1215). Chemerinsky noted
that damages are often necessary to hold wrongdoers accountable for their actions.
Chemerinsky (2001) is not alone in his arguments against sovereign immunity. Buckley
(2017) stressed broad immunity protections take away meaningful access to the rights and
remedies the law provides. DeLuccio (2010) recognized the important policy reasons to protect
the government from litigation abuse. However, DeLuccio maintained there could not be a
complete prohibition on routes to the courthouse, or else there will be no way to keep the state
from abusing its immunity protections.
Texas Supreme Court Justice Hecht has openly discussed the policy-based arguments
against sovereign immunity (DeLuccio, 2010). Justice Hecht cites his concern with the
separation of powers since judges determine the State's exposure to liability, which could be
millions of dollars (DeLuccio, 2010). He contended the political decisions of sovereign
immunity should look beyond the potential for monetary liability against the state and consider
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the political issues surrounding sovereign immunity (Simmons, 2013). In Federal Signs v. Texas
Southern University (1997), Justice Hecht advocated for looking at what would serve the best
interests of the state and its citizens.
DeLuccio (2010) pointed out no one wants to be responsible for eliminating sovereign
immunity. Courts or legislatures do not want to determine the specific instances when immunity
should and should not apply (Raboin, 2016). The courts call on the legislature to decide, and the
legislature leaves it up to the courts (Federal Signs v. Texas Southern University, 1997).
Legislators have created administrative dispute resolution processes rather than eliminate
immunity (DeLuccio, 2010).
Buckley (2017) encouraged policymakers to consider the costs of immunity. He argued
retention of personal liability for employees is necessary to achieve corrective justice. Allowing
for some exposure for liability may deter negligent actions (Buckley, 2017). Justice Enoch, a
Texas Supreme Court Justice, also called for the abolishment of sovereign immunity (DeLuccio,
2010). Enoch claimed governmental funding concerns could be satisfied through legislative
appropriation (Catalina Development, Inc. v. County of El Paso, 2003).
As early as the 1920s, opponents of blanket sovereign immunity protections reasoned
injured persons bore all the risks of negligent actions of the state and its employees under the
doctrine (Buckley, 2017). Critics claimed immunity was an injustice, so state courts and
legislatures began to alter or reject the common law doctrine of sovereignty (Nelson, 2009).
Tort Claims Acts
Congress recognized the need for governmental accountability for torts committed by
federal officials and employees (Nelson, 2009). Subsequently, Congress passed the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) in 1946, which waived federal immunity for lawsuits involving negligent
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acts or omissions of governmental employees (Kim, 2014). Tort claims acts make the
government liable in a lawsuit for torts of its employees in the same way a private individual is
liable for negligence (Nelson, 2009). Under the FTCA, the federal government is liable for tort
claims similar to a private individual under similar circumstances. Federal employees are also
protected under state law, including a state's common law and statutory immunity provisions
(Simmons, 2013). Therefore, if a state provides immunity to government employees and
officials, state immunity may provide a defense for federal employees even with the passage of
the FTCA (Hendrick, 2016).
States also began passing tort claims acts as a way to narrow the circumstances when
lawsuits could be filed against the government (Masso, 2005). State tort claims acts waive
portions of immunity (Centner, 2007). With a movement away from absolute sovereign
immunity, states began passing statutes that limited state and local government liability for torts.
Without sovereign immunity protections and state intervention, governments and their
employees have exposure to liability for their negligent actions (Simmons, 2013).
Texas, like every other state, recognizes the government’s inherent protection under
sovereign immunity (Simmons, 2013). As early as 1847, the Texas Supreme Court provided
immunity protections to the state. In Hosner v. DeYoung (1847), the court stated, “no State can
be sued in her courts without her consent, and then only in the manner indicated by that consent”
(p. 2). However, Texas followed the numerous states and began to narrow the immunity
protections for the government with the passage of the Texas Tort Claims Act (Flynt, 2005)
The Texas legislature began narrowing situations when a government or its employees
were immune from liability (Flynt, 2005). The Texas legislature first introduced the tort claims
act bill in 1949 (Forgey, 2018). The bill, known as the State Tort Claims Act, waived immunity
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and restored liability for the State of Texas, its agencies, and its employees for torts committed
by the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions. However, many years passed before the Texas
legislature enacted the tort claims act (Forgey, 2018).
During the legislative session in 1967, the House of Representatives passed a bill to
waive immunity for the government, but the companion Senate bill died on the Senate floor with
a tie vote (Shaunessy & Ranis, 2017). Finally, in 1969, the Texas Legislature passed the Texas
Tort Claims Act (Daniels & Martin, 2018). Simmons (2013) noted the Texas Tort Claims Act
(TTCA) provided a limited waiver of sovereign immunity in Texas.
The TTCA provided a blueprint for any civil lawsuit involving a governmental entity and
a government employee (Batista & Shaunessy, 2003). The passage of TTCA became statutory
protection for the government unless the victim could demonstrate one of the three exceptions
applied (Shaunessy & Ranis, 2017). The TTCA waived immunity in three circumstances: (1)
injury caused by an employee's use of a motor-driven vehicle; (2) injury caused by a condition
or use of tangible personal or real property; and (3) claims arising from premises defects (Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, 2019).
The TTCA did not abolish governmental immunity completely (Skinner, 2010). For
every immunity waiver granted by the Act, there was a much broader and encompassing
restriction placed on top of it (Batista & Shaunessy, 2003). After the passage of the TTCA,
governmental entities still enjoyed immunity in certain instances. The TTCA and court rulings
shape the interpretation of immunity protections provided to Texas governmental entities,
including school districts (Hull et al., 2005). There are few circumstances where an employee,
and consequently the state, is held liable. The recent tort reform movement has led to even
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greater protections for government entities and government employees over the past few decades
(Nockleby, 2007).
With the passage of the TTCA, Texas courts will analyze whether an entity is immune
from suit by looking at whether the entity enjoys common law immunity from suit (Forgey,
2018). If the entity does not have common law immunity from suit, the court will consider
whether the legislature has provided immunity from suit under a statute. There are three ways for
a government to waive its immunity: (1) waiver by statute, (2) waiver by contract, and (3) waiver
by conduct (Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, 2019).
Tort Reform Movement
Tort reform is a controversial political issue (Roederer, 2008). In the past few decades,
the tort reform movement has gained momentum in the legal and political realm (Nockleby,
2007). Advocates for tort reform argue that litigation is skyrocketing, and damages from lawsuits
are out of control (Daniels & Martin, 2016). The need for tort reform trickles down throughout
society, which leads to extensive protections for many groups, including educators (Nockleby,
2007).
Tort reform refers to proposed changes in the civil justice system that decrease the ability
of victims to sue under tort law and limits the damages a victim receives (Roederer, 2008). Tort
reform intends to reduce the number of tort lawsuits filed against defendants (Holben & Zirkel,
2017). Anderson (2007) noted tort reform includes limitations on liability, shorter statute of
limitations, heightened proof standards, and restrictions on damages. Many states across the
country have adopted tort reform legislation as a way to place limits on the ability to file claims
and capping the award of damages (Roederer, 2008).
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In his law review article, Logan (2015) discussed the impact that the judicial and
legislative branches have on tort reform. Particularly, he advocated for judges and juries to
determine case-by-case justice. Logan maintained judges and juries are the best way to guarantee
justice for tort claims. Judges are more attuned to the needs of the individual state than Congress
or the Unites States Supreme Court. Tort reform began after juries granted victims in civil
lawsuits enormous, unjustifiable awards. Logan (2015) argued big business industries, such as
insurance, manufacturing, pharmaceutical, and medical, continued to vilify the civil jury system
under tort reform. Pro-tort reform advocates claim jurors are overly influenced by their emotions
and biases, which leads to “a world of jackpot justice” (Logan, 2015, p. 904). Under a campaign
of stifled innovation and defensive medical practices, to name a few, along with millions of
dollars paid to the legislator’s campaigns, the tort reform movement successfully reshaped the
civil justice system in the United States (Logan, 2015).
Logan (2015) asserted the challenge with tort reform is “figuring out how to weed out the
unjustifiable awards while providing full compensation to the seriously injured and deterring
unreasonably dangerous future conduct” (p. 906). One such tort lawsuit involved a multi-million
dollar jury award against McDonald’s after a customer spilled hot coffee on himself. The media
only reported the jury’s exorbitant award instead of the judge’s final decision that dramatically
reduced the jury award against McDonald’s (Logan, 2015). These inaccurate portrayals of
unreasonable juries convince citizens and lawmakers to support tort reform.
Legislative and Judicial Tort Reform
There are two types of tort reform: legislative and judicial (Logan, 2015). Judges and
legislators both make the law, but they do not make it in the same way (Entrikin, 2018). The
legislature creates statutory laws. Judges make laws through their decisions in courts, which is
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called common law (Entrikin, 2018). The courts are supposed to interpret and enforce the rule of
law enacted by the legislature. Courts declare what the law is through interpretation (Entrikin,
2018).
Chisolm v. Georgia (1793) was the case that led to sovereign immunity for states
(Forgey, 2018). Before the ratification of the Constitution, the thirteen independent colonies had
sovereign immunity (Centner, 2007). Once the federal courts implemented English laws, state
courts also began incorporating sovereign immunity principles in their decisions (Rich, 2017).
Just as in federal courts, state courts continue to hold that a plaintiff must obtain consent from the
government before filing a lawsuit in a state-created court (Phelan, 2011).
Legislative tort reform is a transparent process since governors, legislators, lobbyists,
study commissions, and others write the legislation (Entrikin, 2018). Legislative committee
hearings vet proposed legislation by allowing anybody to testify for or against an issue. Staff
working for legislators study potential legislation and attempt to explain the implications of such
passage. Anderson (2007) argued elected officials have the opportunity to ask questions, voice
objections, and offer any proposed changes. If the Senate and House of Representatives do not
agree on certain legislation, more compromise must occur. Finally, the president or the governor
has the right to veto legislation (Anderson, 2007).
Judicial tort reform is much less transparent and accessible (Raboin, 2016). Courts carry
out the mandates of the legislature (Roederer, 2008). Thus, it is imperative courts pay attention to
the legislature's intent of passing statutes (Raboin, 2016). Advanced warning about changes to
the law based on a court decision is not as apparent as proposed legislation. Anderson (2007)
warns that courts can dismiss a case without an opinion, which leaves no reasoning behind a
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decision and little room to correct problems in the law. Even though certain interest groups keep
track of outcomes, little to no public input is included in court outcomes (Anderson, 2007).
Common law is formed from published case law, which sets out the legal rights, duties,
powers, prohibitions, and remedies. Common law is subordinate to statutory laws (Kim, 2014).
Although courts look to the legislature to define when to waive immunity, sovereign immunity
is a product of common law (Forgey, 2018).
Judges develop precedent when making decisions in a lawsuit (Kim, 2014). Common law
is based on judicial decisions and is also known as judge-made law (Aktar, 2018). Stevens
(2018) stated that precedent develops large areas of common law. Precedents are “past cases that
provide judges with binding, authoritative reasons to decide their present case according to the
precedent-decision by following that decision” (Stevens, 2018, p. 216).
Logan (2015) explained that the judiciary is in the best position to shape the civil justice
system since judges oversee juries. Judges incrementally create the common law on a case-bycase basis by reflecting on the current needs of society. Entrikin (2018) argued common law is
stable and predictable because of the time-tested advantages with a case-by-case analysis. The
disadvantage of common law is that it moves at an extremely slow pace (Entrikin, 2018).
Common law is very fact-specific and solves specific controversies in each lawsuit (Stevens,
2018).
Nelson (2009) analyzed federal court decisions to determine the percentage of tort
lawsuits against the government dismissed at the beginning stages of a lawsuit. Nelson’s findings
indicated the “judiciary is largely responsible for the government’s 74.1% success rate” when
dismissing a lawsuit against the government for a tort during a pretrial motion to a federal court
(p. 297). These findings indicate federal judges rule in favor of the government without the
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plaintiff even arguing the facts of the case. The reliance on the judiciary in the application of the
FTCA led to Nelson (2009) calling to amend the statutes to provide an outline of Congressional
intent.
Phelan (2011) argued the founders of the United States did not design our democracy on
the idea that judge-made law would govern Americans. Instead, as described by James Madison,
the Constitution intentionally distributed power equally as a way to have checks and balances.
Entrikin (2018) claimed elected officials should enact the laws that govern our nation. The
separation of powers allows the legislature to formulate policies, and the courts will interpret the
policies and statutes written by the legislature (Black, 2016). Yet, common law appears to
remain supreme in the American legal system (Entrikin, 2018).
The question becomes whether judges will accurately rely on legislation in decisionmaking when creating common law (Logan, 2015). Logan advocated for law making through
adjudication given judges are “better-informed, characterized by stronger limits on access to
decision makers, and less influenced by moneyed entreaties” (p. 906). Logan further favored
changes to tort laws made at the state level since judges have more awareness of the needs of that
state, more so than Congress or the United States Supreme Court.
When a court is determining if immunity exists, a presumption in favor of immunity
exists (City of Galveston v. State, 2007). The Texas Supreme Court has called for the legislature
to set out clear and unambiguous language if there will be a waiver of immunity protections for
the government (Forgey, 2018). In Tooke v. City of Mexia (2006), the court argued “to ensure
that legislative control is not lightly disturbed, a waiver of immunity must be clear and
unambiguous” (pp. 32-33). Courts will only waive immunity when the legislature expressly
waives it under statutes.

33
Courts have made it clear they are not willing to eliminate sovereign immunity since this
is a decision best left to the legislature (Forgey, 2018). The Texas Supreme Court has claimed
the legislature is more suitable to address the policy conflicts over immunity protections (Reata
Construction Company v. City of Dallas, 2006). Judges have emphasized they can only interpret
laws passed by the legislative branch (Forgey, 2018). To that end, judges maintain they can only
apply immunity if the legislature expressly writes it in a statute (Forgey, 2018). Thus, the
legislature needs to provide direction for courts on the application of sovereign immunity (Kim,
2014).
Politics in Tort Reform
Carlson (2005) argued tort reform is a broad political campaign that leads to changing the
laws on the books. Tort reform reallocates power between the legislature, courts, and the jury.
Carlson (2005) maintained that only time would tell if House Bill 4 achieved a proper balance
between the legislature, the courts, and the jury.
It has been 17 years since the enactment of House Bill 4. Tort reform stems from the
political process (Roederer, 2008). Candidates running for the legislature pride themselves on
being for tort reform or against it (Daniels & Martin, 2016). Political action committees,
insurance companies, lobbyists, and tort reform associations fund political campaigns (Anderson,
2007).
The American Tort Reform Association's (ATRA) goal is not only to change the laws but
also to change the way people view personal responsibility and civil litigation (Daniels &
Martin, 2016). Daniels and Martin (2016) claimed ATRAs success comes from the perception
and persuasion used to politicize tort reform by villainizing the legal system and lawsuits. These
advocates of tort reform use the scare tactic that we all pay if juries award massive judgments
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(Daniels & Martin, 2016). The tort reform movement uses the fear of raised insurance costs and
the impact on livelihoods as the driving force to implement tort reform (Daniels & Martin, 2016;
Roederer, 2008).
Texas Tort Reform Movement
Texas' first wave of the tort reform movement, which was in the 1970s, led to the
legislature implementing damage caps on medical malpractice cases (Daniels & Martin, 2016).
However, in 1988, the Texas Supreme Court struck down these caps as unconstitutional.
Specifically, the Texas Constitution states “all courts shall be open, and every person for an
injury done to him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course
of law” (Article I, Section 13, of the Texas Constitution).
Logan (2015) argued damage caps violate one of the most fundamental tenets of the civil
justice system, where proof of the defendant’s liability leads to full compensation for the
victim’s injuries caused by the defendant. There is no way to make a plaintiff whole again when
legislatures adopt tort reform statutes implementing damage caps in lawsuits (Logan, 2015). In
the mid-1980s, tort reform gained momentum as pro-tort reform public relations campaigns
increased during this time (Daniels & Martin, 2016).
Tort reform in Texas began almost 40 years ago when the governor appointed a
commission, headed by former University of Texas law professor W. Page Keeton, to study the
crisis in medical malpractice insurance (Anderson, 2007). Almost every legislative session since
has included legislation restricting tort liability. Every session since 1987, the legislature has
built upon the tort reform by consistently demonstrating its desire to provide more liability
protection for businesses, individuals, and other entities (Carlson, 2005; Chriss, 2005). In the
mid-1990s, Texas and 18 other states passed tort reform legislation affecting medical malpractice

35
lawsuits and different rules of civil procedure, making it more difficult on claims by plaintiffs
(Daniels & Martin, 2016). In 1995, George W. Bush ran for governor and won based on tort
reform as one of his four priority issues in his administration (Anderson, 2007).
House Bill 4
In 2003, Texas passed the most sweeping tort reform legislation to date (Flynt, 2005).
During the 78th Legislative Session, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 4, thereby enacting
broad tort reform legislation, which has been referred to as the Texas Tort Reform Act (Hull et
al., 2005). House Bill 4 provided extensive changes to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code. This legislation was one of the most sweeping statutes the Texas legislature ever adopted
since the Reconstruction era (Carlson, 2005).
House Bill 4 significantly limited litigation and damages in lawsuits against defendants
(Hull et al., 2005). Representative Joe Nixon, the author of House Bill 4, revealed the purpose of
House Bill 4 was “to establish an equitable and efficient system of justice in Texas that provides
meaningful remedies for those who have been wronged while protecting the rights of those who
have done no wrong” (Carlson, 2005, p. 2). Governor Perry signed the 2003 legislation as a
deterrent to plaintiffs' lawyers by placing damage caps on lawsuits and making plaintiff cases
less appealing (Daniels & Martin, 2016).
Carlson (2005) claimed tort reform reallocates power to the legislature and redefines the
role of the court and the jury. Carlson aptly termed tort reform in Texas in 2003 as litigation
reform based on the many changes to civil litigation in general. Carlson argued this legislation
was one of the most sweeping statutes the Texas legislature ever adopted since the
Reconstruction era.
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House Bill 4 reduced the discretion of judges and juries. House Bill 4 primarily consists
of several liability-limiting or liability-eliminating provisions for many groups, including school
employees (Carlson, 2005). House Bill 4 provided broad changes to the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. House Bill 4 also provided more presuit obstacles to filing lawsuits and
increased the risks to plaintiffs when filing a lawsuit (Chriss, 2005).
Several statutes enacted under House Bill 4 provide immunity protections for
governmental workers, including Texas educators (Chriss, 2005; Flynt, 2005). During the 76th
Texas Legislative session in 2003, the legislature responded to the call to protect educators by
passing comprehensive tort reform (Chriss, 2005; Hull et al., 2005).
With the passage of House Bill 4, educators in Texas now have even broader immunity
protections (Hull et al., 2005). With the passage of House Bill 4 in 2003, Texas educators now
have immunity from adverse employment decisions or disciplinary proceedings when the
educator uses force against a student (Texas Education Code, 2019). Educators can use the
immunity defense in appeals of adverse employment decisions to the Texas Commissioner of
Education (Smith, 2017). Zirkel and Clark (2008) found statutory immunity to be the defense
educators used to prevail in lawsuits against them.
An addition to the Texas Education Code under House Bill 4 broadened the definition of
a professional school employee of a school district (Chriss, 2005). Superintendents, school board
members, substitute teachers, students in an educator preparation program, bus drivers, and
individuals who contract with schools to deliver services were all added under the definition.
Chriss (2005) maintained that every person in a school district, except for custodians, was given
immunity with the new legislation.
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Additionally, the legislature made it clear the new protections in the Education Code
were a supplement to federal protections created by the Coverdell Teacher Protection Act of
2001 by Congress (Flynt, 2005; Texas Education Code, 2019). The legislature explicitly stated
the new provisions in the Education Code broaden protections for educators by the federal
government under the Coverdell Teacher Protection Act (Chriss, 2005). Presuit notice
requirements were part of the Education Code, so ninety days advance notice must be given
before filing a suit against an educator or a school district. Plaintiffs are also required to exhaust
their administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit (Chriss, 2005).
The legislature added a provision that allows an educator to bring a counter lawsuit
against a plaintiff to recover the attorney's fees of the defendant (Chriss, 2005; Hull et al., 2005).
Unlike other areas of the law where a defendant must prove a lawsuit is filed in bad faith or for
harassment purposes, educators only have to show they are entitled to immunity from liability to
recover their attorney's fees (Chriss, 2005). Stated another way, if an educator could show that
they were entitled to immunity from liability, the plaintiff would have to pay the attorney's fees
of the defendant (Alexander & Alexander, 2019). These provisions, known as the loser pays
rules, only favor educators since plaintiffs that win would not recover their attorney's fees from
the defendant educator (Chriss, 2005). The loser pays provision would cause any plaintiff and
plaintiff's attorneys to pause before filing suit (Hull et al., 2005).
Immunity in Education
Schools are surrounded by situations that could give rise to tort liability (Eckes et al.,
2012). However, school districts also enjoy sovereign immunity protections (Essex, 2012). At
the national level, the United States Congress enacted the Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection
Act in 2001. Part of No Child Left Behind (NCLB), Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection Act,
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created statutory immunity protections for school districts and their employees (Forgey, 2018).
The legislative intent of Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection Act was to, “provide teachers,
principals, and other school professionals the tools they need to undertake reasonable actions to
maintain order, discipline, and an appropriate educational environment” (National School Boards
Association [NSBA], 2004, para. 2).
Beyond the national level of protection, states also shield school districts from liability
using statutory immunity (Zirkel, 2015). States vary in the protections provided to school
districts (Maher et al., 2010). Maher et al. (2010) affirmed that state legislatures pass laws to
provide additional immunity protections for educators. Educator lobby groups and publicized
incidents encourage legislators to develop statutes as a way to protect educators from liability
(Zirkel & Cox, 2015).
Maher et al. (2010) emphasized the diverse exceptions to immunity and liability for
public school districts and their employees among states. According to Maher et al. (2010), state
legislatures often amend provisions of the statutes relating to immunity based on “specific
widely publicized incidents or, with lobbying from special interests, to counteract state court
decisions that have established or abrogated common law immunity based on the facts of that
particular case” (p. 245). Their findings indicated the rapidly changing court decisions relating to
immunity lead to a patchwork of laws from the state legislatures.
Zirkel and Clark (2008) studied trends in litigation brought by students against school
districts and their employees. Their findings indicated immunity was a robust defense in school
litigation cases studied over 16 years. Immunity proved to be the basis for public educators
prevailing in litigation against them (Zirkel & Clark, 2008).
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Despite research demonstrating that school districts and educators win most lawsuits or
other claims against them, there is a perception that teachers are always at risk of liability
(Maher et al., 2010). School district's attorneys and education law professors tend to exaggerate
the likelihood of a negligence lawsuit (Holben & Zirkel, 2011). However, Zirkel and Clark
(2008) found courts historically have favored school district defendants over student plaintiffs.
The authors concluded immunity often leads to a district-favorable outcome in most decisions.
Further, not one of the classroom teachers in Zirkel and Clark’s (2008) study were personally
liable.
Texas Statutory Immunity
In 2003, the Texas Legislature amended the Education Code to provide statutory
immunity protections for educators (Tex. Educ. Code §22.051). Statutory immunity under the
Texas Education Code shields professional school employees from tort liability (Hull et al.,
2005). Carman (2009) analyzed Texas appellate court decisions made prior to House Bill 4 to
understand how the courts have interpreted immunity protections provided to educators under the
Texas Education Code. None of the cases from Carman’s study included the statutory immunity
provisions created under House Bill 4. However, Carman’s findings indicated that out of the 32
cases involving immunity under the Texas Education Code, 24 of the educators were immune in
these cases.
Tort reform organizations, such as Common Good, and other groups such as teacher
organization groups, the media, and insurance carriers, benefit from the perceptions and fears
that educators are always on the brink of a lawsuit (Holben et al., 2009; Holben & Zirkel, 2017).
Evidence presented to state legislatures indicated that “fear of litigation is one of the top three
concerns among teachers nationwide” (Hull et al., 2005, p. 142). Because of educators’
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perceptions and fears of liability and litigation, the Texas Legislature amended the Education
Code to extend and broaden existing immunity for professional school employees as part of
House Bill 4 in 2003 (Hull et al., 2005).
House Bill 4 (2003) created additional statutory protections for school professionals
while also preserving the broad immunity protections already provided to educators at that time
(Carlson, 2005). The Texas Education Code §22.0511 codified protections for educators.
School districts have protection from tort liability unless a motor vehicle is involved (Walsh et
al., 2018). House Bill 4 limited damages a plaintiff can recover from a governmental entity to a
“maximum amount of $100,000 for each person and $300,000 for every single occurrence for
injury to or destruction of property” (Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, 2019; Walsh et
al., 2018).
House Bill 4 also expanded the definition of “professional school employees.” Under the
Texas Education Code §22.051, a professional school employee includes:
Superintendents, principals, teachers, substitute teachers, supervisors, social workers,
counselors, nurses, teacher’s aides, student teachers, bus drivers, school board members,
teachers employed by a third-party that contracts with the school district, and anyone else
whose employment requires certification and an exercise of discretion. (Chapter 22.
Subchapter B. Section 22.051)
By expanding the definition of a professional employee, the Texas legislature demonstrated to
educators the importance of protecting them (Hull et al., 2005).
House Bill 4, also known as the Texas Tort Reform Act, also created statutory immunity
provisions expanding and broadening immunity protections for educators (Flynt, 2005; Hull et
al., 2005). Texas Education Code §22.0511 provides Immunity from Liability as follows:
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(a) A professional employee of a school district is not personally liable for any act that is
incident to or within the scope of the duties of the employee's position of employment
and that involves the exercise of judgment or discretion on the part of the employee,
except in circumstances in which a professional employee uses excessive force in the
discipline of students or negligence resulting in bodily injury to students.
(b) This section does not apply to the operation, use, or maintenance of any motor vehicle.
(c) In addition to the immunity provided under this section and under other provisions of
state law, an individual is entitled to any immunity and any other protections afforded
under the Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection Act of 2001 (20 U.S.C. Section 6731 et
seq.), as amended. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit or abridge any
immunity or protection afforded an individual under state law. For purposes of this
subsection, "individual" includes a person who provides services to private schools, to the
extent provided by federal law.
(d) A school district may not by policy, contract, or administrative directive:
(1) require a district employee to waive immunity from liability for an act for which the
employee is immune from liability under this section; or
(2) require a district employee who acts in good faith to pay for or replace property
belonging to a student or other person that is or was in the possession of the employee
because of an act that is incident to or within the scope of the duties of the employee's
position of employment. (Chapter 22. Subchapter B. Section 22.0511)
Texas Education Code §22.0512 provides professional employees immunity from
disciplinary proceedings:
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(a) A professional employee of a school district may not be subject to disciplinary
proceedings for the employee's use of physical force against a student to the extent
justified under Section 9.62, Penal Code.
(b) In this section, "disciplinary proceeding" means:
(1) an action brought by the school district employing a professional employee of a
school district to discharge or suspend the employee or terminate or not renew the
employee's term contract; or
(2) an action brought by the State Board for Educator Certification to enforce the
educator's code of ethics adopted under Section 21.041(b)(8).
(c) This section does not prohibit a school district from:
(1) enforcing a policy relating to corporal punishment; or
(2) not withstanding Subsection (a), bringing a disciplinary proceeding against a
professional employee of the district who violates the district policy relating to
corporal punishment. (Chapter 22. Subchapter B. Section 22.0512)
The Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 provide educators numerous
immunity defenses (Walsh et al., 2018). Texas educators can use an immunity defense for claims
brought against them by a parent, student, or other stakeholders. Educators can use the statutory
immunity provisions as a defense when a school district wants to nonrenew the employee’s
contract (Walsh et al., 2018).
Student Discipline
The new statutory provisions under House Bill 4 also curtailed some lawsuits against
educators arising out of student disciplinary issues (Flynt, 2005). A study by Harris (2012)
explored federal and state court cases across the United States involving student misconduct and
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discipline issues. The findings indicated litigation involving misconduct and discipline has had a
steady increase since 1999. Harris emphasized educators regularly deal with student misconduct
and discipline problems that affect student learning as educators stop instruction to discipline
students.
Texas educators have liability exposure at school because the use of discipline is
necessary in the classroom environment (Harris, 2012). Texas law allows educators to use
reasonable force to discipline a student (Hogenson v. Williams, 1976). As discussed in Hogenson
v. Williams, educators may use force as long as it is reasonable and necessary to efficiently and
effectively run their classrooms. The Hogenson test is one standard used to determine whether
the educator reasonably believes the force used against a student was necessary (Hogenson v.
Williams, 1976).
As part of the sweeping tort reform in 2003, the Texas Legislature provided additional
immunity protections for educators when disciplining students (Hull et al., 2005). The adoption
of the Texas Education Code §22.0152 provides immunity protection to a teacher who uses
reasonable force against a student (Texas Education Code, 2019). It is important to point out that
Texas educators are not immune from liability if they use excessive force in discipline (Hull et
al., 2005).
With the passage of House Bill 4, a professional school employee is not liable for acts
which “involve the exercise of judgment or discretion, except in circumstances where, in
disciplining a student, the employee uses excessive force or his negligence results in bodily
injury of the student” (Texas Education Code, 2019). A question arises whether discipline is
excessive, thereby exposing the educator to liability, or reasonable, thereby providing the
educator immunity from liability.
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Statutory Protections
Texas Education Code section §22.0512 provides a professional employee immunity
from “discipline, termination, or nonrenewal for the employee's use of physical force against a
student to the extent justified under Texas Penal Code section 9.62” (Texas Penal Code, 2019, p.
1617). Section 22.0512 protects an educator who uses reasonable force from discipline by the
school district and from the State Board of Educator Certification (Flynt, 2005). The Texas Penal
Code §9.62 requires that the actor reasonably believe the force was necessary to maintain discipline
(Texas Penal Code, 2019).

The Texas Penal Code and the Texas Education Code make it clear that a teacher is
immune from disciplinary proceedings if the force used was justified by Section 9.62 (Texas
Education Code, 2019; Texas Penal Code, 2019). Applying the Texas Education Code §22.0512
and the Texas Penal Code §9.62, the Texas Supreme Court determined a school district’s
professional employee can use appropriate physical force against a student in limited
circumstances (Williams v. Spring ISD, 2017). The use of nondeadly physical force is justified
when used for a special purpose, as dictated by the Penal Code. A special purpose is the need to
control, train, and educate children (Williams v. Spring ISD, 2017).
Under Texas Penal Code §9.62, a district cannot prohibit an educator from using
reasonable force against a student unless there is a violation of a corporal punishment policy
(Texas Penal Code, 2019). The Texas Penal Code §9.62 makes a clear distinction as to when the
use of force is appropriate to use. For example, courts have determined the use of nondeadly
physical force could be appropriate to enforce compliance or to punish a child (Walsh et al.,
2018). A teacher’s reasonable force is governed by the Texas Education Code §22.0512 and the
Texas Penal Code 9.62 (Harper v. Alvarado ISD, 2010). “An understanding of Texas Penal Code
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§9.62 is essential to understanding Texas Education Code §22.0512” (Harper, p. 2). The Texas
Penal Code §9.62 exempts certain conduct that would otherwise be criminal, such as assault.
Assault can simply be reckless action. “A teacher who snatches a comic book from a student
could theoretically be charged with assault but for Texas Penal Code §9.62” (Harper, p. 2). The
Texas Penal Code §9.62 allows educators to use reasonable force in two circumstances (a) to
enforce compliance with a proper command issued for the purpose of controlling, training, or
educating the child, or (b) to punish the child for prohibited conduct.
Board Policy Cannot Limit Statutory Immunity
Before a district can discipline an educator for the use of force against a student, the
district must determine whether the educator used corporal punishment or whether the educator
attempted to control the student to further an educational purpose and to enforce a proper
command to control, train, or educate the student as allowed by the Texas Penal Code §9.62. A
district can discipline an educator who uses corporal punishment if it violates a district’s policy
relating to disciplining a student. However, a district cannot discipline an educator if the use of
force was used to control, train, or educate the student.
As discussed in Lewis v. Houston ISD (2012), Papa v. Presidio ISD (2006), and Peters v.
Dallas ISD (2012), a district may not enact a policy or give employees directives that limit a
professional employee, who is entrusted with the care, supervision, or administration of a child,
from using nondeadly physical force that the employee reasonably believes is necessary to
further the special purpose of education. However, the district can establish a corporal
punishment policy.
If the force used is reasonable, immunity trumps the directive or policy. A district cannot
adopt a policy or give directives that further limit a professional employee's use of force beyond
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what is permitted under Texas Education Code §22.0512. A district cannot end an educator’s
contract for failing to follow a policy or a directive without first undergoing an analysis of an
educator’s statutory immunity protections under the Texas Education Code
§22.0512.
A district cannot take disciplinary action against an educator who uses reasonable force
when disciplining a student (Walsh et al., 2018). The school district has the burden to prove that
the teacher's use of force is unreasonable (Williams v. Spring ISD, 2017). As long as the use of
force is reasonable, the educator will enjoy immunity protections under the Texas Education
Code (Walsh et al., 2018). The Texas Penal Code defines reasonableness as “a belief that would
be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor” (Texas Penal
Code, 2019, p. 1617).
When a teacher uses force, a school district must view the force from the teacher's
perspective (Alexander & Alexander, 2019). Hogenson v. Williams (1976) cited the following
factors to determine whether the use of force is reasonable, according to the American Law
Institute (1965):
(a) the age, sex, and condition of the child,
(b) the nature of his offense or conduct and his motives,
(c) the influence of his example upon other students,
(d) whether the force was reasonably necessary to compel obedience to a proper command,
and
(e) whether the force was disproportionate to the offense, is unnecessarily degrading, or is
likely to cause serious injury. (p. 459)
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A teacher may use reasonable force that the teacher reasonably believes necessary (1) to
enforce compliance with a proper command issued for the purpose of controlling, training or
educating the child, or (2) to punish the child for prohibited conduct (Williams v. Spring ISD,
2017). A teacher can also use reasonable force to restrain a student. However, force or physical
contact must be reasonable and proportionate to the activity or the offense (Alexander &
Alexander, 2019).
A school district can use the reasonableness standard to determine whether the educator
reasonably believed the actions were necessary, not whether the use of force is objectively
necessary (Papa v. Presidio ISD, 2006). Under the reasonableness standard, a teacher has
immunity if the teacher reasonably believed the force was necessary to further a special purpose,
such as controlling the student, enforcing compliance with a proper command, or punishing the
child for prohibited conduct. The reasonableness standard provides a high level of protection for
a teacher because the acts of the employee must be viewed from the employee’s perspective
(Harper v. Alvarado ISD, 2010).
In Loco Parentis
Educators have a responsibility and duty to protect students from harm (Walsh et al.,
2018). Because educators stand in the place of parents while students are at school, Texas has
long provided teachers may use force in a similar manner as parents may use force against their
children. Under the doctrine of in loco parentis, teachers have the same rights as parents to
impose reasonable rules for children under their care and to enforce obedience to the rules using
moderate restraint (Williams v. Spring ISD, 2017). In loco parentis describes the ability of a
person to have authority to act in the place of a child’s parent (Rumel, 2015). While a parent is
concerned with the general welfare of a child, a teacher’s concerns are limited to the special
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purposes of controlling, training, and educating children (Villareal v. Edinburg Consolidated
Independent School District, 2016).
Students spend more time with educators than with their parents (Osborne & Russo,
2011). As noted by Osborne and Russo (2011), compulsory attendance laws require parents to
entrust their children to teachers for an extended time. Teachers have to discipline students
regularly at school (Holben & Zirkel, 2011). As teachers stand in place of parents under in loco
parentis, they have protection from allegations that they have improperly used force against
children in a very similar manner as parents have protection from similar allegations (Walsh et
al., 2018). In fact, the language in Texas Penal Code concerning the educator-student
relationship is virtually identical to the wording concerning the parent-child relationship (Texas
Penal Code, 2019).
However, Rumel (2013) emphasized that while at school, students have the right to be
free from harm caused in the school setting or by school personnel. Newton (2019) noted the
“rights of educators are not eliminated in favor of student safety and the comfort level of
parents” (p. 31). Osborne and Russo (2011) expressed concern that immunity protections of the
teacher often leave parents without a remedy if a teacher misuses their position of power and
trust over a child. Because of the substantial educator immunity protections and in loco parentis
protections, teachers must adhere to moral and ethical codes when students are under their care
(Harris, 2012).
Texas Educators’ Ethics
The Texas Educators’ Code of Ethics (ECE), enacted in 1971, sets out standard practices
and ethical conduct required for educators to safeguard academic freedom (Umpstead et al.,
2013). Revisions to the ECE in 2010 required educators “to maintain appropriate professional
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educator-student relationships and boundaries” (p. 212). The 2010 revisions protect the safety
and welfare of students and school personnel, ensure educators are a moral fit and worthy to
instruct Texas’ youth, and fairly and efficiently resolve educator disciplinary proceedings in the
least expensive manner possible (Umpstead et al., 2013).
The State Board of Education (SBEC) in Texas enforces the ECE and oversees
certifications and professional discipline of educators (Umpstead et al., 2013). SBEC, as well as
local school districts, enforce the ECE. SBEC can sanction educators, which can include
restriction, reprimand, suspension, surrender, or revocation of an educator’s certification (Texas
Administrative Code, 2019). The seriousness of the violation, whether the violation was
premeditated or intentional, any attempt by the educator to conceal the violation, prior
misconduct, and determining whether a sanction could deter future violations are all
considerations relating to the sanctioning of educators (Umpstead et al., 2013).
SBEC has broad authority to impose additional conditions or restrictions on educators to
protect students, parents, or school officials. In a study by Umpstead et al. (2013) examining
teacher discipline relating to ethical violations, their findings indicated Texas relies “extensively
on state statutes and regulations and less on case law to identify types of inappropriate and
unhealthy teacher behavior” (p. 224). SBEC holds a lot of power over educators with its ability
to sanction or even revoke a teacher’s certification (Umpstead et al., 2013). Certifications are
required for Texas teachers to earn tenure and all the protections tenure entails (Walsh et al.,
2018).
Educator Tenure
Tenure laws provide educators protections and securities (Hoglund-Shen, 2017).
Advocates claim tenure laws help recruit and attract educators to the teaching profession, as well
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as motivate effective teachers to work in troubled schools (Robertson, 2015). Robertson (2015)
claimed tenure provides “academic freedom for teachers to make decisions delegated to them by
administrators, without fear of retaliation or being dismissed” (p. 465). Critics of teacher tenure
argue ineffective and incompetent teachers continue instructing in classrooms because of tenure
laws (Strom & Baxter, 2001). Strom and Baxter (2001) acknowledged that “tenure does not
mean that a teacher cannot lose their job; rather, tenure provides due process when teachers are
threatened with dismissal” (p. 297).
DeMitchell and Onosko (2016) cited the following reasons opponents argue for the
abolishment of teacher tenure: (a) the time and money required to remove tenured teachers
represent a waste of resources; (b) teachers become lax and complacent due to job protections;
and (c) current laws provide protection for teachers, thereby eradicating the need for tenure.
Opponents of teacher tenure laws argue that ineffective teachers in classrooms cause unequal
access to education (Robertson, 2015). Tenure law varies significantly in every state (Strom &
Baxter, 2001).
Tenure for teachers is a highly contentious and political issue (Robertson, 2015). Black
(2016) recounted a recent stream of lawsuits challenging teacher tenure laws stemming from the
legislature’s inability to reform tenure laws. After nine California students filed suit attacking
teacher tenure laws, Black described the attack as the “war on teacher tenure” (p. 79). In the
2012 lawsuit against California, Vergara v. State, the students challenged teacher tenure statutes
because of the perpetuated dysfunction students experience in high-poverty schools.
In Vergara v. State, the students argued teacher tenure laws denied their Constitutional
right to education since a disproportionate number of grossly ineffective teachers were in
predominantly minority or low-income schools (Hoglund-Shen, 2017; Robertson, 2015). The
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trial court agreed with the students and ruled teacher tenure laws were unconstitutional. Further,
the trial court determined teacher tenure statutes “impose a disproportionate burden on poor and
minority students” (Vergara v. State, 2014, p. 4).
Even though the appellate court ultimately reversed the trial court’s determination that
teacher tenure laws are unconstitutional in Vergara v. State, the lawsuit brought to light the
conflict between teachers’ rights and students’ rights (Robertson, 2015). Upon the decision by
the appellate court that teacher tenure statutes were constitutional, both advocates and opponents
of teacher tenure called upon the California legislature to overhaul the teacher tenure statutes
(Robertson, 2015). Many questioned whether the California legislature would take the
appropriate steps to remedy the tenure conflict. Skeptics expressed concern over the deep
pockets of teacher union groups in California persuading elected officials to uphold teacher
tenure protections (Blume & Resmovits, 2016).
Since Vergara v. State, subsequent lawsuits in other states claimed teacher tenure laws
undermine the fundamental, Constitutional rights of every student to learn from effective
teachers and to have an equal opportunity to succeed in school (Hoglund-Shen, 2017). However,
Robertson (2015) cautioned against an abrupt decision to strike down tenure laws given the
political nature of tenure. In particular, Robertson warned against judges leading the educational
reform charge given the differences in school districts and the independent decisions made by the
various school boards. With school boards having local control over the decisions in their school
districts, judges would struggle to rule on educational systems in a meaningful way without
uniform, categorical standards defining the factors to represent teacher effectiveness for
delivering a quality education (Robertson, 2015). In light of Vergara v. State, Robertson
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advocated for an overall reformation of education rather than continuing to attack the politically
charged issue of teacher tenure.
Tenure creates a property right for that educator (Robertson, 2015). The United States
Supreme Court has determined that public education contracts create a property right in
employment under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution (Hoglund-Shen, 2017).
Because tenure creates a constitutionally protected property right for teachers, policymakers
cannot eliminate teacher tenure. Thus, various states have reformed teacher tenure instead of
trying to eliminate it.
Hoglund-Shen (2017) reported that 41 states require certified teachers to wait three or
more years before they are eligible to receive tenure. Some states have increased the probation
period before a teacher is eligible for tenure. Michigan increased the probation period before
awarding a teacher tenure from four to five years, and New Hampshire increased the probation
period from three to five years. Hoglund-Shen found that some states had reformed their tenure
statutes to make it easier to fire a teacher. For example, in Alabama, a teacher must appear before
an administrative judge regarding a firing proceeding. Michigan implemented a statute requiring
districts to fire tenured teachers who receive three consecutive years of ineffective or highly
ineffective ratings (Hoglund-Shen, 2017).
Educator Due Process Rights
Without tenure, educators do not have a property right to their employment (Alexander &
Alexander, 2019). DeMitchell and Onosko (2016) defined tenure as due process for public
school educators. As noted by Essex (2012), a teacher must be granted due process under the law
before being deprived of contractual rights, including life, liberty, or property. Any deprivation
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of that property right triggers due process before the government can take away that educator’s
property (Walsh et al., 2018).
DeMitchell and Onosko (2016) claimed public school teachers work in a “fish-bowl
environment with parents and community members having access throughout the year to many
aspects of their daily work with children” (p. 620). Since educators have a much higher level of
scrutiny than most employees, DeMitchell and Onosko advocated for treating public school
teachers fairly in service of the public good. Teacher tenure protects educators against
termination in instances when there are not any grounds for termination and creates an
opportunity for the teacher to provide a defense (DeMitchell & Onosko, 2016).
Educators are entitled to the two forms of due process known as procedural due process
and substantive due process (Adams-Valdez, 2005). Procedural due process is fundamental
fairness, which “requires the government to implement fair laws in a fair manner if it infringes
upon a person’s life, liberty, or property interests” (DeMitchell & Onosko, 2016, p. 599).
Procedural due process protections include fair notice, a fair hearing, and the opportunity to be
heard (Alexander & Alexander, 2019). Fair notice and fair hearings require a full hearing that
will reveal the relevant facts before depriving educators of their property rights (Alexander &
Alexander, 2019). Procedural due process applies in the court system and in administrative
tribunals, which includes school boards (Adams-Valdez, 2005).
An educator must have substantive due process before a district can deprive them of their
life, liberty, or property (Alexander & Alexander, 2019). Notice, adequate time to prepare a
defense, the right to present evidence, the right to call witnesses and cross-examine witnesses,
disclosure of documents, the right to counsel, the right to a record of the proceedings, and an
impartial decision maker are all substantive due process rights an educator is entitled to before a
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district acts to deprive the educator of their property rights (Adams-Valdez, 2005). Substantive
due process requires the school district to have a valid reason and objective before depriving an
individual of liberty or property. A district must demonstrate a restriction on liberty or property
as a legitimate public purpose (Adams-Valdez, 2005). Courts have consistently held that teacher
tenure, meaning due process rights for teachers who are public employees, serves a public
purpose (DeMitchell & Onosko, 2016; Robertson, 2015).
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985), a security guard for the Cleveland
Board of Education stated he had been convicted of a felony on his employment application.
However, the security guard received a grand larceny conviction. The Board of Education
terminated the public employee without providing him due process rights, such as the
opportunity to challenge his dismissal and respond to the charge (Cleveland Board of Education
v. Loudermill, 1985).
The Supreme Court determined Loudermill, a public employee, was guaranteed property
rights requiring due process procedural safeguards under the U.S. Constitution (Cleveland Board
of Education v. Loudermill, 1985). In its opinion, the Supreme Court concluded the public
employee and the employer’s interests “were served by pre-termination hearings to avoid
disruption of the workplace and erroneous decision-making” (DeMitchell & Onosko, 2016, p.
599). Consequently, due process protects teachers from administrators who discriminate, act out
of malice, or who have different ideological biases (DeMitchell & Onosko, 2016).
Teachers in Texas have due process protections under the Texas Education Code Chapter
21 (Texas Education Code, 2019). In 1995, during the 74th Texas Legislative session, the
passage of Senate Bill 1 completely overhauled the Texas Education Code significantly
impacting school districts and the day-to-day operations of schools (Williams, 1996). The intent
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of Senate Bill 1 was to move decision making from the state to local school boards (AdamsValdez, 2005). The goal of Senate Bill 1 was to create a streamlined process for school districts,
but at the same time also providing Constitutional protections to educators (Adams-Valdez,
2005).
Senate Bill 1 significantly affected the Texas Education Code, the statutes that apply to
the operation of schools in Texas (Adams-Valdez, 2005). The Texas Education Code defines the
responsibilities and duties of the State Board of Education, the Texas Education Agency, school
boards, and personnel (Walsh et al., 2018). Given the political nature of school boards, the Texas
legislature wanted to provide as much fairness and protection as possible to educators (AdamsValdez, 2005). Senate Bill 1 offered a fair process for educators in nonrenewals or termination
hearings while providing an opportunity for districts to dismiss ineffective teachers (Williams,
1996).
One of the most substantial provisions added under Senate Bill 1 was due process
protections for educators, including the right for an educator to appeal a school board decision
that was arbitrary or capricious (Linares, 1997; Williams, 1996). Senate Bill 1 created certified
hearing examiners to serve as the decision-makers and trier of fact relating to teacher contracts,
which positively impacted educators (Tritico, 1997). To serve as a hearing examiner, an
individual must have a Texas law license and a certification from the State of Texas. The Texas
Legislature created certified hearing officers as a way to speed up the process of terminating
educators, while also providing the educator additional due process rights (Tritico, 1997).
Chapter 21 Contracts
Senate Bill 1 led to the creation of Chapter 21 of the Texas Education Code, which
relates to employment and teacher contracts (Adams-Valdez, 2005). Teacher tenure was a
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significant component in Senate Bill 1 (House Research Organization, 1995). Senate Bill 1 also
changed teacher certification requirements, including the implementation of more rigorous
teacher preparation (Williams, 1996). In Texas, a school district and professional school
employees have a contractual relationship under the Texas Education Code Chapter 21 (Walsh et
al., 2018). Chapter 21 contracts create property rights and due process rights for professional
employees (Adams-Valdez, 2005).
Chapter 21 contracts are a combination of “constitutional, statutory, administrative,
contract, and judicial law” (Walsh et al., 2018, p. 212). These contracts specify the legal
requirements a district must follow to terminate, renew, or nonrenew the contractual agreement
between the employee and the district (Linares, 1997). Under a Chapter 21 contract, Texas
teachers are public employees with a property right as a pure question of law for continued
employment (Ramirez, 2014). Before a Texas school district can opt not to renew, or nonrenew,
a Chapter 21 contract, there are specific school board policies a district must follow before
ending a contractual relationship (Ramirez, 2014). Due process under Texas law means the
employee has timely notice of the reasons for the dismissal, a fair hearing to present a defense,
question any evidence against that employee, and the school district must offer sufficient
evidence to establish good cause for the termination (Walsh et al., 2018).
Probationary, Term, and Continuing Contracts
The three types of contracts offered to certain employees of Texas public school districts
are probationary, term, and continuing (Walsh et al., 2018). The Texas Education Code requires
districts to provide a Chapter 21 contract to teachers, principals, supervisors, school counselors,
nurses, and all other full-time professional employees required to hold an educator certification
(Adams-Valdez, 2005). At a minimum, all teachers must have a probationary contract when
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starting work in a school district (Tritico, 1997). Probationary contracts are for one school year
and can last up to three years. After the completion of the probationary contract period, the
district can terminate the educator or offer the educator a continuing or term contract (Walsh et
al., 2018). A probationary contract provides the least protection of the three types of contracts for
Texas educators (Tritico, 1997).
Educators must receive a term contract or a continuing contract at the end of the
probationary period (Texas Education Code, 2019). Most school districts offer term contracts
rather than continuing contracts at the end of a probationary contract (Tritico, 1997). A term
contract has a specific beginning and ending date. Term contracts must be in writing and
approved each year by the school board (Walsh et al., 2018). An educator must have had a
probationary contract before a district can offer the educator a term contract (Tritico, 1997).
Additionally, a teacher has a property interest in a term contract during the dates of the contract
(Tritico, 1997). School districts, and in particular school boards, must take some action when the
end of the term contract approaches (Ramirez, 2014).
Unlike a term contract that ends an educator’s property rights at the end of a term, an
educator’s property rights continue under a continuing contract until the educator or the school
district takes action to end the continuing contract (Tritico, 1997). Continuing contracts
automatically continue from one year to the next without any board action. Thus, most school
districts have discontinued continuing contracts (Tritico, 1997). Educators remain on a
continuing contract until the educator “resigns, retires, is released from employment by the
school district because of necessary reduction of personnel, is discharged, or returned to
probationary status” (Tritico, 1997, p. 26). Continuing contracts provide educators a “property
interest in continued employment with that district” (Tritico, 1997, p. 26).
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If a school district opts to not renew or terminate an educator’s Chapter 21 contract, the
type of contract dictates the level of due process afforded to that educator (Tritico, 1997). A
board can terminate a probationary contract at the end of the year as long as a board can
demonstrate the termination is in the best interest of the district (Walsh et al., 2018). The board
must provide written notice of the termination of the probationary contract within the time set
under the Texas Education Code. The board’s decision to terminate a probationary contract is
final and not appealable by the educator (Tritico, 1997).
School boards can terminate a probationary contract mid-year for good cause, meaning
the educator failed to meet the accepted standards of conduct for the teaching profession (Walsh
et al., 2018). However, if the board moves to terminate a probationary contract in the middle of
the year, the educator has some due process protections and a right to appeal that decision
(Tritico, 1997). In particular, due process rights under a probationary contract allows an educator
to request a hearing before the district moves forward with terminating the contract in the middle
of the year (Walsh et al., 2018).
Term contracts and continuing contracts offer greater protection to educators before a
district can move to end the contractual relationship (Tritico, 1997). Teachers with term contracts
and continuing contracts are entitled to a hearing before termination (Tritico, 1997). At the end
of a term contract, the board must either renew or nonrenew an educator’s term contract (Texas
Education Code, 2019). A renewal of a term contract simply requires a vote by the board to
renew the contract for the following school year (Walsh et al., 2018).
If the board opts to not renew a term contract, the educator must receive due process
before the board can take action (Walsh et al., 2018). An educator is entitled to notice of the
board’s intention to not renew the contract within the timeframe set out by the Texas Education
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Code and the option to be heard by the board during a hearing (Tritico, 1997). The board has to
follow the time restrictions under the Texas Education Code because a failure to provide timely
notice of the nonrenewal requires the board to employ the educator in the same capacity the
following year (Walsh et al., 2018).
Unlike a nonrenewal of a probationary contract, an educator can request a hearing before
the board relating to the proposed nonrenewal before the board votes to not renew the term
contract (Tritico, 1997). The school board has the option to sit as the trier of fact during the
hearing, or the board can request a certified hearing examiner to act as the decision-maker on
behalf of the district (Texas Education Code, 2019). Whether the school board or a certified
hearing examiner hands down the decision relating to the nonrenewal, the teacher can appeal the
decision of nonrenewal to the Texas Commissioner of Education (Tritico, 1997).
A board can discharge an educator working under a continuing contract for good cause
(Tritico, 1997). The same notice requirements apply to continuing contracts as term contracts
(Walsh et al., 2018). The educator has to have the opportunity to contest the discharge before the
board can move forward with termination. Districts have the opportunity to terminate an
educator’s contract before the end of the term of the contract. However, a Chapter 21 contract
cannot be terminated without good cause or due to a financial exigency that requires a reduction
in personnel (Walsh et al., 2018).
The Texas Education Code defines good cause simply as “the failure to meet the accepted
standards of conduct for the profession as generally recognized and applied in similarly situated
school districts in Texas” (Tritico, 1997, p. 26). During a hearing, educators and districts argue
the extent good cause exists to end the contractual relationship in each case (Tritico, 1997).
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Similar to a probationary contract, the board may terminate a term contract in the middle of the
year for good cause.
A termination of a Chapter 21 contract is a deprivation of a property interest; therefore,
the board of trustees for each school district must define what constitutes good cause for
termination in district policies (Linares, 1997). School districts have to follow the Texas
Education Code requirements if the district determines to either end a Chapter 21 contract in the
middle of the year or nonrenew the contract at the end (Walsh et al., 2018). In 1995, the Texas
legislature enacted provisions in the Texas Education Code that mandate a full due process
hearing according to the state’s independent hearing process in the event of a Chapter 21 contract
termination (Linares, 1997).
The new provisions under the Texas Education Code created in 1995 also allow
educators the opportunity to compel witnesses to appear at the termination hearing and testify on
their behalf (Adams-Valdez, 2005). Before these provisions, witnesses had to agree to appear
and testify, which led to few witnesses showing up based on fear of retaliation from the school
district (Tritico, 1997). Additionally, educators can take depositions and subpoena information
before a termination hearing. The public cannot attend termination hearings, and the hearing
officer follows the rules of evidence like a trial court. Educators also have the right to counsel
during a termination hearing (Walsh et al., 2018).
Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer has to issue a written
recommendation within 45 days after the date the commissioner received the request for a
hearing (Tritico, 1997). The recommendation must include findings of fact and conclusions of
law (Ramirez, 2014). The hearing officer has the option to include a proposal for granting relief
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ranging from the reinstatement of the educator, back pay, or employee benefits (Walsh et al.,
2018). However, the hearing officer cannot propose recovery of attorneys’ fees or other costs.
The board of trustees must then consider the hearing officer’s recommendation at a board
meeting (Walsh et al., 2018). After the board hears an oral argument from both the school district
and the educator, the board can adopt, reject, or change the hearing examiner’s conclusions of
law or proposal for relief (Tritico, 1997). If the board changes or rejects the hearing officer’s
recommendation, the board must state in writing the reasons and the legal basis for that decision.
School boards have many restrictions in the event the board wants to reject a finding of fact
(Walsh et al., 2018).
The importance of teacher tenure is evident under Chapter 21 contracts (Ramirez, 2014).
Educators with Chapter 21 contracts, whether a probationary, a continuing, or a term contract,
were entitled to a hearing for any contract termination (Adams-Valdez, 2005). A teacher on a
probationary contract does not require a hearing for a nonrenewal of a probationary contract
(Adams-Valdez, 2005). Under the Texas Education Code §21.103, an educator cannot appeal a
district's decision to terminate a probationary contract at the end of the contract year if, in the
board's judgment, the best interests of the district will be served by terminating the employment
(Texas Education Code, 2019).
Appeals to the Texas Commissioner of Education
An educator can appeal the board’s decision to the Texas Commissioner of Education by
filing a petition for review to the commissioner within 20 days of the board’s decision (Smith,
2017). However, the board's decision to terminate a probationary contract under the Texas
Education Code §21.103(a) is final and may not be appealed to the commissioner. The
commissioner may rule on the appeal based on the review of the record from the school board
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without any new evidence (Tritico, 1997). It is important to note that the commissioner may not
replace his or her judgment for that of the school board unless the decision was arbitrary,
capricious, unlawful, or not supported by substantial evidence (Alexander & Alexander, 2019).
The Texas Education Code authorized the Texas Commissioner of Education to overturn
a district’s termination of an employee (Smith, 2017). Before appealing a decision to the
commissioner, educators must exhaust their administrative remedies provided by the school
district for resolving a complaint (Smith, 2017). The exhaustion doctrine relies on “the fact that
an agency can remedy a situation in different ways, often providing non-legal recourse” (Smith,
2017, p. 345).
The commissioner has the option to designate an administrative law judge to conduct any
hearings under the Texas Education Code (Ramirez, 2014). Once the Texas Commissioner of
Education rules on a contract nonrenewal, either the district or the employee may appeal the
decision to the courts (Adams-Valdez, 2005). However, courts can only consider an appeal of a
Texas Commissioner decision if there is a question of law (Walsh et al., 2018). Courts cannot
hear appeals based on a question of the facts of the case.
The commissioner has strict timelines to respond to the petition for review (Ramirez,
2014). If the commissioner does not respond within the deadline the school board’s decision is
upheld. In the event the commissioner reverses the board’s decision, the district must reinstate
the educator with any back pay and employee benefits from the time of discharge or suspension
(Walsh et al., 2018). The school district has the option to reinstate the teacher or pay the teacher
one year’s salary. The school district or the educator has the right to appeal the commissioner’s
decision to the district court (Walsh et al., 2018). The district court can only reverse the
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commissioner’s decision if the decision lacks substantial evidence or if the commissioner’s
conclusions of law were erroneous.
Empirical Studies of Educator Immunity Cases
There are two lines of empirical research. The first involves adverse employment actions
against educators. The second area includes cases about educator conduct in student discipline.
Adverse Employment Actions
There is a gap in research relating to revocation or suspension of teaching certificates
(Zirkel, 2015). Not only are the laws in each state diverse relating to the revocation or suspension
of teaching certificates (Moore, 2016), but the case law continues to change the process of
revocation or suspension of teaching certificates in all 50 states (Zirkel, 2015). In a recent study
relating to the revocation of teacher’s certifications, Zirkel (2015) found more teachers have their
certificates revoked for criminal-like conduct than any other reason; the other reasons for
revocation included performance issues and ethics violations.
Mayger and Zirkel (2014) studied outcomes of principal challenges to dismissal and other
adverse employment actions. The researchers determined plaintiff principals seldom prevail in
court cases challenging adverse employment actions. In fact, courts consistently ruled in favor of
the defendant district at a ratio of 10:1. Interestingly, Mayger and Zirkel determined even
principals with unblemished performance records lost their termination cases against the school
district. The authors noted, however, that the courts deferred to the discretion of school districts.
Mayger and Zirkel (2014) found that when principals challenged their dismissals or
received other adverse employment actions, the courts ruled in favor of the districts over the
challenges of the principals 90% of the time. Mayger and Zirkel determined that courts’
deference in support of the school district over the principal was consistent. Similarly, Ramirez
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(2014) indicated educators are not guaranteed a favorable outcome if they file grievances or
challenge employment actions.
Student Discipline Cases
Holben and Zirkel (2011) researched the increase nationally in student discipline cases
over the past three decades. They identified student safety as the prevailing concern that drew
this issue to the spotlight. In the flurry of news reports, media sources failed to analyze the
actual holdings of student-initiated lawsuits. Instead, newspapers, television, and social media
focused on alleged facts and claims. Holben and Zirkel (2011) argued the failure to report the
ultimate outcome of student discipline lawsuits leads to a belief that courts cripple teachers from
maintaining order and student safety in schools.
In a follow up study by Zirkel and Holben (2017), their findings indicated that the
“ultimate relief obtained in 58% of the 77 cases ending in settlement or a conclusive ruling for
the plaintiff was unavailable” (p. 215). The researchers determined one reason for the lack of a
conclusive ruling was due to confidentiality clauses in the settlement agreement between the
parties that prohibited the release of the settlement information. Zirkel and Holben (2017)
maintained the inability to find the ultimate relief calls for a reconsideration of the success rates
of plaintiffs in lawsuits against educators and school districts.
Flatt (2012) studied 125 cases in which administrators contested adverse employment
actions against them that occurred from 1981 to 2010. School districts prevailed in 73% of the
cases relating to an adverse employment action. The most prevalent defense used by
administrators was the failure of the district to provide due process before the adverse
employment action. Flatt determined “litigation can favor the administrator in such cases if the
circumstances can be reasonably understood” (p. 255).
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It is important to note that courts still require due process even if the administrator’s
behavior was outlandish (Flatt, 2012). Flatt’s findings only included three cases involving an
administrator’s physical altercation with a student. Only one out of the three cases found in favor
of the administrator based on evidence the contact with the student was reasonable (Flatt, 2012).
In particular, the one prevailing administrator showed the physical altercation with a female
student occurred while the administrator attempted to diffuse the situation so the court said the
contact with the student was inadvertent.
Researchers indicated the courts, along with administrative hearing officers, go to great
lengths to excuse the behavior of a teacher relating to student discipline (Harris, 2012; Mays,
2017; McDaniel, 2014). O’Neal (2013) found courts ruled in favor of districts when educators
had received previous warnings from administrators about insubordinate behavior. Holben and
Zirkel (2011) found educator defendants prevailed in 61% of the lawsuits against them when the
lawsuit involved an intervention or nonintervention in a student fight. Additionally, the
researchers found the estimated odds that a court would hold an educator liable for student injury
occurring during a fight was less than one case in 2,000 (Holben & Zirkel, 2011).
Harris (2012) examined litigation involving student misconduct and discipline in schools.
Similar to other studies, Harris found 73% of courts ruled in favor of school districts and school
employees. In particular, Harris examined 79 cases directly related to student misconduct and
discipline, and schools prevailed in 59 of the cases. Only three plaintiffs in the study’s cases
prevailed against the schools. Courts dismissed four of the cases, and 12 cases involved a ruling
split between the school and the plaintiff suing the school (Harris, 2012).
Courts often focus on an immunity defense. Educators prevail using an immunity defense
if they prove their actions were reasonable. Courts provided qualified immunity for educators in
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45 (57%) of the 79 cases in Harris’ (2012) study. Further, Harris determined the majority of
court decisions supported the school’s right to enforce discipline to maintain order in the
educational environment.
O’Neal’s (2013) study included 129 cases relating to adverse employment actions against
educators for insubordination in the years from 1900 to 2011. The findings showed 93 courts
favored the school board and only 36 courts favored employees. Of the 129 cases in O’Neal’s
study, only 11 dealt with classroom management or inappropriate discipline. In a particular case
from 2005, the court upheld the decision of a school board to dismiss an experienced teacher
who continued to hit students and to put her hands on students’ faces inappropriately. The court
reasoned the teacher should know how to deal with students in a more professional manner. The
court emphasized the educator’s continuous inappropriate classroom management and handling
of discipline incidents, as well as the administration's continual warnings about her behavior.
O’Neal determined the primary theme involving insubordination showed the courts’ desire not to
impede or replace the decision-making process of school boards. Notably, O’Neal found
substantial documentation against an employee correlated with the reason for termination
provided a stronger case in favor of the school district.
Hearing officers, in numerous cases, have ruled in favor of teachers because a teachers’
behavior was necessary to maintain order in the classroom and to discipline inappropriate student
behavior (Mays, 2017). In Mays’ (2017) study, only two cases favored an educator over a school
district. In one case, the hearing officer determined the evidence did not support a teacher’s seven
day suspension without pay, despite the teacher receiving warnings not to have physical contact
with students and not to use profanity in front of students.
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The second case in Mays’ (2017) study where the hearing officer ruled in favor of the
teacher involved the suspension of a 25-year veteran teacher for grabbing a fifth-grade student
by the collar, screaming at him, dropping him to the floor, and isolating him from other students.
The teacher claimed the student attempted to steal a money clip from the teacher’s person. As
the student walked away, the teacher grabbed the student by his shirt, reprimanded the student
for attempting to steal, and directed the student to sit away from other students. The hearing
officer found the teacher’s version of the incident was more credible. The hearing officer
determined the incident was necessary for the teacher to maintain order and discipline and to
correct inappropriate behavior.
According to Mays (2017), a terminated teacher prevailed in a case before a hearing
officer even though the teacher physically assaulted a student by placing his hands around the
child’s neck when the student refused to go to the office. The teacher left bruises on the student’s
arms and elbows and scratches on the student’s neck. Interestingly, the hearing officer discounted
another student’s testimony that saw the teacher choke the student. The hearing officer’s opinion
pointed to the student’s failure to follow directions to go to the office as causing the altercation,
thereby allowing the teacher to stand in loco parentis while the student is in school. The hearing
officer determined “a parent may very well reach for his own child in the same manner in order
to obtain compliance with his instruction” and “it appears [the teacher’s] lapse in judgment was
provoked by the student’s abject disrespect” (p. 15). The hearing officer reversed the teacher’s
termination and ordered a 15-day suspension instead. These cases highlight the difficulty teachers
have in prevailing and the unique factors involved when they do prevail.
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Summary
This chapter provided a comprehensive analysis and synthesis of the applicable literature.
The next chapter describes the methodology used for a qualitative legal study to determine under
what circumstances the ruling of statutory immunity shields educators from liability.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Without the ability to sue educators as a way to deter and correct wrongful behavior, the
question arises whether additional immunity protections are too broad with protecting school
districts and educators (Buckley, 2017). This study was designed to determine whether the
immunity protections under the Texas Education Code are too broad or too narrow by assessing
the extent to which statutory immunity currently shields educators from liability (Buckley, 2017;
Daniels & Martin, 2016; Maher et al., 2010; Payne, 2012). Buckley (2017) called for research
evaluating immunity defenses provided to educators and an assessment of the extent that immunity
shields educators from liability. The purpose of this study was to describe how the Texas
Commissioner of Education and Texas appellate courts have attempted to apply statutory
immunity protections provided to Texas educators under the Texas Education Code
§22.0511 and §22.0512.
The study was focused on answering the following research questions:
RQ1: What were the legal questions in cases decided by the Texas Commissioner of
Education and Texas appellate courts where educators invoked statutory immunity protections?
RQ2: What were the decisions made by the Texas Commissioner of Education and Texas
appellate courts in cases where educators invoked statutory immunity protections?
RQ3: What were the trends in the decisions made by the Texas Commissioner of
Education and Texas appellate courts where educators invoked statutory immunity protections?
RQ4: What legal principles for Texas educators can be discovered from the decisions
made by the Texas Commissioner of Education and Texas appellate courts where educators
invoked statutory immunity protections?
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This chapter describes the study’s (a) research design and rationale, (b) instrumentation, (c) data
collection, (d) data analysis, and (e) ethical considerations.
Research Design and Methods
This study used a legal realism approach to interpret law. Legal realists define the law as
a “set of norms in force” (Guastini, 2015, p. 45). Legal realism supports the view that the law is a
set of normative meanings assigned to legal texts through interpretation rather than the idea that
the legal texts are the law. Interpreting the law as a set of norms in force requires “the
identification of the norms actually applied by judges and other law-applying agencies”
(Guastini, 2015, p. 53).
Determining a set of norms involves extracting and construing facts from legal texts.
According to Guastini (2015), the norms in force in legal decisions are the set of norms applied
from the past that can be “predictably applied in the future” (p. 45). Thus, this study aimed to
interpret the set of norms applied in previous Texas Commissioner of Education decisions and
Texas appellate cases where educators invoked statutory immunity protections in order to predict
the application of norms in future decisions.
A study examining the Texas Commissioner of Education decisions and Texas state
appellate cases was conducted to determine the extent statutory immunity protections currently
shield educators from liability. This qualitative legal research study utilized a black letter law
methodology, also known as doctrinal research (Lammasniemi, 2018). Black letter law
methodology is “concerned with the formulation of legal doctrines through the analysis of legal
rules” (Lammasniemi, 2018, p. 72). Consequently, the normative meanings of the facts were
interpreted to gain an understanding of the principles applied in the cases.
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Through the analysis of statutes, case law, law journals, and government reports, black
letter law methodology was approached as legal research from the standpoint of a social scientist
(Lammasniemi, 2018; Salehijam, 2018). Black letter law methodology focuses on determining
what the law is on a particular point by utilizing legal reasoning, which is a “unique blend of
deduction and induction” (Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012, p. 105). Because the focus of this study
was to understand the statutory immunity protections provided to Texas educators under the
Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512, the use of a content analysis study design was
deemed appropriate. Content analysis provided the basis for a black letter law empirical
methodology (Lammasniemi, 2018).
There was a need to determine the immunity protections awarded to Texas school
districts and educators (Hendrick, 2016). The research, subsequently, analyzed historical public
records, including state agency decisions and appellate court cases, to provide an understanding
of the immunity protections awarded to Texas school districts and educators and to inform
victims injured by these government actors (Hendrick, 2016). Reliable sources of data in
qualitative research include historical research, such as research of public records (Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016).
Studying historical court cases and state agency decisions through black letter law
methodology served as a source of reform by characterizing unjust or misguided practices from
the past (Borg, 1989; Lammasniemi, 2018). Merriam and Tisdell (2016) maintained public
documents are easily accessible and contain information that would take a researcher significant
time and effort to collect otherwise. Moreover, Hall and Wright (2008) asserted judicial opinions
are “probably the best single resource of systematic historical data on the law” (p. 98).
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The Texas Commissioner of Education decisions and Texas state appellate cases
represented the cases in this research design. Primary sources of this study included legal texts,
including court decisions, agency opinions, and statutes (Lammasniemi, 2018). The study
focused on legal principles found in outcomes of the Texas Commissioner of Education
decisions and Texas appellate cases (Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012). Analyzing state agency
decisions and court cases using content analysis provided an understanding of immunity
protections awarded to Texas school districts, educators, and victims injured by these
government actors (Borg, 1989; Hendrick, 2016).
Data Collection
Decisions by the Texas Commissioner of Education and by Texas state appellate cases
constituted the data for this study. I collected data using LexisNexis and Westlaw databases,
computer-assisted online legal research databases (Dagley, 2012; Flatt, 2012; Lacefield, 2010;
Newton, 2019). Using Zirkel’s (2015) three-pronged process for data collection, I retrieved
relevant Texas Commissioner decisions and case law with a (1) Boolean search of Texas
Commissioner of Education decisions and Texas appellate cases in LexisNexis and Westlaw, (2)
review of decisions issued by the Texas Commissioner of Education and reviewed as part of the
Texas Association of School Boards (TASB) Legal Update, and (3) extract additional relevant
citations in agency decisions and court cases initially determined to fit within the scope of the
study.
The scope of the search included both published and unpublished Texas appellate cases
and Texas Commissioner of Education decisions. Nelson (2009) acknowledged that not every
court publishes its cases, and unpublished cases are not binding precedent. A preliminary search
from September 1, 2003, through September 30, 2019, representing the effective date of Texas
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Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 through the present occurred. The following terms
in various combinations identified Texas Commissioner decisions and court cases in the
LexisNexis and Westlaw databases: ("Texas education code" or "tex. educ. code" or "tex.
educ.code" or "tex.educ. code" or "tex.educ.code" /5 22.051!).
The focus of this study was to understand the statutory immunity protections provided to
Texas educators under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512. Therefore, the target
population of cases only included decisions involving the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and
§22.0512. I evaluated cases retrieved from LexisNexis and Westlaw and included only cases
involving the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512. Duplicate cases and cases not
involving educators seeking statutory immunity protection were omitted from the findings of the
search. Once the relevant cases were determined, I systematically briefed the data using a case
briefing format as suggested by Statsky and Wernet (1995). Statsky and Wernet’s (1995)
briefing method provided a uniform analysis of the outcomes of the agency decisions and court
cases to compare and understand patterns. The cases used for the analysis included the state
agency decisions and Texas appellate cases. A search of the public records revealed 19 Texas
Commissioner of Education decisions and 15 Texas appellate cases relevant to this study.
Data Analysis Methods
The analysis and interpretation began by reading each Texas Commissioner of Education
decision and state appellate court case selected for the study. The initial review of the data
uncovered the “overall sense of the whole” to “provide an initial framework for the development
of the study's findings” (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008, pp. 101-102). After an initial reading of the
agency decisions and court cases, the Statsky and Wernet’s (1995) case brief method was
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utilized to help collate and organize the data by summarizing the following information in
each Texas Commissioner of Education decision and state appellate court case:
● citation: describing where the case can be found, including the volume of the reporter, the
year of the decision, and the page on which the case begins.
● key facts: state the facts that were important to the court and state agency in reaching the
holding.
● issues: provide a specific reference to the questions of law before the court by making a
specific reference to the rule of law considered for each issue.
● holdings: state the court’s answers to the issues.
● reasoning: explain why the court determined each issue.
● disposition: state the order and procedural consequences as a result of the court and
agency’s holding. (p. 41)
Case briefing provided a process to synthesize voluminous data into more concise
statements regarding key data from each court case and commissioner decision. As noted by
Dagley (2012), case briefs are much like “interview transcripts or ethnographer’s field notes, and
represent a rich source of data about the topic being studied” (p. 71). Upon completion of
Statsky and Wernet’s (1995) briefing method of the the Texas Commissioner of Education
decisions and Texas appellate cases, a system of coding was employed to interpret the results
(Dagley, 2012; Flatt, 2012; Harris, 2012; Moore, 2016; Newton, 2019; O’Neal, 2013). Coding
data is “the process of translating properties or attributes of the world (variables) into a form that
is susceptible to systematic analysis” (Epstein & Martin, 2014, p. 95). The data analysis process
in this black letter law methodology involved the practice of content analysis as applied in
empirical legal research (Hall & Wright, 2008).
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Content analysis can be used to study the law itself through the analysis of legal texts,
such as judicial opinions, legislation, and other agency decisions (Hall & Wright, 2008;
Salehijam, 2018). According to Hall and Wright (2008), content analysis has the “power to
transform classic interpretative skills into recognizable and transferable social science
knowledge” (p. 121). Content analysis is similar to court analysis performed by lawyers, but
content analysis brings the rigor of social science to understand case law (Hall & Wright, 2008).
Content analysis allows the researcher to “sort out the interaction of multiple factors that
bear on an outcome in the legal system” (Hall & Wright, 2008, p. 65). With content analysis, the
scholar collects documents on a particular subject, and looks for patterns and draws inferences
from these patterns (Salehijam, 2018). Black letter law researchers, using content analysis, can
identify unnoticed patterns in decisions that traditional legal researchers might miss while
analyzing data for the sole purpose of winning an argument (Lammasniemi, 2018; Salehijam,
2018). Hall and Wright (2008) noted an empirical study of the thinking and behavior of judges
provides knowledge about what courts and state agencies do and why they do it. Particularly,
themes and patterns in the data can develop an understanding of the statutory immunity
protections provided to Texas educators.
The analysis of data included the use of memos and an open coding system to analyze
the outcomes of the decisions by the Texas Commissioner of Education and Texas appellate
courts to answer the research questions in the study (Dagley, 2012; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). I
used memos to note and highlight important observations, interpretations, reflections, comments,
and conclusions in the court cases and agency decisions (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008). Memos
assisted with capturing new descriptors that emerged from the agency decisions and court cases
and the development of coding schemes. Finally, memos assisted with recording my preliminary
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findings, interpretations, and conclusions throughout the coding process (Bloomberg & Volpe,
2008).
Both deductive and inductive reasoning were used to code the collected data (Webley,
2010) within the secure computer assistive qualitative data analysis application known as
Dedoose. Beginning with coding using deductive reasoning, I coded the data with a list of
predetermined codes developed by Newton (2019). Newton (2019) focused on “legal cases
related to the dismissal of elementary and secondary professionals for the cause of immorality”
(p. 58). Given the similar nature between Newton’s study and this study, data were initially
organized using Newton’s (2019) predetermined codes including (a) gender of the educator, (b)
gender of the student, (c) educator’s position, (d) educator’s misconduct (e) elementary or
secondary setting, (f) the initial action against the educator, and (g) if the decision was upheld.
Next, data were coded using inductive reasoning by open coding the data. Open coding
allows for the creation of codes during the coding process (Webley, 2010). Khandkar (2013)
defined open coding as labeling concepts and “defining and developing categories based on the
properties and dimensions” of the data (p. 1). While coding the data, I looked for similarities and
grouped them into categories based on their common properties (Dagley, 2012; Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016). Qualitative research is a nonlinear process allowing the researcher to notice new
things while open coding the data (Khandkar, 2013). Merriam and Tisdell (2016) noted that the
use of open coding allows the researcher to develop concepts from the raw data and group the
data into conceptual categories. Using open coding, categories that affected the findings included
the following: (a) use of force, (b) prior incidents, (c) video footage, (d) type of contract, (e)
action by the district, (f) apology, (g) written statements, (h) type of motion, (i) job type, (j)
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procedural issue, (k) issue, (l) outcome, and (m) type of motion. Data were then disaggregated
further to determine any categories, patterns, or themes (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
Analytical coding helped identify emergent themes in the data to answer the research
questions in the study (Dagley, 2012; Newton, 2019). The final grouping of analytical codes
became the categories for analysis (Dagley, 2012). Following Dagley’s (2012) research design, I
then analyzed the categories for emergent themes to answer the research questions of this study.
The overarching themes that emerged in appeals when an educator sought statutory immunity
protections under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 are set out in Chapters 4
and 5.
Establishing Trustworthiness
Lincoln and Guba (1985) defined trustworthiness as the credibility, reliability, and
validity of research findings and determines whether research is worthy of attention.
Trustworthiness is contingent upon the methods used to collect, prepare, and report the findings
from the study (Saldana & Omasta, 2017). Multiple methods provided reliability and validity in
this study, including the use of public records, a reputable data source, the ability to duplicate the
research procedure, triangulation, and peer debriefing. The data utilized in the study included
public records, meaning the documents were accessible online to a reader (Epstein & Martin,
2014).
To ensure the authenticity and accuracy of the data in the study, I retrieved data from
Westlaw and LexisNexis, two reputable computer-assisted legal research online databases. Other
researchers have utilized these specific procedures and have addressed comparable issues from
this study (Dagley, 2012; Flatt, 2012; Harris, 2012; Moore, 2016; Newton, 2019; O’Neal, 2013).
The use of multiple databases represented triangulation (Shenton, 2004). Finally, as
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recommended by Shenton (2004), I performed frequent debriefing sessions with the dissertation
committee and a peer reviewer to ensure a dependable and accurate interpretation of the data.
Debriefing sessions ensured the conclusions and theories were free of personal biases and
assumptions.
Researcher’s Role and Positionality
Patton (2015) asserted that the researcher plays a critical role in the analysis and
analytical coding of data. In the process of analyzing the data, a researcher “draw[s] upon what
we know to help us understand what we don’t know” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 75). My
professional qualifications positioned me for conducting this legal analysis of the Texas
Commissioner of Education decisions and Texas appellate cases where educators invoked
immunity defenses.
As a licensed attorney and a member of the State Bar of Texas since 2002, I have
represented governmental entities as well as parties suing governmental entities in litigation. I
also served as a legislative assistant covering education in the Texas legislature before attending
law school. Since 2016, I have served as a school district administrator in a Texas school
district. As a school administrator, various employee issues arise where I provide guidance to
administration. Consequently, I had to remain mindful and aware of the ways my beliefs and
experiences could potentially influence my interpretation of the data (Saldana & Omasta, 2017).
Statsky and Wernet (1995) touted the use of codes as a mechanism to view data from
another lens and remove researcher-based biases. Consequently, I developed data summary
tables for use with coding and analysis of the data in the study as recommended by Clary and
Lysaght (2010). Data summary tables organized codes and displayed themes from the Texas
Commissioner of Education decisions and Texas appellate cases (Merriam & Tisdell,
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2016). Data summary tables allowed me to evaluate the data based on identical criteria, make
sense of the data, and formulate conclusions (Saldana & Omasta, 2017). The data summary
tables assisted with the briefing, analyzing, and interpreting data as well as the assurance of
trustworthiness.
Moreover, I used a reflection journal to record my personal thinking about the data and
reviewed its contents with the codes to ensure that my thoughts were not interfering with the
data’s patterns and codes. A peer reviewer examined the codes and the underlying data. The peer
reviewer challenged my assumptions and codes and suggested ways to reduce bias and ensure
accuracy, or credibility, in the coding process.
Assumptions
1. The editors of LexisNexis and Westlaw have identified and accumulated all the
Texas Commissioner of Education decisions and Texas appellate cases from September 1, 2003
through September 30, 2019, involving the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512.
2. All Texas Commissioner of Education decisions and Texas appellate cases involving
the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 are in accordance with local, state, and federal
laws.
3. All Texas Commissioner of Education decisions and Texas appellate cases involving
the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 provided sufficient data to answer the stated
research questions.
Limitations
The agency decisions and court opinions are limited by what the commissioners and the
judges choose to include in the opinions and do not always include the full nature or context of
the decision.
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Delimitations
1. Case brief analysis was limited to decisions involving the Texas Education Code
§22.0511 and §22.0512 drawn from the Texas Commissioner of Education decisions and
the opinions of the Texas appellate courts listed in the LexisNexis and Westlaw databases
from September 1, 2003, through September 30, 2019.
2. Principles for school districts and educators were based solely on the patterns, themes,
and trends appearing in the Texas Commissioner of Education decisions and Texas
appellate cases through legal commentaries.
3. This study only encompassed state appellate court cases. The study did not include
federal court cases.
Summary
This chapter described the methodology for this qualitative legal study to determine
under what circumstances the ruling of statutory immunity shields educators from liability. The
next chapter will present the data derived from the Texas Commissioner of Education decisions
where educators invoked statutory immunity protections.
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Chapter 4: Texas Commissioner of Education Decisions
The purpose of this study was to describe how the Texas Commissioner of Education
and Texas appellate courts have attempted to apply statutory immunity protections provided to
educators under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512. This chapter will present the
data derived from the Texas Commissioner of Education decisions where educators invoked
statutory immunity protections. First the presentation of the data appears. Second, the results of
the data analysis of the Texas Commissioner of Education decisions are presented. Third, as the
research questions pertain to the commissioner’s decisions, they are answered later in the
chapter. Finally, the chapter ends with a summary.
Presentation of Data
Since the adoption of the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 on September 1,
2003, there have been 19 Texas Commissioner of Education decisions that ruled on an
educator’s statutory immunity protection. Data were extracted and condensed from the 19
Commissioner decisions using Statsky and Wernet’s (1995) case briefing method. The outline of
the commissioner decisions analysis includes the following: citation, key facts, issues, holdings,
reasoning, and final disposition. The decisions are presented chronologically. Each case is
presented in the order of the following components: (a) key facts, (b) issues, (c) holding, (d)
reasoning, and (e) disposition. Conclusions derived from the case analysis are presented in
Chapter 6.
Case of Lake v. Dripping Springs Independent School District (2006)
Laura Lake was a teacher’s aide under an at-will contract at a high school in Dripping
Springs ISD. Lake contended that she used force against an 18-year-old DAEP male student after
Lake and the student got into a disagreement in the library over the work that the student was
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supposed to complete. Lake maintained the student approached her and stood very close to her.
When Lake allegedly confronted the student and asked him to move, the student refused. Lake
claimed that she crossed her arms in front of her body and pushed passed the student. The
student, on the other hand, argued Lake approached him and told him he was supposed to be
reading a chapter in his book, not doing actual work. The student alleged Lake grabbed his
papers and told him to get out of her way. The student said he moved into the cubicle where he
was working and told her she could go around him. The student said Lake then pushed his chest
with both of her hands and yelled at him to get out of her way. The student claimed he fell into
the cubicle causing the chair to turn upside. The student admitted he yelled at Lake, “what’s your
problem?” (p. 4). After the student fell and his head on the overturned chair Lake said, “See
that’s what you get” (p. 4).
Lake later argued the student lacked credibility since he was assigned to an alternative
education placement classroom indicating he had behavior problems. The principal asked Lake
three times whether the student touched her, and each time Lake said no. Lake admitted to the
assistant principal that she lost it on the student and shoved him. She told the assistant principal
she was arguing with the student about doing his work, and she said she went to the student’s
desk to get his paper. After the incident, the superintendent directed Lake two times to have no
further contact with the student. However, Lake disobeyed the directives and apologized to the
student. Lake changed her testimony during the hearing to the school board and indicated the
student stepped forward and knocked her back with his shoulders.
The issue involved whether Lake reasonably believed force was necessary against the
student. The commissioner held that Lake did not reasonably believe her use of force was
necessary and her actions were not reasonable. Because Lake’s insubordination was not
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protected conduct under the Texas Education Code §22.0512, Dripping Spring ISD’s decision to
terminate Lake’s at-will employment was upheld.
The commissioner’s reasoning was that Lake directly disobeyed the superintendent’s
directive to have no further contact with the student. Lake’s insubordination was sufficient to
justify the termination of Lake’s at-will employment. Moreover, Lake’s admission that she lost it
during the incident, along with the subsequent apology to the student, did not support Lake’s
argument that her use of force was necessary. Lake would not have a need to apologize if the use
of force against the student was necessary. The student obeyed Lake’s command by moving into
the cubicle, and Lake saw that the student obeyed her command when he moved. Earlier in the
day, Lake warned another aide a confrontation may occur with the student that day indicating
Lake might have planned the confrontation with the student. There was no offense by the student
since he moved out of Lake’s way, so the force used was disproportionate. Even though the risk
of injury to an 18 year-old male student was minimal, Lake’s force was excessive and degrading.
For the final disposition, the commissioner denied Lake’s appeal.
Case of Papa v. Presidio Independent School District (2006)
Samuel Papa believed a 14 year-old male student was going to deface Papa’s personal
high school yearbook with a paperclip. Papa grabbed the student’s hands and twisted them
behind the student’s back. Papa pushed the student against the wall and removed the paperclip
from the student’s hand. While forcing the student out of the classroom, Papa forced the student
against the classroom door. Papa did not slam the student into a wall or throw him out of a door.
Instead, Papa opened the door and pushed him out of the classroom. The student was not injured
but reported some soreness in his arm. The district terminated Papa’s contract for the use of
excessive force and for violating the district’s corporal punishment policy.
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The first issue involved whether Papa’s physical force against the student was allowable
under state law. The second issue involved whether Papa reasonably believed the force was
necessary to control, train, or educate the student. The third issue was whether Papa was wrongly
terminated in violation of the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The commissioner held Papa’s
actions and use of restraint was reasonable, and he was entitled to immunity under the Texas
Education Code §22.0512. Presidio ISD erroneously terminated Papa’s contract.
The commissioner’s reasoning was that Papa’s use of force was justified under the Texas
Penal Code §9.62. The physical force, which Papa considered reasonable at the time, was used
for the special purpose of controlling the student. The student, a high school freshman, was
attempting to vandalize Papa’s personal high school yearbook. The student’s actions showed
disrespect of Papa. Other students would have been encouraged to act with similar disrespect if
Papa did not stop the student from defacing the yearbook. The finding by the board that the
student was scratching the yearbook is irrelevant. Papa believed the student was attempting to
vandalize the yearbook and the attempt was enough to determine the actions were reasonable.
The commissioner focused on whether Papa’s actions were reasonable from Papa’s perspective.
Even though the school district argued the level and duration of the restraint by Papa was
unreasonable, the standard is whether Papa had a reasonable belief that the level and duration
was necessary.
The commissioner noted that the force and restraint achieved the goal of preventing the
student from defacing the yearbook and quickly removing the student from the classroom. The
commissioner acknowledged that use of most physical restraints are degrading, but none of
Papa’s actions was designed to degrade the student. Finally, there was no finding of any
likelihood of serious injury from the restraint used. Therefore, the commissioner determined the
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restraint of the student was reasonable when viewed from Papa’s perspective. Papa was immune
from discipline for his actions against the student. Moreover, Papa was not acting to discipline
the student but was instead controlling the student to prevent property damage. There was no
violation of the district’s corporal punishment policy.
There was not substantial evidence that the level of restraint was unreasonable from
Papa’s perspective or that there was an unreasonable restraint duration since the events happened
very quickly. The restraint by Papa was not unnecessarily degrading or likely to cause serious
injury. Papa’s actions were purposeful to protect the yearbook, confiscate the paperclip, and
remove the student from the classroom. It was reasonable for Papa to believe the student would
not comply with a verbal command, and a verbal command was not the only reasonable method
to deal with the situation. Papa was justified in using physical force without giving a verbal
command. For the final disposition, the commissioner granted Papa’s appeal. Presidio ISD had to
reinstate Papa and pay him back pay and benefits since the commissioner deemed the use of
force reasonable. As an alternative to the reinstatement, the district could pay Papa the equivalent
of one year of compensation.
Case of Johnson v. Kenedy Independent School District (2008)
Johnson was a middle school principal in Kenedy ISD. The school board did not renew
Johnson’s term contract based on an incident on the tennis courts after school. A sixth-grade
student, who considered Johnson to be a friend, playfully poked Johnson in the stomach. The
student tapped Johnson's chin with his tennis racket, knocking Johnson’s new expensive
sunglasses askew. Johnson, who previously had Special Forces training, responded by placing
the student in a chokehold and stomping on the student’s feet with his boot heels. The student’s
foot was red and swollen from Johnson stomping on it. After the incident, Johnson called the
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student’s mother and admitted to stomping on the student’s foot “really, really hard” (p. 2).
Johnson also admitted he did not mean to stomp on the student’s foot, but he was having a bad
week. The district placed Johnson on administrative leave, during which time he violated
directives not to contact district employees or come on school property. Johnson contacted two
employees on seven occasions and came to the central administration office without permission.
Additionally, the week of the incident, Johnson led a prayer over the intercom system during the
week of benchmark testing which violated district policy.
The first issue was whether Johnson had immunity from disciplinary action because his
use of force was privileged under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The second issue was
whether the board considered Johnson’s most recent evaluation even though it was not in the
record. The commissioner held that Johnson was not entitled to immunity under the Texas
Education Code §22.0512 because he did not reasonably believe the degree of force used against
the student was necessary. The board considered the most recent evaluation even though it was
not in the record.
The commissioner’s reasoning was that Johnson admitted to the mother that he stomped
on the student’s foot and that he did not mean to do it. Johnson’s admission to the mother
demonstrated he did not reasonably believe the force was necessary to maintain discipline of the
student. The behavior presented a danger of physical harm to the student, so Johnson was not
entitled to immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. Johnson failed to rebut the
representation by the board that they considered his most recent evaluation. Therefore, the
commissioner concluded the board considered the most recent evaluation without this evidence
in the record. Regardless of the decision relating to the evaluation, one incident of misconduct is
enough to support several grounds for nonrenewal. There were multiple reasons to support the
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nonrenewal of Johnson’s contract including misconduct not involving the student. Particularly,
Johnson was insubordinate for failing to follow directives to refrain from contacting district
employees and not to come on school property. Johnson also violated district policy when he
prayed over the intercom system. For the final disposition, the commissioner denied Johnson’s
appeal and the board’s decision was upheld.
Case of Earthly v. Fort Bend Independent School District (2009)
The district did not renew Earthly’s term contract after he allegedly used force against a
student. Earthly, a middle school teacher, intervened when a high school student swung his fist at
another student in the hallway. Once Earthly intervened, the high school student became verbally
and physically aggressive towards Earthly. The student pushed Earthly down the hall and out of
view of the video camera. Earthly eventually restrained the student, and two administrators
instructed Earthly to release the student. It took Earthly 27 seconds to release the student. Earthly
said he did not hear the administrators’ directive to release the student, but they claimed Earthly
ignored their directives. The independent hearing officer determined no good cause existed to
terminate Earthly. The school board disagreed. They changed two of the hearing examiner’s
findings of fact relating to the credibility of witnesses and terminated Earthly’s contract.
The first issue was whether the hearing examiner applied the wrong standard relating to
good cause for a term contract. The second issue was whether Earthly was immune from
discipline under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The third issue was whether an
administrator’s directive or a district policy can override an educator’s right to use reasonable
force under Section 22.0512. The commissioner said the board could not reweigh the evidence,
so the board had no authority to change the findings of fact. The district failed to establish good
cause for the termination since Earthly had immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0512.
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A district cannot prohibit a professional employee from using force that is justified under the
Texas Penal Code 9.62 except when an employee violates a corporal punishment policy.
The commissioner’s reasoning was that the district failed to prove Earthly used
unjustified force. The independent hearing determined that six of the 11 eyewitnesses’
statements were not credible. A reasonable finder of fact could have come to this conclusion.
Eyewitness statements do not always indicate what happened in a situation because eyewitnesses
can get the facts wrong. Even though the video footage was of poor quality, it still supported
Earthly’s testimony. The independent examiner said there was not any evidence in the record
disproving Earthly’s statement that he did not hear the administrators tell him to release the
student. Administrators saying Earthly heard their directives to release the student is not
sufficient evidence. The video tape showed Earthly release the student 27 seconds after the
administrators approached him. This district’s evidence was insufficient to demonstrate
insubordination.
When the wrong definition of good cause is used, the commissioner must apply the
correct definition in the findings of the case. The evidence in the findings of fact proved
Earthly’s actions were justified. With the application of the proper definition of good cause for a
term contract, there was no good cause for the district to terminate Earthly. The hearing
examiner used the wrong burden of proof, but the district waived this objection when it failed to
raise this argument at the local level. For the final disposition, the commissioner overturned the
board’s decision to not renew Earthly’s contract. The commissioner reinstated Earthly and gave
him back pay and benefits. In the alternative, the district could pay Earthly one year’s
compensation.
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Case of Harper v. Alvarado Independent School District (2010)
Harper was a middle school teacher in Alvarado ISD. The district terminated her term
contract after she placed her hands on an eighth-grade student’s face and turned her head to
redirect her attention to reading materials on Harper’s desktop computer. There were no signs of
injury to the student, and no medical professional diagnosed the student with an injury. An
independent hearing examiner found Harper’s actions were immune from liability under the
Texas Education Code §22.0512. Even though the independent hearing examiner recommended
that the board renew Harper’s contract, the board voted not to renew her contract based on her
use of corporal punishment and the violation of the district’s policy relating to disciplining
students. Harper argued she was not disciplining the student. Harper maintained she was
attempting to control the student to further an educational purpose and to enforce a proper
command issued to control, train, or educate the student. Harper appealed the board’s decision to
the commissioner.
The issue involved whether the district ended Harpers’ term contract improperly because
she had statutory immunity protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The
commissioner’s reasoning for overturning the board’s decisions was Harper believed her actions
were reasonable to maintain discipline of the student. Even though other teachers or
administrators may have viewed Harper’s actions as unreasonable, Harper still had immunity
since the actions were reasonable from Harper’s perspective. Reasonableness must be viewed
from the perspective of Harper, and she reasonably believed the force use was necessary to
control the student. Harper was not disciplining or punishing the student. She was attempting to
control the student to further an educational purpose and to force a proper command to control,
train, and educate the student.
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The evidence showed Harper did not use excessive force in this situation, so the district
could not discipline her based on the use of force. The district cannot pass a policy that limits the
immunity granted under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. Since Harper did not impose
corporal punishment on the student, the district should have applied the standards of the Texas
Penal Code 9.62 and the Texas Education Code §22.0512 to determine if Harper’s actions were
protected by the statutory immunity granted by law. Harper’s use of force was reasonably
necessary to control the student, so she had immunity for her use of force. For the final
disposition, the commissioner granted Harper’s appeal and required the district to reinstate her
contract and to pay back pay and benefits. In the alternative, the board could pay Harper one
year’s salary.
Case of Flores v. Houston Independent School District (2012)
Roberto Flores worked in Houston ISD during the 2006-2007 school year as a teacher,
and he was an alternative certification intern under a probationary contract. Flores taught in an
elementary school behavior services class. The school board voted to terminate Flores’ contract
for the failure to follow policies and administrative directives concerning discipline. The policies
and directives Flores violated included the failure to call for assistance before using force and
failing to follow directions in the training manual on how to administer force against students.
Flores appealed the decision to terminate his contract under the Texas Education Code §22.0512.
The district argued the Texas Education Code §21.103(a) prohibits the appeal of a probationary
contract. After the vote to terminate his contract, Flores filed a grievance complaining of the
recommendation to terminate his contract. Houston ISD argued Flores should have filed a second
grievance regarding the actual termination of his contract. The issue before the commissioner
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was whether the Texas Education Code §22.0512 prohibited the district from disciplining Flores
for the use of force against a student.
The commissioner held that district failed to determine whether Flores’ use of force was
justified and protected under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The commissioner remanded
the case back to the district to determine if Flores’ actions were reasonable and protected under
statutory immunity. The commissioner’s reasoning was a district cannot terminate a probationary
contract for the use of force against a student if it is justified under the Texas Penal Code §9.62.
The school board failed to consider the Texas Education Code §22.0512 when ruling on the
termination of Flores’ contract. A contract cannot be terminated if it is related to the use of force
without properly analyzing any protections provided to an educator under the Texas Code
§22.0512.
Educators under a probationary contract are entitled to statutory immunity protection for
use of force that is justified against a student. Moreover, a school district cannot adopt a policy
or give a directive that limits a professional employee’s use of force under the Texas Education
Code §22.0512. The commissioner acknowledged training provided by an educator impacts
whether an educator reasonably believes force was necessary. The commissioner also concluded
Flores did not have to file a second grievance concerning the termination of his contract in order
to exhaust his local administrative remedies. For the final disposition, Flores’ appeal was
remanded to Houston ISD with instructions to consider whether the use of force by Flores was
protected under the Texas Education Code §22.0512.
Case of Lewis v. Houston Independent School District (2012)
Claude Lewis was a teacher’s aide in Houston ISD employed under an at–will contract.
On April 12, 2007, Lewis went to a life skills classroom to eat his lunch even though he was he
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was not assigned to this classroom. During his lunch, an 11 year-old male with Down’s
syndrome took another student's work out of the folder and ripped it up. This student, who had a
history of acting out, was a special education student with a Behavior Intervention Plan. Lewis
knew the student’s propensity to act out, but Lewis did not know about the Behavior Intervention
Plan. Despite a teacher’s aide verbal command to the student to stop, the student continued to
destroy the schoolwork. Lewis grabbed the student’s arm and twisted it. When the student
attempted to get away, there was a popping sound indicating the student’s arm was broken.
Lewis then released the student. After the student ran under the table, Lewis drug him out from
under it. The issue was whether Houston ISD terminated Lewis’ at-will contract in violation of
the Texas Education Code §22.0512.
The commissioner held that the district properly terminated Lewis because his use of
force was not protected under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The commissioner’s
reasoning was the student was 11 years-old and in the special education setting. Even though the
student’s intent was to destroy the schoolwork, the student had already destroyed the work when
Lewis intervened. The student posed no danger to himself, others, or any significant danger to
the property. Thus, Lewis’ actions were not necessary. Lewis did not reasonably believe the
force was necessary to further the child’s education or to maintain discipline in the classroom.
Lewis’ force used was disproportionate, unnecessarily degrading, and likely to cause serious
injury. Twisting an arm behind a person’s back is a threat to inflict serious pain, if not even break
an arm. The force used by Lewis was not reasonable and not privileged. The commissioner
determined the district failed to provide substantial evidence that Lewis failed to contact the
school nurse, render appropriate first aid, or follow the student’s Behavior Intervention Plan. For
the final disposition, the commissioner denied Lewis’ appeal.
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Case of Black v. Hart Independent School District (2012)
Dana Black was a physical education teacher and a coach at an elementary school in Hart
ISD under a term contract for the 2011-2012 school year. On September 21, 2011, a parent
complained that Black grabbed her child’s arm. Black met with the principal of the school about
the complaint. Black signed documentation confirming the reasons she had the meeting with her
principal, which included discussions about the principal’s concerns and future actions. On
February 6, 2012, Black taught hockey to 24 first-grade students in the gym. Black repeatedly
instructed the students not to cross a line in the gym. Black admitted she used her hand to force
down the heads of approximately 14 students to show them the line they were not supposed to
cross in a hockey game. At the time of the February 2012 incident, a new principal supervised
Black. On February 10, the new principal and the superintendent met with Black about the
complaint relating to the incident in the gym. The superintendent asked Black three times if the
previous principal talked to her in September 2011, and Black denied having knowledge of a
conversation with a different principal in September. When the superintendent indicated to Black
the incident involved Black grabbing a student’s arm, Black indicated no conference took place.
When the superintendent referenced the date of the conference and told Black there was signed
documentation, she did not admit to the incident or the conference.
The district moved forward with the nonrenewal of Black’s contract because of her
untruthfulness in this situation. The board voted not to renew Black’s contract due to the failure
to fulfill duties and responsibilities, insubordination, failure to meet standards of professional
conduct, and misrepresentation of facts to a supervisor. Additionally, Black was a smoker, and
she violated board policy, state law, and federal law when she smoked in a storage room on
campus. The district included these policy and statutory violations as additional reasons for

94
nonrenewal. Black admitted to the board that she was a smoker. She often smelled of smoke
during the school year, and she would carry an aerosol spray can of something similar to Glade
or Febreeze with her. Administration found a smoke filtering machine with ashes in it in the gym
storeroom, and Black admitted to be the only employee with access to this room. When Black
removed her personal belongings out of the storeroom, she removed the smoke filtering machine.
Black appealed to the commissioner asserting statutory immunity protection for her use
of force with the first-graders. In her appeal, Black did not contest the board’s findings that
Black lied to the administration or about smoking on district property. Black contended the
nonrenewal of her contract stemmed from the February 6, 2012, incident where she pushed the
students’ head down to show them the line they should not cross. The issue involved was
whether Black was protected by statutory immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0512.
The commissioner held the board had substantial evidence to terminate Black’s contract.
The commissioner’s reasoning was that Black did not contest the board’s findings regarding
smoking and being untruthful to the administration in the appeal. Thus, Black waived her right to
contest these issues. The commissioner upheld the board’s decision to terminate Black for
smoking on campus and for her untruthfulness. Even if Black did not waive her argument about
smoking on campus and being untruthful to the administration, the commissioner noted there
was substantial evidence to terminate Black. Black said she believed the superintendent and the
principal were asking about a meeting with another principal. She claimed she did not lie, but
instead she was mistaken. The record contains substantial evidence that Black was not truthful to
the superintendent and the principal regarding the prior incident wherein Black grabbed a
student’s arm in September 2011 since Black’s signature appeared on the documentation.
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Black said in her rebuttal testimony she believed the superintendent and principal were
asking whether she had spoken to another principal about her physical contact with students. The
commissioner emphasized the superintendent’s report was specific and created at or near the
time of the meeting with Black. Additionally, Black signed the document in the previous school
year about an incident where she grabbed a student’s arm. The evidence was enough for the
board to determine Black was not truthful in the interview with the superintendent and principal.
According to the commissioner, lying to a supervisor is a serious matter and a reason for
nonrenewal. There was substantial evidence that Black violated board policy when she failed to
provide accurate and truthful answers to the administration. There was substantial evidence that
Black violated board policy and the law when she smoked on campus. Black admitted she was a
smoker, she smelled of smoke during the year, and she carried an aerosol spray can with her. She
also admitted to the board that she secured the gym storeroom with her personal lock where
administration had found a smoke filtering machine. No one else had access to a key to that
storeroom, and Black removed the smoke filtering machine when she removed the rest of her
personal belongings from that room.
Black only appealed the decision that there was not reasonable use of force against firstgrade students in her physical education class. The commissioner did not rule on whether Black
was entitled to statutory immunity under the Texas Education Code because there was
substantial evidence supporting nonrenewal for smoking on campus and lying to the
administration. Thus, the commissioner did not reach a decision regarding the Texas Education
Code §22.0512. For the final disposition, the commissioner dismissed Black’s appeal for a
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, or in the alternative, on the basis there was substantial
evidence to support the decision not to renew her contract.

96
Case of Almeyda v. Alief Independent School District (2012)
David Almeyda worked in Alief ISD under a probationary contract in 2008–2009 and
2009–2010. On May 5, 2009, after a student attacked Almeyda, he used reasonable force to
defend himself. On August 26, 2009, Alief ISD’s school board proposed termination of
Almeyda’s probationary contract because of the May 5 incident. The board determined the use of
force by Almeyda was reasonable, and Almeyda had immunity from discipline for the May 5
incident under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. On February 26, 2010, the district notified
Almeyda his contract would be recommended for termination at the end of the contract. The
board voted on March 24, 2010 to terminate the probationary contract at the end of the year. The
reason for termination did not include the May 5, 2009 incident where Almeyda used force
against the student. Almeyda argued an email string among the administration proved his
termination stemmed from the May 5 incident.
Almeyda argued his termination was not allowed because of the Texas Education Code
§22.0512. Alief ISD maintained Almeyda’s contract was not appealable under the Texas
Education Code §21.103(a), which allows a board to terminate a probationary contract if it is in
the best interest of the district. The board did not provide findings of fact or conclusions of law
that indicated their reasoning for terminating Almeyda’s probationary contract. The standard of
review for a school board is much lower for decisions relating to probationary contracts. The
issue involved whether Alief ISD terminated Almeyda’s probationary contract based on his use
of force against a student on May 5, 2009.
The commissioner held that the board could have concluded it was in the best interest to
terminate Almeyda’s contract. The commissioner’s reasoning was it is difficult on appeal to
determine a school board’s motive for terminating a contract without findings of fact and
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conclusions of law. The commissioner acknowledged the board’s reasons for ending Almeyda’s
contract were weak since they only relied on Almeyda’s testimony about an anonymous and
unjustified complaint against him. However, there were not any findings of fact for Almeyda to
prevail on his appeal. The commissioner discussed the conflict between the Texas Education
Code §22.0512 and the Texas Education Code §21.103(a). Since the Texas Education Code
§22.0512 is more recent than the Texas Education Code §21.103(a), a school district cannot
terminate a probationary contract at the end of the contract term for use of force against a student
if it is justified under the Texas Penal Code §9.62.
The district inadvertently turned over an email string to Almeyda in a public information
act request that contained advice from the district’s attorney regarding the termination of
Almeyda. The commissioner determined Almeyda could not use the email string as evidence
since it was protected by attorney-client privilege. Even though an attorney did not write the
email it reflected the attorney’s advice. Even if the email string was admitted as evidence, the
outcome by the commissioner would not have changed. For the final disposition, the
commissioner denied Almeyda’s appeal.
Case of Peters v. Dallas Independent School District (2012)
Adrian Peters was an assistant principal under a term contract in Dallas ISD for the
2010–2011 and 2011–2012 school years. S.M. was a 15-year-old freshman at the high school
who was two months pregnant. In December 2011, S.M. requested to leave her classroom several
times to go to the restroom. When the teacher denied her request, S.M. walked out of the class
and said she had to go to the nurse’s office. S.M.’s teacher instructed her not to leave, but S.M.
left anyway. Peters stopped S.M. in the hallway and detained her by grabbing her wrist. S.M.
told Peters she needed to go to the nurse, and Peters did not ask her why. Instead, he ordered her
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to go back to the classroom and to apologize to her teacher. When S.M. disregarded the order to
return to class, Peters began to use a loud, aggressive, threatening, and unprofessional tone with
S.M. Peters grabbed S.M. by her arm and began pulling on her clothes while she struggled to get
away. S.M. used profanity as she yelled at Peters and told him to leave her alone. Peters then
forcefully pinned S.M.’s arm behind her back and pushed her across the hallway, which led to
her head and body hitting the lockers. Peters' use of restraint was extremely aggressive, and he
pushed S.M.’s arm up her back. Witnesses described the position of her arm as being awkward
and looking like a chicken wing. S.M. notified Peters that she was pregnant and repeatedly
requested that he let her go, but he continued to restrain her. S.M. told Peters he was going to
break her arm.
A counselor in the school intervened in the struggle because he was concerned for S.M.’s
safety after he saw Peters chase S.M. to the other side of the hall and pin her face against the
lockers while pressing her arm behind her. The counselor was able to calm S.M. down, but
Peters still refused to let S.M. go. S.M. continued to tell Peters she was pregnant, and he
responded that he did not care. Peters threatened to throw S.M. on the floor. Three other teachers
observed the incident and were concerned for the safety of the student. In particular, they were
concerned Peters would break her arm, and they were concerned for S.M.’s unborn child. The
witnesses all testified that Peters’ restraint was inappropriate, unreasonable, and unnecessary. An
independent hearing examiner, after hearing the evidence related to the incident between Peters
and S.M., made a written recommendation to the school district to terminate Peters’ contract.
The independent hearing examiner, after using the Hogenson factors, concluded Peters was
physically and verbally abusive of S.M. The school board convened to consider the
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recommendation of the independent hearing examiner. Peters and his attorney's requested the
hearing occur in closed session.
While in closed session, a board member incorrectly made a motion to adopt the
independent hearing examiner’s recommendation to terminate Peters’ contract. The board voted
unanimously to terminate the contract. Procedurally, the vote should have been in open session.
However, the vote occurred in front of Peters and his attorney, and the attorney did not object to
the vote occurring in closed session. The issue involved whether Peters was entitled to statutory
immunity protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The commissioner held that
Peters was not entitled to immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0512 and the district
had good cause to terminate his term contract. The commissioner’s reasoning was that Peters did
not reasonably believe the force used was necessary against the student. For the final disposition,
the commissioner denied in part and dismissed in part Peters’ appeal.
Case of Allen v. Jacksboro Independent School District (2013)
Sarah Allen was a special education teacher with a term contract in the 2012–2013 school
year. One of her students, with mental abilities considerably lower than his age, would act up at
times in class. Once the student calmed down, Allen would lead the student to the restroom and
close the door. No one could see what was happening in the restroom. Allen testified she would
hold the student’s hand while in the bathroom to comfort the child. Allen also directed her aide
to use the same technique with this student if the student disrupted the class. The Admission
Review and Dismissal committee did not have this technique listed as an acceptable use with the
student. Jacksboro ISD moved not to renew Allen’s contract. The reasons for nonrenewal
included Allen improperly disciplining a special education student in the restroom where no one
could observe her actions, using a technique not approved by the ARD committee, failure to
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follow directives, and insubordination. Allen argued her use of force against this special
education student was protected under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The board
maintained it voted not to renew Allen’s contract because she took the student into a restroom,
not for her use of force in holding the student’s hand while walking the child to the restroom.
Jacksboro ISD argued Allen did not raise the §22.0512 defense until her closing
statement before the school board. However, a board cannot prohibit an educator from raising the
issue of statutory immunity in closing arguments. Texas Education Code §22.0512 prohibits
discipline proceedings if the use of force is justified, it does not create an affirmative defense.
When Allen notified the school board during the hearing in her closing statement she had
statutory immunity protection, it was enough to provide notice of her argument for immunity.
Notice of nonrenewal has to be specific enough to notify the educator of the reasons for
nonrenewal. While the commissioner maintained the notice was too broad, Allen failed to
request a more specific statement of the claims against her. Because Allen failed to object to any
of the evidence in the record, all the issues were tried by consent.
The issue involved whether Allen had statutory immunity under the Texas Education
Code §22.0512 for holding a student’s hand. The commissioner held Allen may hold the
student’s hand to direct and comfort the student, but she was not immune for punishing the
student. Allen improperly punished the student in a room without any windows where no one
could see her actions. The punishment techniques Allen used were not approved by the ARD
committee. The commissioner’s reasoning was that no law says a teacher cannot touch a student.
A teacher can direct and comfort a student by holding the student’s hand. Allen had statutory
immunity for holding the student’s hand. The problem was the punishment issued by Allen. The
commissioner redacted several portions of the record, so some of the findings were inconclusive.
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With regard to the punishment against the special education student, the commissioner
determined there were three serious problems with the punishment used by Allen. One reason
was not clear in the record due to the redactions. The commissioner determined Allen’s
punishment was inappropriate because she should not be alone in a room without any windows
where no one can observe her and the ARD committee did not approve the technique. For the
final disposition, the commissioner denied Allen’s appeal due to the type of punishment Allen
used.
Case of Moreno v. Donna Independent School District (2013)
Silverstre Moreno was a sixth-grade teacher in Donna ISD. On April 4, 2010, Moreno
used force in disciplining a student who persistently disobeyed in class. Moreno told the student
his behavior was not acceptable, and the student began to yell and scream. Moreno told the
student six times to stop his behavior. Moreno, a skilled boxer, hit the student with a left hook to
the side of the student’s torso. The district placed Moreno on leave with pay for hitting the
student, but Moreno argued the district did not have authority to suspend him. The day after the
incident, Moreno filed an incident report claiming his actions were appropriate to enforce
compliance with the proper command to maintain discipline in this classroom under the Texas
Education Code §22.0512.
The first issue involved was whether the district had the authority to suspend Moreno
with pay. The second issue involved whether the district prohibited Moreno from presenting one
of his grievances against an individual. The third issue involved whether the assistant
superintendent over human resources violated the Code of Ethics and Standard Practices for
Texas Educators. The commissioner held Moreno was not entitled to statutory immunity under
the Texas Education Code §22.0512 because he did not have an objectively reasonable belief
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that force was necessary in this instance. Moreover, the commissioner did not have jurisdiction
to hear violations of educator ethics violations, contract complaints without monetary harm,
violations of the Texas Penal Code, violations of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, or
violations of state or state constitutions.
The commissioner’s reasoning was that he only has jurisdiction over violations of
contracts that cause monetary harm. Since the district suspended Moreno with pay, there was no
monetary harm. Moreno did not show how his suspension with pay violated any state laws of his
contract. The State Board of Educator Certification, not the Texas Commissioner of Education,
has jurisdiction over educator’s ethics violations. With regard to any immunity claims, in order
for an educator to have immunity for the use of force, the educator must believe the actions were
reasonable and the employee’s belief must be objectively reasonable. The commissioner,
applying the Hogenson factors, determined Moreno’s actions were not reasonable in this
instance. Punching a student was not necessary to enforce a command. Moreno did not have a
reasonable belief that punching the student was necessary in this instance.
Moreno only raised the issue of self-defense in his appeal to the commissioner. His claim
of self-defense was not included in the incident report, which Moreno wrote the day after the
incident. Even if Moreno had made a claim for self-defense in his incident report, the board
could have concluded that an unarmed sixth grader was not a threat to a grown man with
boxing’s experience. The commissioner noted that an educator’s use of force is not prohibited
when responding to a verbal provocation, but the force must be reasonable. For the final
disposition, the commissioner denied in part and dismissed in part Moreno’s appeal.
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Case of Olabisi v. Aldine Independent School District (2014)
Juliet Olabisi, a teacher with a term contract in Aldine ISD, grabbed a student’s arm and
pulled her out of line. Olabisi denied she grabbed or pulled the student. The student, along with
other students who witnessed the incident, claimed Olabisi did grab the student. Since Olabisi
maintained the incident did not occur, she provided no explanation for the incident. Olabisi’s
actions did not harm the student. Olabisi claimed the administration was biased against her, but
she did not provide substantial evidence to prove any biases. Information regarding the details of
the student were redacted from the record. Prior to this incident, administrators counseled Olabisi
in writing to model appropriate behavior. In one of the prior incidents, Olabisi used a method of
redirecting a student to be quiet by putting her fingers on the student’s mouth and cheek. The
other incident involved Olabisi pushing a student out of class.
The first issue was whether Olabisi was entitled to statutory immunity protection under
the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The second issue was whether good cause existed to
terminate Olabisi’s contract. The commissioner upheld the school board’s decision to terminate
Olabisi. The commissioner’s reasoning was Olabisi did grab and pull the student even though
she denied this allegation. The commissioner noted the factfinder of the case concluded that
Olabisi did grab and pull the student. The factfinder, in this instance the independent hearing
examiner, is the sole judge of the witness’s credibility. A reasonable factfinder could have
determined Olabisi grabbed and pulled the student out of line without justification.
In order to have statutory immunity protection under the Texas Education Code
§22.0512, an educator has to reasonably believe the use of force is necessary. Olabisi did not
provide any explanation for her use of force since she claimed she never grabbed the student.
Without a reasonable belief, Olabisi’s use of force could not be protected by statutory immunity.
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Since Olabisi did not have statutory immunity, the commissioner determined whether her actions
constituted good cause to terminate her term contract. The factfinder determined that the incident
did not constitute physical violence or rise to the level of physical or mental mistreatment,
neglect or abuse. Even though Olabisi did not harm the student, she did not model appropriate
behavior, failed to create an atmosphere of mutual respect, and failed to exhibit an appropriate
manner of dealing with others. There was no violation of the Code of Ethics and Standard
Practices for Texas Educators in this case. Olabisi violated board policies requiring teachers to
present a strong professional image and create an atmosphere where mutual respect is evident.
Grabbing and pulling a student without justification is not professional and shows a lack of
mutual respect.
Olabisi violated the policy regarding teacher conduct. The two prior incidents that led to
the district directing Olabisi to model appropriate behavior were not the same as the incident that
led to the termination of her contract. However, both of the prior incidents were about improper
contact with students. Olabisi failed to follow the directives of the district, which can be good
cause to terminate the term contract. Finally, even though Olabisi argued the district
administrators terminated her contract because of their bias against her there was no evidence
that an administrator’s bias led to Olabisi pulling the student out of line. Grabbing and pulling a
student out of line without justification violated repeated written directives, so there was good
cause to terminate Olabisi’s contract. For the final disposition, the commissioner denied
Olabisi’s appeal.
Case of Lee v. Dallas Independent School District (2016)
Caroline Lee was a third-grade science teacher in Dallas ISD. The district proposed the
termination of her contract for removing an eight year-old student from her classroom. The
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district alleged she was dragging, pulling, and pushing an elementary student outside of the
classroom into the hallway. A subcommittee in Dallas ISD rejected many of the independent
hearing examiner’s findings of fact, and the district moved forward with terminating the contract.
In Lee’s appeal to the commissioner, she argued Dallas ISD improperly changed one of the
findings of fact, the findings of fact do not support its decision, the district improperly rejected
numerous findings of fact, and the district improperly changed conclusions of law.
The issue was whether Dallas ISD properly changed the recommendation of the
independent hearing examiner. The commissioner held there was not good cause to support the
termination of Lee’s contract. The commissioner’s reasoning was that the subcommittee in
Dallas ISD wrongfully changed the independent hearing examiner’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The commissioner emphasized a school board or its subcommittee cannot
change a finding of fact supported by substantial evidence. Under the Texas Education Code, any
rejection or change to a finding of fact or a conclusion of law must be in writing and include a
legal basis for the change. The commissioner determined the subcommittee wrongfully rejected
and changed the independent hearing examiner’s conclusions of law. The subcommittee failed to
invalidate the conclusions of law, and the board failed to provide a legal basis for any of the
changes. The commissioner noted that, even if the independent hearing examiner’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law had been properly changed, Lee would have been protected under the
Texas Education Code §22.0512 because of her use of reasonable force to control students. For
the final disposition, the commissioner granted Lee’s appeal. The district had to either reinstate
Lee with back pay or pay one year’s salary from the date of reinstatement.
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Case of Villarreal v. Edinburg Consolidated Independent School District (2016)
A second-grade male student threw a female student onto the ground and was about to hit
her when Villarreal grabbed the student and restrained him by bending his wrist. In a prior
incident in 2012, Villarreal improperly used force against a student. Since Villarreal used
improper force in 2012, the district gave Villarreal a written directive not to use force again
against a student. Edinburg Consolidated ISD terminated Villarreal’s contract since Villarreal
had been reprimanded for improperly using physical force several years before. The district
concluded Villarreal used improper force previously, so he could not have had a reasonable
belief that the current use of force was proper.
The issue involved whether Villarreal had statutory immunity protection under the Texas
Education Code §22.0512 for the use of physical force. The commissioner held Villarreal’s use
of force in this situation was privileged under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The district
could not use Villarreal’s use of force as a basis for terminating his contract. The district’s
decision to terminate Villarreal’s contract was overturned. The district had to reinstate Villarreal
and pay back pay and unemployment benefits. The district had the option to pay one year’s
salary from the date he would have been reinstated instead of reinstating him.
The commissioner’s reasoning was the Texas Education Code §22.0512 is a remedial
statute, and it must be construed liberally. It is not an affirmative defense, so the school district
must prove that an employee’s use of force is unreasonable. The employee does not have to
prove the use of force was reasonable. Additionally, a district policy cannot set a different
standard than the Texas Education Code §22.0512. An administrator’s belief the force used by
Villarreal was improper does not prove the force used was excessive. Each incident must be
judged independently using the Hogenson factors. Even though Villarreal used improper force in
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the past, this does not prove that Villarreal used improper force in the most recent incident. There
is little similarity between the most recent use of force and the previous use of force.
The factfinder failed to apply the appropriate standards to terminate Villarreal’s contract
for the improper use of physical force in this case. The factfinder did not apply the standards set
out as the Hogenson factors, as identified in American Law Institute (1965), to determine
whether Villarreal had an objectively reasonable belief force was necessary in the most recent
incident. Because Villarreal used reasonable force, a district cannot take disciplinary action
against him. Even if other teachers on the campus had not used physical force with students, this
does not prove Villarreal’s use of force was unreasonable in this specific instance. Other teachers
who taught the same students without any problems did not prove these teachers were confronted
with the same situation as Villarreal. Showing that other incidents were handled better does not
prove Villarreal handled this situation unreasonably. For the final disposition, the commissioner
granted Villarreal’s appeal. The decision to terminate his term contract was overturned.
Case of Williams v. Spring Independent School District (2017)
Ranti Adio Williams was a middle school special education teacher under a term contract
during the 2016–2017 school year. On January 26, 2017, Williams intervened when she walked
up on two students, a male and a female, fighting on the floor of a classroom. Williams did not
observe what led to the students being on the ground. When one of the students got up and
walked past her, Williams grabbed his wrist with both of her hands to keep him from leaving so
she could find out what happened. The student struggled to get away from Williams, but she
continued to hold his wrist for more than a minute. The student did not have any injuries,
redness, or bruising on his wrists afterwards.
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The day after the incident, Williams wrote a statement saying that she was working in a
seventh-grade classroom with another teacher where she observed a male student struggling with
a female student. Williams wrote she interacted immediately because she deemed the situation a
matter of safety. Williams’ statement indicated she remained seated as she reached out to grab
the boy to keep him from leaving, and she asked him what happened. The male student refused
to answer. The other teacher in the room removed the male student from the classroom, and the
female student told Williams he had punched her in order to take her candy bar. Video footage of
the incident shows Williams speaking calmly to the student to get him to stop and listen to her
questions. The video shows the student struggling to get away from Williams. On April 17,
2017, Spring ISD notified Williams of the intent to propose nonrenewal of her term contract.
At the hearing on nonrenewal of Williams’ contract, two administrators testified that the
force she used was not reasonable to keep a student from walking away. Williams testified that
she stopped the student to find out what happened. The other teacher in the room testified at the
hearing that it is a teacher’s duty to investigate what happened and to determine if there is a
safety issue when an altercation occurs in class. The other testified that it is reasonable to expect
an answer from a student when asking what happened in order for the teacher to determine if a
disciplinary referral is necessary. The other teacher said Williams’ tone was appropriate and that
the student refused to listen to Williams. He also testified that a teacher questioning a child to
find out what happened is not disciplining a child.
In 2011, the district reprimanded Williams for inappropriate verbal interaction with the
student. The reprimand reminded Williams that teachers and students are expected to be
mutually respectful of each other. Spring ISD used this reprimand to assert Williams had a
pattern of failing to comply with the standards of professional conduct. The board voted not to
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renew Williams’ contract, and Williams appealed to the commissioner. The issue involved
whether Williams had statutory immunity protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0512.
The commissioner held Williams’ use of force was privileged and protected under the Texas
Education Code §22.0512 so her actions cannot be used as the basis not to renew her term
contract. The district reinstated Williams with back pay and employment benefits from the time
of nonrenewal. Instead of reinstating Williams, the district had the option to pay one year’s
salary with back pay and employment benefits from the reinstatement date.
The commissioner's reasoning was that the Texas Education Code §22.0512 has to be
construed liberally, and the district had the burden to prove Williams’ use of force was not
reasonable. Whether the force was reasonable must be viewed from Williams’ subjective belief,
not from other educators’ perspectives. The video footage, along with testimony from the other
teacher in the room, led to the determination that Williams’ actions were justified. Williams was
entitled to statutory immunity for using force by holding the student’s wrist to keep him from
leaving the room. Williams repeatedly asked the student to stop and listen to her. A reasonable,
ordinary, and prudent educator would have stopped the student from leaving the scene of an
incident where safety concerns existed to find out what had occurred. Williams asking the
student what occurred was a reasonable and legitimate request. Even though the student stopped,
the evidence indicated he refused to answer any of Williams’ questions. It was reasonable for
Williams to hold the rest of the students for approximately 56 seconds in order to find out what
happened. For the final disposition, the commissioner granted Williams’ appeal, and the school
board’s decision not to renew her term contract was overturned.
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Case of Gracia v. Brownsville Independent School District (2018)
Roselee Gracia was a paraprofessional in Brownsville ISD for over 20 years. The district
terminated Gracia based on her use of force against a prekindergarten student on three separate
occasions over nine days. Hallway cameras captured all three incidents. In the first incident,
Gracia led the class down a hallway and one of the girls stopped at the water fountain. The
student walked up to the little girl and told her to get back in line. Gracia took the little girl’s
hand and hit the student on the shoulder with the girl’s hand. When administration questioned
Gracia about the incident, she said she made the children shake hands as friends. The second
incident occurred when the student stopped in a hall to look into a window of a classroom.
Gracia grabbed the student by his arm and pulled him forcefully back into the line. When other
children stopped to look in the window, Gracia guided these children back in the line by gently
placing her hand on their backs.
The third incident involved several students running down the hall, but Gracia only
punished the same student previously singled out. This student ran down the hall with his arms
out like a bird or an airplane. Gracia waited for the student to reach her and confronted him.
Gracia grabbed the student’s face and moved closer to him. The video footage shows that once
Gracia stood up and backed away, the student looked dejected as he hung his head. The student
told his parents he did not want to return to school, and he complained that his face hurt. Gracia
treated this student differently than other children, and she was more forceful with the student
than the other children who had the same or similar behavior. The district placed Gracia on
administrative leave while the police department performed the investigation. The school district
terminated Gracia because it was in the best interest of the district and the students.
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The issue involved whether Gracia was entitled to statutory immunity under the Texas
Education Code §22.0512. The commissioner held the use of force by Gracia was not
reasonable, and the district’s decision to terminate Gracia was supported by substantial evidence.
The commissioner’s reasoning was that the student was in prekindergarten and his behaviors
were consistent with the behavior of prekindergarten students coming to school for the first time.
For instance, running in the hall, peering into windows, and leaving the line is not serious or
unexpected for prekindergarten students. Additionally, Garcia treated other students who were
running in the hallway, getting out of line, and looking in classrooms differently and much
gentler than the one student.
The use of one student’s hand to hit another student is unnecessarily degrading and
disproportionate to the offense. The student was not fighting with the little girl but was
attempting to help her. Gracia set a bad example and modeled the use of physical force between
students by using the student’s hand to hit the other student. In the second incident, Gracia
yanked the student’s arm to pull him out of the window. Gracia’s reaction was disproportionate
to the offense and completely different than how she gently guided the other students back into
line. Many of the students were running down the hall, but Gracia waited for the student and
only stopped him. Even though the video footage only showed the student’s actions, Gracia’s
negative effect on the student was clear from the video. Before the interaction with Gracia, the
student appeared happy and played as most prekindergarten students do. As soon as Gracia
grabbed the student’s face and scolded him, the student appeared sullen and dejected. Gracia’s
forcefulness was disproportionate to the student’s offense, unnecessarily degrading, and caused
enough pain that the student did not want to return to school. Even though the force did not cause
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serious injury, it did cause an emotional injury that could be detrimental to the student’s future
attitude about school.
Using the Hogenson factors, the commissioner determined the force was unreasonable in
all three incidents. Gracia argued her force was reasonable under the Texas Education Code
§22.0512. In the first incident, she claimed she was trying to make the students be friends.
However, the video footage contradicted her testimony by showing Gracia using the girl’s hand
to hit the student. In the second incident, Gracia claimed the student resisted and failed to comply
with her redirection. Again, the video footage contradicted Garcia’s claim. With the third
incident, Gracia testified she did not touch the student. Even though it was not clear from the
video whether she touched the student or not, the student’s reaction to what occurred differed
from Gracia’s testimony. The parents also reported the student said his face hurt and that he did
not want to return to school, both of which are further circumstantial evidence that the force was
not reasonable. In all three incidents, Gracia treated the student differently than the other students
in the class. For the final disposition, the commissioner denied Gracia’s appeal.
Case of Doggett v. Seguin Independent School District (2019)
Theresa Doggett worked as a teacher at an alternative education program school in
Seguin ISD. The incident that led to the proposed termination of Doggett’s term contract
involved a sixth-grade female who was 11 years-old and weighed 100 pounds. Five students sat
around a horseshoe-shaped table with Doggett working on a project using newspaper and glue.
While working on their project, Doggett made the comment to the students that none of her
family had ever been incarcerated. The students later testified Doggett’s statement made them
upset since some of the students had family incarcerated, including the father of the student
involved in the incident. Doggett knew the student was emotional about her father’s
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incarceration and any statement could serve to escalate a situation with this student. Based on
video footage, the student did not act angrily towards Doggett but instead directed her emotions
to the glue in the paper in front of her.
The principal characterized the student pouring glue on newspaper as a minor infraction.
Doggett got up from her chair, grabbed the newspaper away from the student, and smeared glue
on the student. Doggett testified she took the newspaper away because she was concerned about
the male student sitting next to the student in question. The student then grabbed the paper back
from Doggett’s and started rubbing it on Doggett’s shirt. Doggett claimed she pushed the paper
back to the student who got glue in the student’s hair.
The issue involved whether substantial evidence supported Seguin ISD’s decision to
terminate Doggett’s term contract. The commissioner held that it was not reasonable for Doggett
to smear glue on a student for pouring excessive amounts of glue onto a piece of paper. The
commissioner’s reasoning was that Doggett, an adult teacher, should never have shoved a paper
covered with glue at a student’s face. These actions were disproportionate and unnecessarily
degrading to the student’s offense of pouring glue on paper. Doggett’s actions were completely
unprofessional. There was substantial evidence that Doggett reached out, grabbed the newspaper
from the student, and shoved it onto the student’s shirt and face while pushing her backwards.
Substantial evidence proved Doggett purposefully smeared glue on the student. Additionally, the
size disparity between Doggett and the student was substantial. This use of force by Doggett was
unreasonable and not protected by the Texas Education Code §22.0512. For the final disposition,
the commissioner denied Doggett’s appeal.

114
Case of Zarsky v. Southside Independent School District (2019)
Paul Zarsky was a middle school librarian in Southside ISD under a term contract for the
2018–2019 school year. On December 3, 2018, Zarsky was assigned to monitor the seventhgrade hallway. Three eighth-grade male students came into the seventh-grade hallway to get into
the in-school suspension classroom. These students were not assigned to in-school suspension,
and the school prohibits eighth-grade students from being in the seventh-grade hallway. Zarsky
told the eighth-grade boys several times to leave, but they ignored him and continued walking
towards the in-school suspension classroom. Zarsky blocked the students from entering into the
classroom. However, when someone opened the door to the in-school suspension classroom, the
boys tried to push their way into the room. Zarsky actively began to move the students away
from the entrance to the in-school suspension classroom and pushed them back down the hall
towards the eighth-grade hallway. It was only a short distance between the seventh-grade
hallway and the in-school suspension classroom.
One of the students began to curse at Zarsky, so Zarsky pushed the student down the hall
towards the office. The student then ran off and the other two students disappeared as well. The
whole incident from the time the students entered the seventh-grade hallway to the time they ran
off was 26 seconds. It took seven seconds for Zarsky to direct the one student towards the office.
No students or bystanders were injured, and Zarsky’s actions were unlikely to cause serious
injury. Zarsky's actions were intended to direct the three eighth-grade students away from the inschool suspension room, out of the seventh-grade hallway, and towards the office. He did not hit
or slap the three boys, and he did not lose self-control during the incident. Zarsky’s
responsibilities as a hall monitor included giving directives to students who were not in places
they were not supposed to be. Zarsky was concerned the three students were trying to start a
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fight, so he acted to avert what he reasonably believed to be a dangerous situation. Zarsky
promptly reported the incident to the administration. The district maintained Zarsky’s statement
to his supervisor concerning the incident misrepresented the facts. After the incident, the district
opted not to renew Zarsky’s contract based on this incident.
The issues involved were whether Zarsky was entitled to statutory immunity protection
under the Texas Education Code §22.0512 for his use of force. The commissioner held Zarsky’s
use of force was privileged and protected under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The
commissioner’s reasoning was that Zarsky was entitled to statutory immunity because the force
he used was reasonable. Zarsky was a hall monitor, and hall monitors should direct students to
leave prohibited areas. Zarsky used proper commands directing the students to leave the area. He
was entitled to use reasonable force in order to enforce his commands to leave that seventh-grade
hallway. The district had to prove Zarsky’s use of force was not reasonable. It was not enough
for the district to argue there was a different or even better way to handle this specific situation.
Zarsky used force to push eighth-grade students away from the in-school suspension classroom
in order to prevent a fight. The three boys were approximately 13- or 14 years-old, and the video
showed they appeared to be of average size. The force used by Zarsky was necessary to get the
students to comply with his directive to leave the seventh-grade hallway.
Zarsky’s concern that the three boys would start a fight was not unreasonable since fights
occur at that middle school. Additionally, one of the students had a history of disruptive
behavior. The students ignored the verbal directive to leave the area, and Zarsky used force in
order to prevent a fight. The three students violated the rules to stay out of the seventh-grade
hallway. If Zarsky had not enforced these rules there would have been a disruption. By
disregarding the directive by Zarsky to leave the area and by cursing at him, the three students

116
set a bad example for the other students in that public space. Zarsky moved the students a short
distance in order to move them away from the door of the in-school suspension classroom and
out of the seventh-grade hallway. Once the student cursed at Zarsky, he pushed the student a
short distance down the main hallway toward the office. The actions by Zarsky removed the
three students from an area off limits to them. Zarsky did not use force until the three students
refused to listen to Zarsky’s directives to leave. The commissioner determined the use of force
was not disproportionate even though the students did not appreciate being touched, the
“student’s own actions in violating rules led to [Zarsky’s] actions” (Zarsky v. Southside ISD,
2019, p. 13).
Zarsky was protected by the Texas Education Code §22.0512. His force against the
students was not disproportionate. Zarsky did not hurt the students and he quickly resolved the
incident by removing them with minimal force to prevent a fight. The actions by Zarsky were not
unnecessarily degrading even though the students did not appreciate being touched. Zarsky used
force against the students after they violated the rules. The district claimed that Zarsky
misrepresented facts to his supervisor. It is not a misrepresentation of facts when an educator
conveys their legitimate interpretation of the situation to a supervisor. Zarsky did not
misrepresent the facts of this incident, but instead conveyed the facts as he interpreted them. For
the final disposition, the commissioner granted Zarky’s appeal. The district had to reinstate
Zarsky with back pay and employment benefits. Alternatively, the district could pay Zarsky one
year’s salary from the date Zarsky would have been reinstated.
Data Analysis
After completing the case brief method, the 19 commissioner decisions were analyzed
and then compared to find similarities and differences. Of the 19 decisions by the Texas
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Commissioner of Education in the sample of cases, the commissioner denied 11 appeals (58%),
granted seven appeals (37%), and remanded one appeal (5%) back to the district. Stated another
way, the commissioner ruled in favor of the district in 11 appeals, ruled in favor of the educator
in seven appeals, and sent one appeal back to the district for more information. Table 1
highlights all the commissioner decisions in the sample in terms of the appeals granted or denied
when an educator invokes statutory immunity protection.
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Table 1
Texas Commissioner of Education Decisions
Name of Case

Role

Gender

2006 Lake v. Dripping Springs ISD

Aide

Female

Male

Upheld

2006 Papa v. Presidio ISD

Teacher

Male

Male

Reversed

2008 Johnson v. Kenedy ISD

Principal

Male

Unknown

2009 Earthly v. Fort Bend ISD

Teacher

Male

Male

Reversed

2010 Harper v. Alvarado ISD

Teacher

Female

Female

Reversed

2012 Almeyda v. Alief ISD

Teacher

Male

2012 Black v. Hart ISD

Teacher

Female

2012 Flores v. Houston ISD

Teacher

2012 Lewis v. Houston ISD

Aide

2012 Peters v. Dallas ISD

Asst.
Principal

Student Gender

Outcome

Upheld

Unknown

Upheld

Both

Upheld

Male

Unknown

Remand

Male

Male

Upheld

Male

Female

Upheld

2013 Moreno v. Donna ISD

Teacher

Male

Male

Upheld

2013 Allen v. Jacksboro ISD

Teacher

Female

Male

Upheld

2014 Olabisi v. Aldine ISD

Teacher

Female

Unknown

Upheld

2016 Villarreal v. Edinburg ISD

Teacher

Male

2016 Lee v Dallas ISD

Teacher

2017 Williams v. Spring ISD

Male

Reversed

Female

Unknown

Reversed

Teacher

Female

Male

Reversed

2018 Gracia v. Brownsville ISD

Aide

Female

Male

Upheld

2019 Doggett v. Seguin ISD

Teacher

Female

Female

Upheld

2019 Zarsky v. Southside ISD

Librarian

Male

Male

Reversed
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All 19 commissioner decisions addressed the Texas Education Code §22.0512 that relates
to immunity from disciplinary proceedings for professional employees. Not one educator sought
protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 in an appeal to the commissioner. Thirteen
(69%) of the educators were classroom teachers, three (16%) were educational aides, one (5%)
was a librarian, one (5%) was an assistant principal, and one (5%) was a principal. Of the 19
commissioner decisions, educators that sought immunity protection included nine (47%)
educators at the secondary level, six (32%) educators at the elementary level, and the school
level for four (21%) educators was unknown.
Ten (53%) males and nine (47%) females appealed decisions to the commissioner. The
decisions involved ten (53%) male students, three (16%) female students, one (5%) case had
both male and female students, and the gender of the students in five (26%) of the cases was
unknown. The sample included 14 term contracts (74%), three at-will contracts (16%), and two
probationary contracts (10%). The action by the district to end the contractual relationship with
each educator varied in the decisions. The commissioner heard 14 appeals (74%) regarding the
termination of a contract. There were four (21%) nonrenewal decisions, and one grievance
appeal (5%).
All 19 commissioner cases addressed the educator’s use of force and the statutory
immunity protection given to educators under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The statutory
wording of the Texas Education Code §22.0512 requires the commissioner to determine whether
the use of force by an educator was privileged. If the use of force was privileged, the district is
prohibited from subjecting an educator to disciplinary proceedings for the use of physical force
against a student to the extent that the force is justified under the Texas Penal Code §9.62. The
Texas Education Code §22.0512 defines a disciplinary proceeding as an action brought by the
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school district employing a professional employee of a school district to discharge or suspend the
employee or terminate or not renew the employee's term contract. The commissioner determined
seven (37%) out of the 19 educators had statutory immunity protection under the Texas
Education Code §22.0512.
Research Question 1
The first research question was what were the legal questions in cases decided by the
Texas Commissioner of Education where educators invoked statutory immunity protections? The
analysis focused on answering what the legal questions were in cases decided by the
commissioner where educators invoked statutory immunity protections. The commissioner
considered various legal issues when determining whether an educator had immunity protection
under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. Eight categories emerged involving the legal
questions consistently addressed by the commissioner when determining whether an educator
had statutory immunity, including: (a) administering corporal punishment, (b) the reasonableness
standard, (c) the Hogenson test, (d) board policy and administrative directives cannot prohibit the
use of force, (e) insubordination, (f) the conflict between the Texas Education Code §§22.0512
and 21.103, (g) in loco parentis, and (h) changes to findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Administering Corporal Punishment. In two of the 19 decisions, the commissioner
distinguished corporal punishment from privileged use of force (i.e., Harper and Papa).
Educators use corporal punishment to discipline students. Privileged use of force is used to
“control the student to further an educational purpose and to enforce a proper command issued to
control, train, or educate the student” (Texas Education Code, 2019). A district must first
determine if the educator was administering corporal punishment or if the educator’s use of force
is privileged under the Texas Education Code §22.0512 and the Texas Penal Code §9.62. In
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Harper v. Alvarado Independent School District (2010) and Papa v. Presidio ISD (2006), the
districts terminated the educators for violations of a corporal punishment policy. The districts
punished the educators for using corporal punishment without analyzing if the use of force was
to control, train, or educate the student. Since the districts failed to determine whether the
educator had statutory immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0512 and the Texas Penal
Code §9.62, the commissioner overturned the terminations of Harper and Papa. The
commissioner determined the educators did not use corporal punishment. Harper and Papa used
force to control as student. Thus, the educators had statutory immunity protection for their use of
force.
Reasonableness Standard. In five of the 19 decisions, the commissioner discussed the
reasonableness standard to determine if the educator had a reasonable belief the use of force was
necessary. The cases included Gracia, Harper, Lake, Papa, and Peters. In Papa v. Presidio ISD
(2006), Papa believed the student was attempting to vandalize Papa’s yearbook. The
commissioner decided the attempt to vandalize Papa’s property was enough to determine that the
actions were reasonable from Papa’s point of view. Papa had a reasonable belief his force was
necessary to further an educational purpose and to enforce a proper command issued to control
the student.
In Harper v. Alvarado ISD (2010), the board voted to terminate Harper after she placed
her hands on an eighth-grade student’s face to turn the student towards the reading materials on
Harper’s computer. Harper argued she reasonably believed the force she used to turn the
student’s head was necessary to control the student for his educational needs. The commissioner
agreed Harper had a reasonable belief her force was necessary in this instance. The
commissioner determined the educators did not have a reasonable belief their force was
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necessary in three of the five decisions that used the reasonableness standard for analysis. In
Lake v. Dripping Springs ISD (2006), the commissioner found that Lake’s force against a student
was not reasonable since Lake admitted to an assistant principal that “she lost it” with the student
(p. 11). According to the commissioner, Lake’s own admission that she lost it on the student
proved she did not reasonably believe force was necessary.
In the Peters v. Dallas ISD (2016), Peters used an extremely aggressive restraint against
S.M., a freshman who was two months pregnant. Peters did not reasonably believe the force used
was necessary. Peters did not “have a reasonable belief that it was necessary to continue a very
physical struggle with a pregnant girl to keep her from walking away” (p. 18). The commissioner
upheld the district’s decision to terminate Peters’ contract. In Gracia v. Brownsville Independent
School District (2018), the commissioner determined Garcia’s use of force against a
prekindergarten student in three separate incidents was not reasonable. Particularly, it was not
reasonable for Gracia to use one child’s hand to hit another student, to single out one
prekindergarten student when other students were doing the same thing, or forcefully jerk the
student away from a window when there was no imminent danger to the student or others.
Moreover, the commissioner believed a simple command to stop running would have been
effective.
The Hogenson Test. In eight of the 19 decisions, the commissioner discussed the
Hogenson test to determine whether the educator’s use of force was reasonable (i.e., Doggett,
Gracia, Lewis, Papa, Peters, Villarreal, Williams, and Zarsky). As fully described in Chapter 2,
the Hogenson test is a standard that can be used to determine if an educator’s use of force was
reasonable. In Doggett v. Seguin ISD (2019), Doggett grabbed paper covered in glue away from
a student and shoved it in the student’s face and onto the student’s shirt. The student was eleven
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years-old and weighed 100 pounds, and Doggett was “a very large adult female of much greater
weight” (p. 8). With the significant size disparity between Doggett and the student, the
commissioner determined the use of force by Doggett was unreasonable and not protected by the
Texas Education Code §22.0512.
In Lewis v. Houston ISD (2012), Lewis grabbed and twisted an 11 year-old special
education student’s arm until it made a popping sound. Lewis also dragged the student out from
under a table. When the commissioner analyzed Lewis’ appeal, he emphasized the Hogenson test
factors of age, size, special education setting, likelihood that other students influenced by the
student’s misbehavior, and potential harm. Particularly, the others students were unlikely
influenced by the misbehavior since the student often misbehaved in a similar manner.
Additionally, the student’s destruction was complete when Lewis intervened, so the student
posed no danger to himself, others, or any property. Since the commissioner determined Lewis’
actions were not reasonable, Lewis was not protected under the Texas Education Code §22.0512.
In Williams v. Spring ISD (2017), Williams, a middle school special education teacher,
intervened when she walked up on two students, a male and a female, fighting on the floor of a
classroom. When the male student got up and walked past her, Williams grabbed his wrist with
both of her hands to keep him from leaving so she could question him about what happened. In
determining whether Williams’ use of force was reasonable, the commissioner emphasized that
Williams used minimal force to obtain compliance with a legitimate request, she spoke calmly to
the student, she was not unnecessarily degrading, and she did not apply force in a manner that
would likely cause injury. Thus, Williams was entitled to immunity based on the Hogenson test.
In Zarsky v. Southside ISD (2019), Zarsky actively moved three eighth-grade students
away from the seventh-grade hallway and towards the eighth-grade hallway. Zarsky assumed the
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three students were trying to enter the in-school suspension classroom to start a fight. Using the
Hogenson test, the commissioner noted all three eighth-grade boys were of average size for
children that age, Zarsky’s actions were unlikely to cause serious injury, Zarsky did not “hit or
slap the eighth-grade students,” and his actions were “directed to moving the students away from
the in-school suspension room” and towards the office (p. 4). The commissioner also mentioned
that Zarsky did not lose his self-control during the incident. Accordingly, the commissioner
determined that Zarsky reasonably believed he needed to avert a dangerous situation, so he had
statutory immunity.
In Papa v. Presidio ISD (2006), the commissioner determined Papa’s removal of the
paperclip from the student’s hand and use of force to remove the student from the classroom met
the Hogenson test. The commissioner determined a 14 year-old male freshman attempting to
vandalize Papa’s high school yearbook was a sign of disrespect. The student’s actions would
affect other students and encourage other actions of disrespect. The commissioner noted that the
force and restraint achieved the goal of preventing the student from defacing the yearbook and
quickly removing the student from the classroom. Papa’s actions were not designed to degrade
the student, and there was no finding of any likelihood of serious injury from the restraint used.
Therefore, Papa’s actions were reasonable, and he was entitled to statutory immunity under the
Texas Education Code §22.0512.
In the Peters v. Dallas ISD (2016) decision, Peters shoved a 15 year-old pregnant student
against the lockers and forced her arm behind her back like a chicken wing to the point that it
almost broke the student’s arm. The commissioner pointed out the female student was 4’11” and
weighed 160 pounds. Peters used force against the pregnant student for the offense of leaving the
classroom without permission. While the student did set a bad example for other students, some
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force was necessary to compel the student to obey Peters’ commands. However, the use of force
was significant and included twisting the child’s arm behind her back. The force used was not
proportionate to the offense in this situation. Because the student was pregnant was of particular
concern to the commissioner. The commissioner stressed the force used by Peters risked harming
both the girl and her unborn child. Even after the student notified Peters she was pregnant, he
responded that he did not care. The commissioner, using the Hogenson test, found the use of
force by Peters was not reasonable.
In Gracia v. Brownsville Independent School District (2018), Gracia singled out one
prekindergarten student to punish on three separate occasions. The commissioner viewed the
situation from Gracia’s perspective and determined that the actions against a prekindergarten
student for running in the hall, stopping to look into a classroom window, and leaving the line
was not serious nor unexpected behavior from a prekindergarten student. The commissioner also
noted other students were acting the same way, but Gracia only punished the one student. Even
though Gracia’s use of force did not cause serious physical injury, the commissioner expressed
concern that the force caused emotional injury that could be detrimental to the student’s future
attitude about school. The commissioner determined Gracia’s use of force was not reasonable.
In the Villarreal v. Edinburg Consolidated ISD (2016) case, Villarreal saw a secondgrade male student throw a female student onto the ground as he was about to hit her. Villarreal
grabbed the student and restrained him by bending his wrist and applying pressure. The
commissioner noted the district did not make a decision using the Hogenson test or “another
valid standard to conclude that Villarreal did not have an objectively reasonable belief that force
was necessary” (p. 2). The commissioner clarified that the Hogenson test is not the only
acceptable standard to use when determining whether the use of force is reasonable, but some
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standard must be used. As noted in the decision, while the Hogenson test is “a good and useful
list of factors to consider,” it is not “an exclusive list applicable to all circumstances” (p. 8). The
district’s failure to use any standard to determine if the use of force was reasonable led the
commissioner to overturn the termination of Villarreal’s contract. The district only relied on the
practice and policy violations instead of providing evidence that Villarreal’s actions were
unreasonable. Thus, the commissioner determined Villarreal had immunity protection for his use
of force.
Board Policy and Administrative Directives. Six of the 19 commissioner decisions
explained that if a teacher is using reasonable force to restrain a student, a district cannot take
disciplinary action against that teacher because the force violated an administrator's command or
district policy (i.e., Flores, Lewis, Olabisi, Peters, Papa, Villarreal). In the Villarreal v. Edinburg
Consolidated ISD (2016), the commissioner drew the distinction between a policy that limits the
use of force versus other policies in the district (Villarreal v. Edinburg Consolidated ISD, 2016).
In most instances, a district usually can take action against an educator for violating district
policy. However, a district cannot take action against an educator for violating a policy relating
to the use of force if the educator’s actions are protected under the Texas Education Code
§22.0512 (Villarreal v. Edinburg Consolidated ISD, 2016). Additionally, a district cannot write a
policy that states an employee can only use force to protect a person from physical injury.
In Villarreal v. Edinburg Consolidated ISD (2016), the commissioner made clear a
district cannot write a directive to an educator prohibiting the use of force protected by the Texas
Education Code §22.0512. Villarreal used force improperly against a student in a prior incident
in 2012, and the administration gave Villarreal a written directive not to use force against a
student in the future. The directive stated that a violation of the directive, meaning the use of
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force in disciplining a student, would lead to the recommendation of termination of Villarreal’s
contract. The commissioner noted the 2012 reprimand “sheds little light on the issue of whether
[Villarreal] used unreasonable force in the instances in question in the present case” (p. 10). The
“standard concerning the use of force is objective” and the “incident is to be viewed from the
teacher’s perspective” when determining whether the force used was reasonable (p. 6). A district
must analyze the reasonableness each time an educator uses force. The commissioner granted
Villarreal’s appeal since the district never determined whether the use of force was reasonable
from Villarreal’s perspective. Instead, the district terminated Villarreal’s contract because of a
prior directive not to use force in the future.
In Flores v. Houston ISD (2012), the school board voted to terminate Flores’ contract for
the failure to follow policies and administration directives concerning discipline. The district
claimed Flores failed to call for assistance before using force and failed to follow a training
manual’s directions on how to handle the administration of force. The commissioner found that
the violations of policies and directives were closely connected with the issue of whether Flores
properly used force. Since the district did not analyze if Flores was entitled to protection under
the Texas Education Code §22.0512, the commissioner remanded Flores v. Houston ISD (2012)
back to the district to determine if Flores was entitled to statutory immunity.
Insubordination. In Earthly, Johnson, and Lake, the commissioner analyzed the
educators’ insubordination. In Earthly v. Fort Bend ISD (2009), a student tried to initiate a fight
and Earthly tried to restrain that student. When Earthly refused to follow a directive from an
administrator to disengage from restraining the student, the district claimed Earthly was
insubordinate. The commissioner disagreed. Even though Earthly violated an administrator’s
command to disengage with the student Earthly had statutory immunity protection. The
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commissioner again emphasized that a district cannot prohibit an educator from using force that
is justified under the Texas Penal Code 9.62. The Texas Education Code §22.0512 prohibits
administrators from giving an educator a directive not to use justified force against a student. The
commissioner held Earthly was not insubordinate. Thus, Earthly’s use of force was reasonable
and justified under the Texas Education Code §22.0512, and he was entitled to statutory
immunity.
In both Johnson v. Kenedy Independent School District (2008) and Lake v. Dripping
Springs Independent School District (2006), the commissioner agreed that a district could use an
insubordination claim against an educator for failure to follow directives not related to the use of
force. In Johnson v. Kenedy Independent School District (2008), the district placed Johnson on
administrative leave while investigating an incident where Johnson placed a student in a
chokehold and stomped on the student’s foot on the tennis courts after school. The district
directed Johnson not to contact district employees or to come onto school property while on
leave. Johnson disregarded these directives when he contacted two employees on seven
occasions and came to the central administration office without permission. The commissioner
agreed Johnson was insubordinate and upheld the nonrenewal of Johnson’s contract.
In Lake v. Dripping Springs ISD (2006), Lake used force against an 18 year-old DAEP
male student based on a disagreement in the library over the work that the student was supposed
to complete. After the incident, the superintendent directed Lake two times to have no further
contact with the student. Lake disobeyed the directives and apologized to the student. The
commissioner determined Lake was insubordinate for failing to follow the directives of the
superintendent. Thus, the commissioner upheld the termination of Lake’s at-will employment.
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Conflict Between the Texas Education Code §22.0512 and §21.103. Almeyda v. Alief
ISD (2012) and Flores v. Houston ISD (2012) exposed a conflict between the Texas Education
Code §21.103(a) and the Texas Education Code §22.0512. A conflict arises when a school
district terminates a probationary contract at the end of the contract for the use of force against a
student that is justified under the Texas Penal Code §9.62. Under the Texas Education Code
§21.103(a) the board's decision to terminate a probationary contract is final and may not be
appealed to the commissioner. The Texas Education Code §22.0512 states that a district is
prohibited from terminating an educator for the use of physical force against a student that is
justified. The commissioner held that school districts cannot terminate a probationary contract if
the educator is entitled to immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0512 (Almeyda v. Alief
ISD, 2012; Flores v. Houston ISD, 2012). As explained in Flores v. Houston ISD (2012), the
Texas Education Code §22.0512 is a more specific provision and a more recent provision. The
commissioner determined immunity protection provided under the Texas Education Code
§22.0512 prevails over the right for a school board to terminate a probationary contract that is in
the best interest of the district. Therefore, a school district cannot terminate a probationary
contract at the end of a contract period for the use of force if it is justified under the Texas Penal
Code §9.62.
In Loco Parentis. In the commissioner addressed in loco parentis in two of the 19
decisions. In Villarreal v. Edinburg Consolidated ISD (2016) and in Zarsky v. Southside ISD
(2019), the commissioner stated educators may use force against a student in a similar manner as
parents are allowed to use force. The commissioner emphasized, “as teachers stand in the place
of parents, they are protected from allegations that they have improperly used force against
children in a very similar manner as parents are protected from equivalent allegations”
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(Villarreal, p. 6; Zarsky, 2019, p. 8). The commissioner determined Villarreal and Zarsky were
acting in loco parentis and entitled to protection from allegations that they used improper force
against a student.
Changes to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The sample revealed several
issues that arise when a board makes changes to an independent hearing examiner’s findings of
facts and conclusions of law. In Lee v. Dallas ISD (2016), an independent hearing examiner
determined there was no good cause to terminate Lee’s contract. However, a subcommittee in
Dallas ISD rejected several of the independent hearing examiner’s findings of fact and moved
forward with terminating Lee’s contract. The commissioner determined the subcommittee
wrongfully rejected and changed the independent hearing examiner’s conclusions of law and Lee
prevailed in her appeal. Similarly, in Earthly v. Fort Bend ISD (2009), the independent hearing
examiner recommended that the school board not move forward with terminating the contract.
The board also disregarded the independent hearing examiner’s recommendation and moved
forward to terminate the contract. In the school board’s decision, the board changed two of the
hearing examiner’s findings of fact relating to the credibility of witnesses. On appeal, the
commissioner ruled in favor of Earthly and Lee.
Synopsis of Research Question 1. The legal questions consistently addressed by the
commissioner when determining whether an educator had statutory immunity included: (a)
administering corporal punishment, (b) the reasonableness standard, (c) the Hogenson test, (d)
board policy and administrative directives cannot prohibit the use of force, (e) insubordination,
(f) the conflict between the Texas Education Code §22.0512 and §21.103, (g) in loco parentis,
and (h) changes to findings of fact and conclusions of law. All the legal questions centered on the
Texas Education Code §22.0512 and involved an educator’s use of force against a student. The
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three themes that emerged from legal questions answered by the commissioner were the
reasonable use of force, classroom management and daily duties of educators, and due process.
A determination as to whether the educator’s used force that was reasonable was a key
legal question addressed by the commissioner. Whether the commissioner used the Hogenson
test or some other reasonableness standard, the legal question addressed was whether the
educator used reasonable force. When a district considers whether an educator’s use of force
against a student is justified, the district must determine whether the educator has statutory
immunity protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0512 and the Texas Penal Code §9.62.
The commissioner consistently made decisions as to whether the educator had a reasonable
belief force was necessary to further an educational purpose and to enforce a proper command
issued to control the student. A majority of the decisions used the Hogenson test to determine
whether the use of force was reasonable. In particular, a significant size disparity between the
educator and the student, the amount of force used, and whether the student’s action could injure
or harm another person were determining factors by the commissioner when ruling on the
educator’s use of force.
The theme of classroom management and daily duties of educators emerged in the legal
decisions after the commissioner made clear that educators have rights similar to parents under in
loco parentis. Even more, the commissioner determined statutory immunity would trump other
provisions of the Texas Education Code. According to the commissioner, administration cannot
give directives or claim an employee was insubordinate to overcome an educator’s immunity
protection provided under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. Also, a district cannot write a
policy prohibiting an educator from using reasonable force protected under the Texas Education
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Code §22.0512. Finally, a district must distinguish between its policies relating to corporal
punishment versus the statutory immunity protection for the educator’s use of force.
The theme of due process emerged based on the rulings in favor of educators over school
districts when school boards attempted to make changes to findings and conclusions of an
independent hearing examiner. The commissioner consistently found in favor of an educator
when a school board attempted to make changes to the evidence an independent hearing
examiner determined had weight. Effectively, the commissioner determined that school boards
lack the authority to reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses simply
because they disagreed with the findings from the independent hearing examiner.
Research Question 2
The second research question was what were the decisions made by the Texas
Commissioner of Education in cases where educators invoked statutory immunity protections?
The analysis focused on answering what decisions the commissioner made when educators
invoked statutory immunity protections. The commissioner made a broad range of decisions
when determining whether an educator had immunity protection under the Texas Education
Code §22.0512. Six categories emerged involving the decisions consistently addressed by the
commissioner when determining whether an educator had statutory immunity including: (a)
extensive protections for educators, (b) practices and opinions of others are irrelevant, (c) public
policy justifications, (d) prior incidents, (e) misrepresentations, and (f) admissions and apologies.
Extensive Protections for Educators. The commissioner consistently stated that the
Texas Education Code §22.0512 is a remedial statute and is to be given the most comprehensive
and liberal construction possible (i.e., Doggett, Lewis, Peters). As noted in Earthly v. Fort Bend
ISD (2009) and Doggett v. Seguin Independent School District (2019), statutory immunity is not
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an affirmative defense that the teacher must prove, so the school district has the burden to prove
the educator’s use of force is unreasonable. In Lewis v. Houston ISD (2012), the school district
argued statutory immunity only applies to a student’s teacher, coach, or school administrator.
The commissioner corrected this interpretation and stated that the Texas Education Code
§22.0512 provides extensive protections for all teachers, coaches, aides, and administrators. The
commissioner suggested that if the district’s narrow interpretation was correct, then a teacher
whose student engages in a fight with a student from a different class would only have immunity
for the use of force against a student from that teacher’s class.
Interestingly, the commissioner noted that a school district could adopt a policy that
teachers and others are only entrusted with the care, supervision, and administration of the
students that are on their class rosters. Such a policy would mean that teachers and others only
stand in loco parentis to the students on their class rosters and have no authority over other
students. Moreover, the district could adopt other policies with specific circumstances when
teachers and others are allowed to correct students. However, in the absence of such a policy that
makes clear that teachers, coaches, and teachers’ aides have no responsibility for care,
supervision, or administration of a student, educators correcting any student’s behavior will be
covered under the Texas Education Code §22.0512.
Practices and Opinions of Other Educators are Irrelevant. Whether the acts of an
educator are reasonable must be viewed from the educator’s perspective. The commissioner has
made it clear that how other educators on campus would handle a similar situation is irrelevant
when determining whether the force used was reasonable. As discussed in Villarreal v. Edinburg
Consolidated ISD (2016), the opinions of administrators or other educators on how a situation
should have been handled is not evidence that can be used when determining whether use of
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force is reasonable. Differences in handling situations does not determine unreasonable behavior,
but instead just proves the incidents were handled differently. Witness statements by
administrators do not prove whether an educator used force that was reasonable. The
commissioner consistently explained that whether the educator used reasonable force is a
question that has to be viewed from the educator’s perspective.
The commissioner noted in Villarreal v. Edinburg Consolidated ISD (2016) that
witnesses who indicated Villarreal’s force was unreasonable was not the right standard for
determining Villarreal’s reasonableness in his use of force. The commissioner disregarded the
district’s argument that an educator’s force was unreasonable because no other teachers on the
same campus had used physical force during that school year. It is irrelevant that another
educator could have used a different method instead of force. A district must view an incident
from the educator’s perspective.
In Williams v. Spring ISD (2017), Williams, a middle school special education teacher,
intervened when she walked up on two students, a male and a female, fighting on the floor of a
classroom. The commissioner again emphasized whether the force was reasonable must be
viewed from Williams’ subjective belief not from other educators’ perspectives. The video
footage, along with testimony from the other teacher in the room during the incident, led to the
determination that Williams’ actions were justified. Williams was entitled to immunity for
holding the student’s wrist to keep him from leaving the room.
In Earthly v. Fort Bend ISD (2009), Earthly intervened when a high school student swung
his fist at another high school student. The independent hearing determined that six of the 11
witness statements were not credible. The commissioner established that eyewitness statements
do not always indicate what happened in a situation because eyewitnesses can get the facts
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wrong. Likewise, in Zarsky v. Southside ISD (2019), the commissioner commented that
witnesses’ statements do not prove that the witness got the facts correct or that the situation
happened as the witnesses believed.
Public Policy Justifications. Seven of the 19 commissioner decisions emphasized the
public policy reasons for allowing educators to use reasonable force when they stand in the place
of educators during the school day (i.e., Gracia, Harper, Papa, Peters, Villarreal, Williams,
Zarsky). The commissioner consistently discussed the need for broad immunity protection for
educators, so they have the necessary support to enable them to efficiently discharge their
responsibilities. For example, in Zarsky v. Southside ISD (2019), if the district’s decision to
terminate Zarsky was upheld, “Texas teachers would have to carefully think whether they should
intervene to prevent or stop fights” (p. 15). Zarsky’s actions were justified since he used force to
enforce compliance with instructional commands. The students had violated school rules and
ignored Zarsky’s repeated directives to leave the area. Zarsky was “conscientiously doing his
job. He intervened to prevent a fight. He did not lose control of himself or the situation. No one
was hurt and no danger of likely serious injury occurred” (p. 15). The commissioner contended
“this is precisely the type of activity protected by the Texas Education Code §22.0512” (p. 15).
Prior Incidents. The commissioner analyzed five decisions where an educator was
disciplined previously for their behavior (i.e., Black, Olabisi, Peters, Villarreal, Williams). In
Black v. Hart ISD (2012), parents complained that Black used force against students in 2011 and
in 2012. Even though the use of force by Black was similar in the two incidents, the
commissioner found numerous other grounds to uphold the nonrenewal of Black’s contract. In
Olabisi v. Aldine Independent School District (2014), Olabisi grabbed a student’s arm and pulled
her out of line. Prior to this incident, the district counseled Olabisi in writing on two separate
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occasions to model appropriate behavior. Olabisi used a method of redirecting a student to be
quiet by putting her fingers on the student’s mouth and cheek. The other incident involved
Olabisi pushing a student out of the classroom. According to the commissioner, the two prior
incidents were not the same as the incident that led to the termination of her contract (Olabisi v.
Aldine ISD, 2014). However, both of the prior incidents were about improper contact with
students, so the commissioner upheld the district’s decision to terminate Olabisi’s contract.
Peters v. Dallas ISD (2012) involved an assistant principal who used too much force
against S.M., a student who was two months pregnant. Before the incident with S.M., Peters
confronted teachers in an unprofessional manner on two separate occasions. The commissioner
noted the response from the district on the two incidents was sparse but could not be ignored.
The commissioner held the three incidents collectively constituted good cause to terminate
Peters’ contract.
In Villarreal v. Edinburg Consolidated ISD (2016), Villarreal saw a second-grade male
student throw a female student onto the ground as he was about to hit her. Villarreal grabbed the
student and restrained him by bending his wrist and applying pressure to his wrists. The district
relied on a prior reprimand against Villarreal for the improper use of physical force when
determining whether to terminate his contract. According to the commissioner, even if someone
believed Villarreal used improper force previously, this did not prove that Villarreal used
improper force in the current situation. The commissioner determined there was little similarity
between the recent use of force and the previous use of force. Therefore, the commissioner
overturned the decision to terminate Villarreal.
In Williams v. Spring ISD (2017), Williams intervened when she walked up on two
students, a male and a female, fighting on the floor of a classroom. In 2011, Williams received a
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memorandum following an inappropriate verbal interaction with the student. The memorandum
reminded Williams that students and teachers are expected to be respectful of each other. The
district argued the incident in 2011 and the current incident in 2017 show a pattern of the failure
to comply with the standards of professional conduct. According to the commissioner, “two
dissimilar incidents in six years is hardly evidence of a pattern” (p. 15). Because Williams was
entitled to immunity for the 2017 incident, nothing directly or indirectly related to it could
provide good cause to support the decision not to renew her contract. The commissioner
emphasized that when an educator is entitled to immunity, the district cannot take disciplinary
action against them for a violation of policy, rules, or directives.
Misrepresentations by Educators. Two commissioner decisions dealt with an allegation
by the school district that an educator made misrepresentations to an administrator (i.e., Zarsky,
Black). These two decisions had different outcomes. In Zarsky v. Southside ISD (2019), Zarsky’s
use of force to push three eighth-grade students down the hall to prevent a fight was protected
under Texas Education Code §22.0512. The commissioner determined Zarsky did not
misrepresent the facts of the incident. “Facts are not misrepresented when a legitimate
interpretation of the situation is conveyed to a supervisor. While various legitimate
interpretations can be given of the incident, [Zarsky] did not misrepresent the facts” (p. 15).
Because there was not a misrepresentation of the facts, Zarsky won the appeal to the
commissioner.
In Black v. Hart Independent School District (2012), the district maintained Black lied to
the superintendent and the principal when she denied having a meeting in 2011 with the previous
principal regarding a complaint that she grabbed the arm of a student. Black signed
documentation confirming the reason she had the meeting with her principal in 2011. Black
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received another parent complaint in 2012 for forcing first grade students’ heads down in PE
class. Even after the superintendent and the principal told Black there was a document from the
2011 meeting with Black’s signature, Black still refused to acknowledge that meeting. The
record contained substantial evidence that Black was not truthful to the superintendent and the
principal regarding the prior incident based on the documentation in 2011. The commissioner
determined the specificity of the 2012 superintendent’s report created at or near the time of the
meeting with Black, along with the document that Black signed for the 2011 incident, was
enough evidence for the board to determine Black was not truthful in the interview with the
superintendent and principal. The commissioner noted “lying to a supervisor is a serious matter”
(p. 12).
Admissions and Apologies. Two decisions involved an educator admitting their use of
force might have been excessive as soon as it occurred (i.e., Johnson and Lake). These educators
apologized for the extent of force used. In Johnson v. Kenedy ISD (2008), Johnson placed a
student in a chokehold and stomped on the student’s feet with his boot heels. After the incident,
Johnson called the student’s mother and admitted to stomping on the student’s foot “really, really
hard” (p. 2). Johnson also admitted he did not mean to stomp on the student’s foot, but he was
having a bad week. The commissioner determined Johnson’s admission to the mother
demonstrated he did not reasonably believe the force was necessary to maintain discipline of the
student. Johnson was not entitled to immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0512.
The commissioner came to the same conclusion in Lake v. Dripping Springs ISD (2006).
Lake was a teacher’s aide under an at-will contract at a high school in Dripping Springs ISD.
Lake contended that she used force against an 18 year-old DAEP male student after she had a
disagreement with the student over the schoolwork he was supposed to complete. After the
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incident, Lake admitted to an assistant principal that she lost it on the student and shoved him.
Lake also sought out the student the next day and apologized to him, which violated a directive
from the superintendent not to have contact with the student. The commissioner found that
Lake’s admission that she “lost it” during the incident, along with the subsequent apology to the
student, did not support the argument that Lake believed the force was necessary (p. 4). Lake
would not have needed to apologize if the use of force against the student was necessary.
Synopsis of Research Question 2. The decisions consistently determined by the
commissioner when determining whether an educator had statutory immunity included: (a)
extensive protections for educators, (b) practices and opinions of bystanders are irrelevant, (c)
public policy justifications, (d) prior incidents, (e) misrepresentations, and (f) admissions and
apologies. There were three themes that emerged from the decisions made by the commissioner
when an educator sought protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The themes that
emerged were that the educator’s viewpoint was the only one considered for statutory immunity
protection, justification for protecting educators, and repeat violations by an educator led to
decisions in favor of districts.
The first theme, which appears in cases most often, was the fact that the commissioner
only considered the viewpoint of the educator when determining whether that educator had
statutory immunity protection. It was irrelevant that an administrator or fellow educator would
have handled a situation differently. Eyewitness testimony rarely affected the decision to provide
statutory immunity to an educator for the use of force. When an educator apologized, the
commissioner deemed the educator could not have been using reasonable force. The
commissioner emphasized the educators were acting in an emotional state when they apologized
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for their use of force. The commissioner deemed an apology as proof that the educator did not
believe the use of force was reasonable.
Educator dishonesty about their actions affected the commissioner’s determination as to
whether an educator had statutory immunity protection. In Zarsky v. Southside ISD (2019), the
educator’s recollection of facts of the incident differed from the administration. The
administration claimed Zarsky lied to the administration. However, the commissioner deemed
the educator was representing the facts from his viewpoint. On the other hand, in Black v. Hart
ISD (2012), the educator denied she signed a previous write up in the district. Since the write up
had the educator’s signature, the commissioner deemed the denial to be a lie and noted that lying
to a supervisor is a serious offense.
The second theme that emerged in the decisions by the commissioner was the
justification for the protection of educators. More than one decision addressed the public policy
reasons for protecting teachers as they educate students. The commissioner emphasized the need
to provide educators the necessary support as they teach students. Teachers are similar to parents
in that they have the right to prescribe reasonable rules for the “government of children under
their charge, and to enforce, by moderate restraint or correction, obedience to such rules”
(Williams v. Spring ISD, 2017, p. 8). In Zarsky v. Southside ISD (2019), the most recent
commissioner decision in the sample, the commissioner noted that Zarsky’s actions represent the
need for statutory immunity. In particular, the commissioner noted that Zarsky was
conscientiously doing his job when he intervened to prevent a fight. If Zarsky’s termination were
to stand, as noted by the commissioner, “Texas teachers would have to carefully think whether
they should intervene to prevent or stop fights” (p. 15).
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The third theme was that prior incidents did not always lead to a determination that the
educator’s use of force was unreasonable. The commissioner considered the length of time and
the similarities between the prior incident and the current incident. A prior incident did not
automatically lead to the commissioner ruling in favor of the district. The commissioner
determined that six years between incidents did not indicate a pattern of misbehavior. Each use
of force has to be analyzed from the educator’s own viewpoint before looking for patterns and
similarities. Moreover, a verbal reprimand from a prior incident did not carry the same weight as
a signed written documentation of a prior event.
Research Question 3
The third research question was what were the trends in the decisions made by the Texas
Commissioner of Education where educators invoked statutory immunity protections? The
analysis focused on answering what the trends were in cases decided by the commissioner where
educators invoked statutory immunity protections. Nine categories emerged involving the trends
that emerged as the commissioner determined whether an educator had statutory immunity,
including: (a) type of cases appealed to commissioner, (b) the year the commissioner decided
cases relating to statutory immunity, (c) the role of the educator, (d) the gender of the educator,
(e) the gender of the student, (f) the types of contracts and the action by the district to end that
contractual relationship with the educator, (g) video footage of the incident, (h) the
commissioner of education that made the decision, (i) the administrative law judge assigned to
the case, and (j) prior incidents by the educator.
Types of Cases Appealed to the Commissioner. All 19 commissioner decisions
involved an educator’s protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. Not one decision
included an analysis of the Texas Education Code §22.0511. The Texas Education Code
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§22.0511 provides educator’s immunity from liability. The Texas Education Code §22.0512
provides educator immunity from disciplinary proceedings for professional employees, including
the use of justified physical force against a student. The commissioner had to determine in these
cases whether the educator had statutory immunity for the use of force against a student.
Year of Commissioner Decisions. The first case heard by the commissioner involving
an educator invoking statutory immunity protection was Lake v. Dripping Springs ISD (2006). In
2008, 2009, 2010, 2014, 2017, and 2018, the commissioner heard one case per year involving the
Texas Education Code §22.0512. In 2006, 2013, 2016, and 2019, the commissioner heard two
cases per year regarding statutory immunity. The commissioner heard three cases in 2012
relating to the Texas Education Code §22.0512, which was the most in one year.
Role of the Educators. Classroom teachers made up the majority of educators who
appealed cases to the Texas Commissioner of Education. Out of 13 appeals by classroom
teachers, the teachers prevailed in six (46%) cases, the school district prevailed in six (46%)
cases, and one (8%) appeal was remanded back to the district. Out of three appeals by teacher’s
aides, the school district prevailed in all three cases (100%). The school district prevailed in the
one (100%) appeal by a principal. The school district prevailed in the one (100%) appeal by an
assistant principal. In the one (100%) appeal by a librarian, the librarian prevailed.
Grade Level. Six of the 19 commissioner decisions occurred at the elementary level. In
elementary level appeals, school districts prevailed in four (67%) cases and educators prevailed
in two (33%) cases. Nine of the 19 commissioner decisions occurred at the secondary level.
School districts prevailed in four (44%) cases at the secondary level, and educators prevailed in
five (56%) cases at the secondary level. The grade levels were unknown in four of the 19 appeals
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to the commissioner. When the grade level was unknown, the school district prevailed in four
(75%) cases and one (25%) case was remanded back to the district.
Gender of Educator. Nine females appealed a decision to the Texas Commissioner of
Education. In cases where a female educator appealed, the commissioner ruled in favor of the
district in six (67%) decisions and in favor of the female educator in three (33%) decisions. Ten
males appealed decisions to the Texas Commissioner. In these cases, the district prevailed
against a male educator in five (50%) decisions, the male educator prevailed in four (40%)
decisions, and one (10%) appeal by a male was remanded back to the district.
Gender of Student. Three out of the 19 appeals to the commissioner involved female
students. The educator prevailed in one (33%) case and the district prevailed in two (67%) of
cases where the student was a female. Ten out of 19 appeals involved male students. In cases
involving male students, educators prevailed in five (50%) decisions and school districts
prevailed in five (50%) decisions. In five of the appeals, the gender of the student was unknown.
One appeal involved both male and female students.
Type of Contract and Action by District. The majority of the educators who appealed
cases to the commissioner had term contracts. In this study, the commissioner heard appeals
relating to a school board’s decision relating to 14 term contracts, two probationary contracts,
three at-will contracts, and one grievance. Out of the 14 appeals where an educator had a term
contract, the commissioner ruled in favor of school districts in seven (50%) of the appeals and in
favor of educators in seven (50%) of the appeals. Two educators with probationary contracts
appealed decisions, and the commissioner ruled in favor of the school district in one (50%)
decision and remanded one (50%) decision back to the district. Three educators appealed
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decisions relating to their at–will contracts, and the school districts prevailed in all three (100%)
of these decisions.
Of the 19 decisions appealed to the commissioner, one case was an appeal of a grievance
and the commissioner ruled in favor of the district. In four of the decisions appealed to the
commissioner, the school district voted to not renew an educator’s contract. Out of the
nonrenewal cases, three (75%) school districts prevailed and one (25%) educator prevailed. In
fourteen out of the 19 appeals to the commissioner, the school districts had terminated the
educators’ contracts. Out of the 14 terminations, the commissioner ruled in favor of the school
district in seven (50%) cases, in favor of the educator in six (43%) cases, and one (7%) was
remanded back to the district.
Video Footage. Five of the 19 commissioner appeals had video footage relating to the
incident in question. In cases where the incident was captured on video, two (40%) school
districts prevailed on appeal (i.e., Doggett, Gracia) and three (60%) educators prevailed (i.e.,
Earthly, Williams, Zarsky). Gracia was the only educator with an at-will contract where video
footage captured the use of force. Doggett, Earthly, Williams, and Zarsky had term contracts.
When there was video footage showing an educator’s use of force, the districts terminated
contracts in four out of the five cases (i.e., Doggett, Earthly, Gracia, Williams). The district did
not renew Zarsky’s contract.
Texas Commissioner of Education. Since the passage of the Texas Education Code
§22.0512, the following commissioners of education and their designees have heard appeals
where an educator invoked statutory immunity: Robert Scott heard seven appeals; Michael
Williams heard five appeals; Mike Morath has heard five appeals; Todd Webster, the Chief
Deputy Commissioner of Education heard one appeal; and William Wilson, Designee of the
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commissioner, heard one appeal. In the appeals heard by Robert Scott, the school district
prevailed in three (43%) cases, educators prevailed in three (43%) cases, and one (14%) case was
remanded back to the district for more information. All five (100%) of the appeals heard by
Michael Williams were in favor of the district. In the appeals heard by Mike Morath, two (40%)
districts prevailed and three (60%) educators prevailed. The one appeal heard by Todd Webster
was in favor of the school district, and the one appeal heard by William Wilson was in favor of
the educator.
Administrative Law Judge Assigned to the Case. Four individuals have served as an
administrative law judge where an educator invoked statutory immunity protections. Christopher
Maska served as the administrative law judge in 13 of 19 appeals. Maska ruled in favor of the
district in seven (54%) of the appeals, in favor of the educators in five (38%) of the appeals and
remanded one (8%) appeal back to the district for more information. Joan Howard Allen served
as the administrative law judge in two appeals, and both appeals were in favor of the district.
Merle Dover was the administrative law judge in three appeals. Dover ruled in favor of the
district in two (67%) appeals and in favor of the educator in one (33%) appeal. Sandy Lowe
served as the administrative law judge in one appeal, and she ruled in favor of the educator.
Prior Incidents by the Educator. In cases where there was a previous reprimand or
other disciplinary action against the educator, the school district prevailed in 71% of those
appeals (i.e., Black, Allen, Peters, Gracia, Olabisi). The educator prevailed in 29% of the appeals
when there was a prior incident against the educators (i.e., Villarreal, Williams). In both cases
where an educator prevailed, the prior incidents occurred four and six years before the current
incident. Even more, the current incident was not of a similar nature to the current incident.
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Therefore, the commissioner determined the time between incidents and the lack of similarity did
not show a pattern of misbehavior, so he ruled in favor of Villarreal and Williams.
Synopsis of Research Question 3. The trends consistent in the commissioner decisions
when determining whether an educator had statutory immunity, included: (a) type of cases
appealed to commissioner, (b) the year the commissioner decided cases relating to statutory
immunity, (c) the role of the educator, (d) the gender of the educator, (e) the gender of the
student, (f) the types of contracts and the action by the district to end that contractual relationship
with the educator, (g) video footage of the incident, (h) the commissioner of education that made
the decision, (i) the administrative law judge assigned to the case, and (j) prior incidents by the
educator. There were five themes that emerged from the trends in the commissioner decisions,
including appeals only involved use of force cases, educators with tenure were the only ones who
successfully appealed decisions for their use of force, gender was only a significant factor in the
outcome when there was a male teacher and a female student, educators at the elementary level
are at higher risk of losing an appeal to the commissioner than educators at the secondary level,
and video footage capturing an employee using force led to outcomes favoring both the district
and educators in appeals to the commissioner.
The most prevalent theme that emerged was that all appeals to the commissioner
involved an educator’s use of force and the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The second theme
that emerged was that tenure matters. The type of contract an educator had significantly
impacted the outcome of decisions by the commissioner. Educators with term contracts prevailed
in 50% of their cases. Educators with an at-will contract or a probationary contract did not win
one appeal. The third theme that emerged from the data indicated that the gender was only a
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significant factor in the outcome when there was a male teacher and a female student. The
commissioner did not rule in favor of males over females.
The fourth theme that emerged was educators at the elementary level are at higher risk of
losing an appeal to the commissioner than educators at the secondary level. The commissioner
ruled for the district in cases involving use of force against an elementary student more than a
high school student based on the size of the student and the educator. The fifth theme that
emerged was that when video footage captured an employee using force, the outcomes favored
both sides in appeals to the commissioner. Video footage gave districts a false sense of success
to terminate an educator. Even though video footage of the educator using force had little impact
on the outcome of an appeal, districts with video footage of an incident were more inclined to
move forward with terminating a contract even though the burden of proof is lower not to renew
an educator’s contract.
Research Question 4
The fourth research question was what were the legal principles in cases decided by the
Texas Commissioner of Education where educators invoked statutory immunity protections? The
legal principles deemed from the commissioner decisions will be discussed in Chapter 6 after the
presentation of data from the Texas appellate court cases in Chapter 5. This research question
will be an analysis of the legal principles from the commissioner opinions and the Texas
appellate court cases.
Summary
This chapter presented a wide variety of legal issues, decisions, trends, and themes
derived from the Texas Commissioner of Education decisions where educators invoked statutory
immunity protections under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The next chapter will present
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the data derived from the Texas appellate court cases where an educator invoked statutory
immunity protections.
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Chapter 5: Texas Appellate Court Cases
The purpose of this study was to describe how the Texas Commissioner of Education and
Texas state appellate courts have attempted to apply the statutory immunity protections
provided to educators. This chapter will present the data derived from the Texas appellate court
cases where educators invoked statutory immunity protections under the Texas Education Code
§22.0511 and §22.0512. First, the presentation of the data appears. Second, the results of the data
analysis of the Texas appellate court cases are presented. Third, as the research questions pertain
to the appellate court’s decisions, they are answered later in the chapter. Finally, the chapter ends
with a summary.
Presentation of the Data
Since the adoption of the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 on September 1,
2003, there have been 15 Texas appellate courts that ruled on an educator’s statutory immunity
protection. Data were extracted and condensed from the 15 Texas appellate court cases using
Statsky and Wernet’s (1995) case briefing method. The outline of the commissioner decisions
analysis includes the following: citation, key facts, issues, holdings, reasoning, and final
disposition. The decisions are presented chronologically. Each case is presented in the order of
the following components: (a) key facts, (b) issues, (c) holding, (d) reasoning, and (e)
disposition. Conclusions derived from the case analysis are presented in Chapter 6.
Case of Lane v. Young (2007)
Superintendent Brad Lane appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion for summary
judgment based on immunity. Three plaintiffs sued Lane for defamation and malicious
prosecution, and a fourth plaintiff sued Lane for civil conspiracy and tortious interference with
her employment. The underlying lawsuit related to a $50,000 gift for a memorial scholarship in
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honor of the school board president’s son. The question arose regarding a trust agreement for the
funds to be transferred to the board president’s personal account to hold the money in trust for
the scholarship. There is no written record from the board to transfer the funds from the district
to a personal account. The meeting minutes reflect the board accepting the gift in December
2001. Recordings of this meeting, along with meetings for a six-month period, were missing.
At the time the board accepted the gift, Lane was not the superintendent. Lane read about
the gift in the minutes from the December board meeting. In May of 2002, there was a deposit of
a $50,000 scholarship check into the district’s account and that money was transferred to a
private account at the same bank. An audit for the school district flagged the transfer since the
“transfer was made without the appropriate written documentation” (p. 5). The district business
manager, also one of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit, approved the transfer based on the previous
superintendent’s approval. A board member asked Lane to investigate after four board members
said they never approved a transfer of funds to a private account. Lane performed the
investigation and determined there was no board approval to transfer the funds to a private
account. Lane discovered the funds originated from a family foundation, so Lane questioned the
deposit and subsequent transfer. Legal counsel advised Lane that once the district received the
funds, the board would have to vote to approve the transfer.
The board instructed Lane to contact law enforcement, but the record indicated that Lane
did not contact the sheriff individually. The district attorney requested information about the
transfer of funds, but Lane refused to comply without a subpoena. Lane suggested to the board
that the business manager should be terminated or allowed to resign, and the business manager
opted to resign. The bank subsequently terminated the employee who made the transfer after the
employee responded to questions from Lane during his investigation into the incident. The issue
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was whether the investigation done by Lane falls under his duties as a superintendent, thereby
entitled him to immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0511.
The court of appeals held Lane’s decision to conduct an investigation, along with the
investigation itself, were within the scope of Lane’s duties as superintendent and involved the
exercise of judgement and discretion. The court’s reasoning was that Lane performed the
investigation as part of his duties of the daily administration of the district, and Lane’s actions
were in furtherance of the district’s business. As the administrative manager of the district, the
board delegated authority to Lane to oversee the day-to-day duties of the district. Overseeing
fund transfers and the bank’s handling of the funds are part of the superintendent's duties. The
investigation and questioning of employees and bank employees involved the exercise of
discretionary acts. The law does not define how to investigate and how to do an investigation, so
Lane could exercise discretion and judgment relating to the investigation. Lane used personal
deliberation, decisions, and judgment during the investigation, all of which are discretionary acts.
Even if the board did not authorize the investigation, Lane could have instigated the investigation
as part of his statutory duties as the superintendent. For the final disposition, the appellate court
reversed the trial court’s denial of Lane’s summary judgment. The court rendered a judgment in
favor of Lane and the plaintiffs took nothing under the judgment.
Case of Ward v. Theret (2009)
In January 2006, McKinney ISD hired Michaela Ward as a high school social studies
teacher and staff cheerleading sponsor in McKinney ISD under a probationary contract. Linda
Theret was the principal at the high school. The lawsuit involves decisions by Ward to punish
several members of the varsity cheerleading squad. The cheerleaders were known for their
disrespect of authority, including teachers and other school officials, and their failure to follow
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school rules. Violations by the cheerleaders included underage drinking at off-campus parties,
violating of dress code, and showing up to school dances under the influence of alcohol. One
particular incident involved photographs of some of the cheerleaders in their cheer uniforms in
sexually suggestive poses. Ward and the other school officials disagreed on how to discipline the
cheerleaders. The disagreement led to the school district not renewing Ward’s contract. In
September 2007, Ward sued the district, Theret, and other school officials for breach of contract,
wrongful termination, and defamation. Theret answered the lawsuit in October, and she filed a
plea to the jurisdiction arguing the lawsuit was barred under the Texas Education Code
§22.0511. Theret also requested attorneys’ fees under §22.0517.
On November 8, 2007, Ward amended her lawsuit to include an interference with
contract claim and a denial of due process. On November 16, 2007, Ward filed a nonsuit of all of
her claims against all the defendants. On November 20, 2007, the court entered an order to
nonsuit all of Ward’s claims. Prior to Ward filing the nonsuit, the trial court entered a
memorandum decision on November 12, 2007, wherein the court awarded Theret $14,071 in
attorney’s fees and costs based on Theret’s statutory immunity. On December 10, 2007, the trial
court held a hearing regarding the award of attorney’s fees to Theret, and the court entered a final
order on the lawsuit on December 11, 2007. The order upheld the attorney’s fees for Ward and
dismissed the claims by Ward with prejudice.
The first issue was whether the trial court erred in granting Theret’s plea to the
jurisdiction. The second issue was whether the trial court erred in awarding Theret attorney’s
fees. The appellate court upheld determined Theret’s plea to the jurisdiction was moot since
Ward dismissed her claims against all defendants. The only live issue pending before the
appellate court was the award of Theret’s attorney’s fees. The appellate court’s reasoning was
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that a plaintiff has the right to nonsuit claims for relief any time during litigation. A nonsuit
extinguishes any claims the moment a party files the motion or the party makes an oral argument
to nonsuit the claims in court. In this instance, Ward’s nonsuit of claims against the defendants,
including Theret, was effective as of November 16, 2007. Courts can only determine cases where
an actual controversy exists. Once Ward filed her notice of nonsuit with the court, Theret’s plea
to the jurisdiction was moot. The appellate court overruled Ward’s first issue.
Ward argued Theret was not entitled to attorney’s fees under the Texas Education Code
§22.0517. Ward claimed that her nonsuit of all claims extinguished Theret’s right to recover
attorney’s fees. The appellate court looked at the plain and common meaning of the Texas
Education Code §22.0517 to determine if Theret should receive attorney’s fees. Ward claimed
Theret never proved she had statutory immunity so she should not receive attorneys’ fees. The
appellate court disagreed noting Theret did have statutory immunity based on the plain language
of the Texas Education Code §22.0511. Particularly, the Texas legislature intended for
professional school employees to have protection from personal liability and the ability to
recover expenses if they were required to defend a lawsuit under the Texas Education Code
§22.0511 and §22.0512. Even though Ward nonsuited the claims against Theret, the appellate
court awarded Theret attorney’s fees under the Texas Education Code §22.0517 since she had to
defend the liability lawsuit before it was nonsuited by Ward. For the final disposition, the
appellate court affirmed the trials court’s decision to award attorney’s fees to Theret. Ward’s
appeal regarding the plea to the jurisdiction was moot based on Ward’s notice of nonsuit of all
claims against the defendants, including Theret.
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Case of Robinson v Brannon (2010)
Adrian Robinson was a teacher at Alief ISD during the 2004 – 2005 school year.
Robinson had a relationship with Lynette Freeman, who was also an Alief employee. Robinson
claimed Freeman and Dwight Brannon, a human resources employee, began a campaign to
tarnish Robinson’s reputation. Particularly, Robinson alleged the defendants circulated an email
to other Alief employees about Robinson’s sexual preferences saying that Robinson had the
AIDS virus. Robinson maintained Freeman made harassing phone calls and sent threatening
texts to him. Robinson claimed Brannon conducted an improper personnel investigation and
placed Robinson on leave for receiving preferential treatment from his supervisor. The campaign
by Freeman and Brannon allegedly caused Robinson a stress-related medical disorder, whereby
he had to resign. Brannon and Freeman also resigned from the district.
Robinson filed a lawsuit in February 2007 against Alief ISD and the superintendent for a
denial of equal rights, freedom of speech, and due process violations under the Texas
Constitution. Robinson also sued Brannon and Freeman for tort claims including civil
conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with prospective and
existing business relationships, invasion of privacy and public disclosure of private facts. All of
the defendants filed motions with the court to dismiss the case. The school district and the
superintendent filed pleas to the jurisdiction, and the trial court granted these motions. Brannon
and Freeman filed motions for summary judgment asserting statutory immunity protection. The
trial court also granted the summary judgment motions for Brannon and Freeman. Freeman and
Brannon filed a motion for attorney’s fees under the Texas Education Code §22.0517, but the
trial court denied the attorneys’ fees. Robinson appealed the trial court’s summary judgment in
favor of Brannon and Freeman, and Brannon and Freeman filed cross-appeals for their attorneys’
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fees. The first issue was whether the trial court erred in granting Brannon and Freeman’s
summary judgment. The second issue was whether the trial court erred in denying Brannon and
Freeman attorneys’ fees under the Texas Education Code §22.0517. The appellate court held the
summary judgment in favor of Brannon and Freeman was proper, and Brannon could recover
attorney's fees for his claims related to statutory immunity. However, the appellate court denied
Freeman’s request for attorney’s fees.
Robinson argued Brannon and Freeman were acting outside the scope of their
employment and that they acted with bad faith by conducting the personnel investigation, placing
Robinson on administrative leave, and sending harassing emails and making harassing phone
calls. The appellate court disagreed. The reasoning given by the court was that the educators
were acting within the scope of their employment and were entitled to statutory immunity
protection. According to the court, even though Brannon and Freeman did not have prior
approval to complete the investigation, this does not mean their actions were outside the scope of
their employment. The summary judgment evidence established that Brannon’s investigation and
placing Robinson on leave were within the scope of his employment as director of human
resources and risk management. Brannon had performed investigations on several employee
issues and participated in pretermination hearings as the director of human resources. Thus,
Brannon acted within the scope of his employment when he investigated and suspended
Robinson. Even more, the appellate court determined that the acts were within Brannon’s duties
so even if he did not follow Alief ISD’s policy, this would not impact immunity protections
under the Education Code. Statutory immunity applied for Brannon’s actions.
The appellate court agreed with Robinson that the two defendants did not have statutory
immunity from the acts of electronic harassment, but the court ruled that Brannon had immunity
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for his investigation and suspension of Robinson. The appellate court determined Robinson
failed to produce any evidence that Brannon or Robinson were the source of the emails and
phone calls. Robinson had no evidence that Brannon or Robinson participated or made the
harassing phone calls, sent text messages, or sent the emails. Instead, Robinson merely
speculated that they were involved, but speculation is not enough to overcome the summary
judgment in favor of Brannon and Freeman.
The court noted that Brannon and Freeman failed to affirmatively plead for attorney's
fees under the Texas Education Code §22.0517. However, the Texas Education Code §22.0517
clearly orders the payment of attorney fees if the professional employee is found to be immune
from liability. Brannon was entitled to attorney’s fees for the costs to prove his immunity related
to the individual acts of investigating and suspending Robinson. Brannon was not entitled to
attorney's fees relating to his defenses of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the no
evidence of acts of electronic harassment. Freeman was not entitled to any attorneys’ fees since
she was found not to have statutory immunity for the alleged acts of harassment. For the final
disposition, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Brannon
and Freeman. The appellate court granted Brannon attorney’s fees for statutory immunity and
denied attorney’s fees for Freeman.
Case of Gonzalez v. Grimm (2011, 2015)
Ione Grimm was the principal at a middle school in El Paso ISD, and Gary Gonzalez’s
child was a student at Grimm’s school. Gonzalez called Grimm and recited Grimm’s social
security number to her. Gonzalez asked Grimm how it made her feel knowing he had her social
security number. Gonzalez further asked Grimm if she knew what he could do with her social
security number. Grimm’s supervisor advised her to report this incident to the police.
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Subsequently, the district attorney filed criminal charges against Gonzalez for harassment using
a telephone that likely harassed, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, or embarrassed Grimm.
Even though a capias was issued to arrest Gonzalez, the prosecutor subsequently dismissed the
charges.
Gonzalez filed a lawsuit against Grimm for malicious prosecution. Grimm responded to
the lawsuit by asserting the affirmative defenses including (1) statutory immunity under the
Texas Education Code §22.0511, (2) common law official immunity since the actions were in the
course and scope of her duties as a principal, and (3) immunity under the Paul D. Coverdell
Teacher Protection Act of 2001. Grimm also requested attorney’s fees under the Texas Education
Code §22.0517. The trial court granted Grimm’s summary judgment motion, but the court did
not grant Grimm attorney’s fees. Gonzalez appealed the trial court judgment for summary
judgment in favor of Grimm, and Grimm filed a cross-appeal for the trial court’s denial of her
attorney’s fees.
The appellate court first heard the case in 2011. The first issue was whether Grimm failed
to prove each element of statutory immunity. The second issue was whether Gonzalez raised a
fact issue that would require a reversal of the trial court’s summary judgment. The third issue
was whether the trial court should have granted Grimm’s attorney's fees. The appellate court held
Grimm’s summary judgment evidence was deficient and the trial court erroneously granted the
summary judgment in Grimm’s favor. Grimm failed to provide evidence that the reporting of
Gonzalez's call to the police was incidental to or within the scope of the principal's duties. The
case was reversed and remanded back to the trial court without a ruling on Grimm’s attorney’s
fees. On remand, Grimm won at the trial court level and the court entered a judgment in favor of
Grimm. Gonzalez again appealed the judgment for Grimm in 2015, four years after the first
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appeal. The appellate court ultimately ruled in favor of the principal by upholding the judgment
in favor of Grimm.
The reasoning of the court in 2011 was that Grimm’s affidavit was inadmissible evidence
given it was not notarized or signed, so the appellate court did not consider Grimm’s affidavit.
The one remaining affidavit from Grimm’s supervisor was insufficient evidence to prove that
Grimm’s report of Gonzalez’s call to the police was incident to or within the scope of Grimm’s
duties as the principal. Grimm argued that principals have a duty to protect the students, staff,
and other personnel at school, but the appellate court was not convinced reporting an incident
involving Grimm’s personal social security number and harassment was in furtherance of school
business. The court maintained that the alleged threat was to Grimm personally and not against
the safety and security of all students, staff and other personnel at the school. Therefore, Grimm
was not entitled to a summary judgment for statutory immunity protections under the Texas
Education Code §22.0511.
Because the evidence was not sufficient to uphold the trial court’s summary judgment in
favor of Grimm, the appellate court did not rule on the attorney’s fees for Grimm. The appellate
court reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court in 2011. After case was remanded
back to the trial court, the trial court eventually ruled in favor of Grimm and Gonzalez appealed
in 2015. The appellate court ruled in favor of Grimm in 2015 and determined there was no
evidence of malicious prosecution. For the final disposition, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court ruling in favor of the principal in 2015.
Case of Moore v. Miller (2012)
Joystene Moore was a teacher’s aide in a special education classroom in Somerville ISD.
Michelle Miller, as next friend of Stacie Woodberry, filed suit against Moore for negligence,
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assault, and negligent discipline. Stacie suffered from Rubenstein-Taybi Syndrome, which
caused facial abnormalities, broad thumbs, gait issues, short stature, and mental disability. In
addition, Stacie was nonverbal due to her mental deficiencies. On December 18, 2017, Moore
allegedly removed Stacie from her chair when Stacie refused to do schoolwork. According to
Moore, students could not sit at the table if they were not working on schoolwork. Moore claims
she told Stacie she could stay at the table and do schoolwork. Moore claimed that if Stacie was
not working she needed to stand up or sit on the floor. The initial lawsuit by Miller alleged that
Stacie chose to sit on the floor. In Miller’s third amended petition, she claimed Moore
aggressively dislodged Stacie from her chair as part of a disciplinary measure. Miller also stated
that Moore threw Stacie hard onto the ground. Miller claimed that Moore failed to provide Stacie
with medical attention.
After the incident, Stacie arrived home agitated and crying, so Miller took her to the
emergency room. Stacie was diagnosed with a dislocated knee, torn ligaments and tendons,
damage to the tibia, and deep tissue bruising which all resulted from great force. Miller also
claimed after the incident that Stacie became uncharacteristically combative, uncommunicative,
and distraught. Stacie would wet herself and could not sleep through the night. Moore filed a
plea to the jurisdiction alleging Miller failed to exhaust administrative remedies and claiming
statutory immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0511. The trial court denied Moore’s
plea to the jurisdiction, and Moore filed an interlocutory appeal to the appellate court.
The issue was whether the trial court erred in denying Moore’s plea to the jurisdiction.
The court held the trial court correctly denied the plea to the jurisdiction. The appellate court’s
reasoning was the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) provides exceptions to the
board policy requiring a parent to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a lawsuit. The
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court of appeals determined Stacie’s disability falls within the scope of IDEA. Thus, if Miller
pleaded sufficient facts and provided enough evidence than exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not required. Moore also claimed she was entitled to statutory immunity under the
Texas Education Code §22.0511, but the trial court determined Miller’s pleadings indicated
Moore could have used excessive force against Stacie. The trial court did not err in denying
Moore’s plea to the jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Tom Gray wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion in this case. In
particular, he stated Miller adequately alleged Moore’s actions were disciplinary in nature, and
the trial court did not err in its denial of Moore’s plea to the jurisdiction. However, Chief Justice
Gray determined Moore was immune from ordinary negligence and simple assault as a
professional employee so Miller’s claims for negligence and assault should be dismissed. The
other justices on the court of appeals did not agree with Gray, so the ordinary negligence and
simple assault claims were remanded back to the trial court against Moore. For the final
disposition, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the plea to the jurisdiction.
Case of Madden v. State Board of Education (2014)
Don Madden was a high school principal in Cumby ISD. Cumby ISD permits corporal
punishment of students in some situations. District policy allows corporal punishment of
spanking and paddling that is reasonable, moderate, and not administered maliciously or for
revenge. The policy also requires the educator to consider the student’s size, age, and condition,
as well as the instrument that will be used, the amount of force to be used, and the part of the
body that will be struck before administering corporal punishment. Madden gave J.S., a seventhgrade student, two swats on his buttocks for two separate disciplinary infractions. J.S. was 12
years-old at the time of the incident. He was wearing gym shorts when Madden administered the
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swats. J.S. had an extensive history of improper behavior at school, and he had received swats on
several occasions in the past. Madden had given swats to J.S. for prior instances of misbehavior.
Madden was going to send J.S. to in-school suspension followed by alternative school,
but J.S.’s father requested Madden administer corporal punishment instead. The two swats
administered by Madden caused large red marks and bruising on J.S.’s buttocks. After school,
J.S. complained of the pain, so his mother took him to the emergency room where the staff noted
he had moderate to severe early bruising that was pink, red, and purple. The emergency room
staff notified Child Protective Services of the incident. J.S. was instructed by the emergency
room staff to take over-the-counter pain medication and soak in cold water. J.S.’s mother
reported the incident to the police, and the police took photos of the bruises. Four days later, J.S.
followed up with the family doctor who noted yellow and brown bruising that were healing.
J.S.’s mother took pictures of the progression of the bruises around the same time as the visit to
the family doctor.
The State Board for Educator Certification filed the disciplinary action alleging Madden
violated the Texas Educators’ Code of Ethics and requested a one-year suspension of his
certification. The matter proceeded to a contested case hearing and many witnesses were called
before the administrative law judge at the State Office of Administrative Hearings. The family
doctor testified Madden used excessive force because of the bruising. Another expert who works
with Child Protective Services testified that, according to the American Academy of Pediatrics,
nonaccidental traumas leading to skin abnormality for more than 24 hours are considered abusive
injuries. This expert also opined reasonable physical discipline should not cause the extent of
bruising that lasts several days, and injuries of this severity are consistent with child physical
abuse.
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Another witness, a district attorney, described the criminal standards related to this type
of incident. The district attorney opined the corporal punishment against J.S. was administered
reasonably and that Madden should not be prosecuted. An administrative assistant in Cumby ISD
who witnessed Madden swat J.S. testified that J.S. did not want the swats, but his father called
and consented. The administrative assistant said she has witnessed other corporal punishment
and Madden did not seem angry or appear to hit J.S. harder than other students. She said she
would have reported if Madden gave swats inappropriately or if the force was excessive.
Madden testified the district’s policy allows for corporal punishment by paddling if it is
reasonable and moderate. He had administered corporal punishment at other times, and this was
the first complaint he had received. J.S. did not want swats, but his father requested corporal
punishment over in-school suspension and placement in an alternative school. Madden
confirmed that J.S. was angry when he left. J.S. did not cry after the swats, and the video footage
did not indicate he was crying as he left the school office. J.S. participated in athletics later in the
afternoon, and he did not complain of injuries to staff. Madden testified he believed the force
used in administering the punishment was necessary, and he denied using any force that was
different from the force he had used at other times in administering swats. J.S. testified at the
hearing that he had numerous discipline problems including detentions, in-school suspensions,
alternative school placements, and swats. J.S. noted Madden had given swats to him on three or
four occasions, but none of these instances caused bruising. J.S. indicated he felt a lot of pain
after the first swat and asked for a minute to rest, and Madden gave him a minute before
administering the second swat. J.S. said the second swat hurt like the first one. He described the
pain as feeling like his body was on fire and it was painful to sit afterwards.

163
After the contested case hearing, the administrative law judge issued a proposal for
decision based on the doctor’s opinions that J.S. sustained moderate to severe bruising, the
bruising was a physically abusive injury resulting from the use of excessive force, and the
bruising remained for one week. The administrative law judge determined Madden violated the
Texas Educators’ Code of Ethics by knowingly treating a student in a manner that adversely
affected the student’s learning, physical health, mental health, or safety and by physically
mistreating a student. Despite the finding of the violation of the educator code of ethics, the
administrative law judge determined Madden could not be sanctioned because he reasonably
believed the force use was necessary to maintain discipline under the Texas Education Code
§22.0512.
In SBEC’s final order, it amended one of the administrative law judge’s findings of fact
and two of his conclusions of law. SBEC rejected the administrative law judge’s determination
that Madden could not be sanctioned because he reasonably believed the force was necessary.
SBEC issued an unpublished censure that does not appear on an educator’s certification and does
not affect the validity of the educator’s certificate. Madden appealed SEBC’s final order that
issued the unpublished censure. The trial court affirmed SBEC’s decision, so Madden appealed
to the appellate court. Madden contended SBEC’s final order did not provide adequate
explanation for their amendments to one finding of fact and two conclusions of law. Particularly,
SBEC could not have said Madden’s use of force was not justified after an administrative law
judge, who was the finder of fact, determined the use of force was justified. SBEC noted the
administrative law judge improperly applied SBEC’s policies that require regulating educator
conduct in a manner that protects the safety and welfare of students and to discipline educators
who violate the Educators’ Code of Ethics.
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The issue was whether the district court improperly upheld SBEC’s unpublished censure
of Madden’s educator certificate. The appellate court held the trial court did not err in
determining SBEC’s final order provided specific reasons and a legal basis for SBEC’s
amendment of the administrative law judge’s findings of fact. The appellate court also noted the
trial court properly upheld SBEC’s determinations that use of force against the student was not
justified and not exempt from discipline under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The
reasoning of the appellate court was the Texas Government Code allows an agency to change
findings of fact and conclusions of law and a proposal for decision if the administrative law
judge improperly applied or interpreted applicable law, agency rules, written policies, or prior
administrative decisions.
If an agency determines a change is required, the agency must provide a written
statement of the specific reasons and legal basis for a change. The appellate court determined
SBEC adequately explained the reasons for its changes in the final order. The reasons given for
SBEC’s amendments were: (a) Madden’s belief that he used the necessary degree of force was
not reasonable under the circumstances, (b) Madden can be disciplined since he violated the
Educators’ Code of Ethics and because his use of force exceeded the scope justified under the
Penal Code, and (c) Madden’s use of force was not justified under the Penal Code since the force
used was not reasonable and of the degree necessary under the circumstances.
The appellate court determined SBEC’s final order provided specific reasons and a legal
basis for mending two of the conclusions of law. Even though the administrative law judge
determined Madden was exempt from disciplinary proceedings and that the use of force was
justified, SBEC determined this conclusion was not consistent with SBEC’s policy to safeguard
the safety and welfare of students and to discipline educators who violate the Educators’ Code of
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Ethics. Madden argued the district court erred in sustaining SBEC’s sanctions because he had
statutory immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. SBEC argued it properly
exercised its authority in issuing the unpublished censure based on its findings that Madden’s
belief that he used a necessary degree of force was not reasonable under the circumstances and
such use of force was not justified. Additionally, SBEC argued they are responsible for enforcing
the Texas Educators’ Code of Ethics in a manner that protects the safety and welfare of Texas
schoolchildren. Thus, SBEC determined Madden’s use of force was not justified under the Penal
Code so he was not exempt from discipline under the Education Code.
The appellate court noted Madden was not wholly exempt from the unpublished censure,
which was the least serious allowed from SBEC just because he claimed he held a reasonable
belief that the force was necessary and the force applied was not deadly. State law required
SBEC to oversee public school educators’ standards of conduct in order to protect Texas
students. The appellate court had no authority to determine whether an unpublished censure was
an absurd result under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The appellate court, as in previous
decisions, noted an educator must use professional judgment in determining the appropriate force
that should be used in the administration of corporal punishment. If the educator cannot make
this determination, the educator can choose to administer another form of discipline. For the final
disposition, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment upholding the unpublished
censure against Madden.
Case of La Joya Independent School District v. Villareal (2014)
La Joya ISD entered into a contract with American Administrative Group (AAG) in 2005
wherein AAG would serve as the district’s third-party administrator of the self–funded health
plan for district employees. Exhibit A to the contract listed the broker of record for commissions
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as Bob Trevino Insurance. In 2012, the district amended the contract after AAG underwent a
name change to become HealthSmart Benefit Solutions (HBS), and Exhibit A listed Ruth
Villareal as the broker of record. In 2012, Joel Garcia, Juan José Garza, Jesus Avendano, and
Oscar Salinas ran for the La Joya ISD school board. Bob Trevino allegedly was the main
financial supporter of these individuals when running for the board. Villareal alleged that Bob
Trevino gave $15,000 to some of the candidates running for the board in exchange for them
replacing Villareal with Trevino as the insurance broker in the HBS contract.
In January 2013, the school board voted to replace Ruth Villareal as the broker of record
with Bob Trevino under the HBS contract. After the board took action to replace Ruth Villareal,
she filed suit against the district for breach of contract. Villareal also sued the individual board
members for tortious interference with a contract and civil conspiracy. The district and the
individual defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction pleading governmental and statutory
immunity protections. The trial court denied both the district’s and the individual defendants’
pleas to the jurisdiction. The defendants appealed the trial court’s decision. The issue was
whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the plea to the jurisdiction filed by the district for
breach of contract. The second issue was whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the pleas
to the jurisdiction filed by the individual defendants for the tort claims. The appellate court held
the district waived its immunity protections for the breach of contract claim under the Texas
Local Government Code §271.152, so immunity protections under the Texas Education Code
§22.0511 is not applicable.
The reasoning of the appellate court was that Villareal was a third-party beneficiary
under the contract as a third-party beneficiary so she was entitled to sue under the contract. Even
though Villareal was not one of the two named parties under the contract between the district and
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HBS. Even though Villareal was not a party to the contract, she was an intended third-party
beneficiary since the 2012 amendment to the contract added her name specifically as the broker
of record. The district argued that third-party beneficiaries are not allowed to waive immunity for
breach of contract claims. The appellate court disagreed since the Texas Local Government Code
§271.152 that waives immunity for a breach of contract can pertain to third-party beneficiaries.
Villareal was a recipient of commissions specifically named under the contract, so her breach of
contract claims against the district can proceed at the trial court level. The trial court was correct
in denying the district’s plea to the jurisdiction.
The individual defendants were professional employees under the Texas Education Code
§22.0511. Villareal argued the board members’ actions were not incident to or within the scope
of their employment as school board members when they replaced her with Bob Trevino as the
broker of record. The individual defendant stated that the change from Villareal to Trevino as a
broker of record was simply a contract decision. Villareal argued the only reason these school
board members replaced her as the broker of record with Trevino was due to campaign
contributions to them by Trevino. Villareal alleged these campaign contributions were bribes,
which were outside the scope of protection for the individual board members. The court of
appeals, taking Villareal’s allegations as true for the purposes of the plea to the jurisdiction
issues, determined statutory immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 did not
preclude the trial court from hearing the tort claims against the individual defendants. The
appellate court agreed with the trial court’s decision to deny the individual defendants’ plea to
the jurisdiction under statutory immunity. For the final disposition, the appellate court upheld the
trial court’s denial of the pleas to the jurisdiction filed by the district and the individual
defendants.
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Case of Dallas Independent School District et al. v. Peters (2015)
Adrian Peters was an assistant principal under a term contract in Dallas ISD for the
2010–2011 and 2011–2012 school years. S.M. was a 15 year-old freshman at the high school. In
December 2011, S.M. requested to leave her classroom several times to go to the restroom.
When the teacher denied her request, S.M. walked out of the class and said she had to go to the
nurse’s office. Her teacher instructed her not to leave, but she left anyway. She was two months
pregnant. Peters stopped S.M. in the hallway and detained her by grabbing her wrist. S.M. told
Peters she needed to go to the nurse, and Peters did not ask her why. Instead, he ordered her to
go back to the classroom and apologized to her teacher. When S.M. disregarded the order to
return to class, Peters used a loud, aggressive, and threatening tone with S.M. Peters, grabbed
S.M. by her arm, and began pulling on her clothes while she struggled to get away. S.M. used
profanity as she yelled at Peters and told him to leave her alone. Peters then forcefully pinned
S.M.’s arm behind her back and pushed her across the hallway that led to her head and body
hitting the lockers. Peters' use of restraint was extremely aggressive, and it caused S.M.’s arm to
be pushed up her back. Witnesses described the position of her arm as being awkward and
looking like a chicken wing. S.M. notified Peters that she was pregnant and repeatedly requested
that he let her go, but he continued to restrain her. S.M. told Peters he was going to break her
arm.
A counselor in the school intervened in the struggle because he was concerned for S.M.’s
safety after he saw Peters chase S.M. to the other side of the hall and pinned her face against the
lockers while pressing her arm behind her. The counselor was able to calm S.M. down, but
Peters still refused to let S.M. go. S.M. continued to tell Peters she was pregnant, and he
responded that he did not care. Peters threatened S.M. that he was going to throw her to the floor.
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Three other teachers observed the incident and were concerned for the safety of the student.
Specifically, they were concerned Peters would break her arm, and they were concerned with her
unborn child. The witnesses all testified that Peters’ restraint was inappropriate, unreasonable,
and unnecessary.
An independent hearing examiner, after hearing the evidence related to the incident
between Peters and S.M., made a written recommendation to the school district to terminate
Peters’ contract. The independent hearing examiner, after using the Hogenson factors, concluded
Peters was physically and verbally abusive of S.M. The school board convened to consider the
recommendation of the independent hearing examiner. Peters and his attorney's requested the
hearing occur in closed session. While in closed session, a board member incorrectly made a
motion to adopt the independent hearing examiner’s recommendation to terminate Peters’
contract. A second board member seconded the motion, and the board voted unanimously to
terminate the contract. Procedurally, the vote should have occurred in an open session. However,
the vote occurred in front of Peters and his attorney and an objection was never made regarding
the vote occurring in closed session.
Peters appealed the decision of the school board to the commissioner and argued the
board violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to vote on the termination of his contract in
open session. The commissioner ruled he could not consider Peters’ open meetings complaint
because he failed to object to the closed session vote at the time it occurred in front of the school
board. The commissioner adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing
examiner in full. The commissioner noted Peters’ use of force was not justified in restraining
S.M. The commissioner ruled there was substantial evidence supporting the good cause to
terminate Peters’ court. Peters appealed the decision of the commissioner to the district court. He
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also filed a declaratory judgment separate and apart from the appeal of the commissioner’s
decision asking for a ruling that the school board’s vote was void given it was made in closed
session. The court found substantial evidence supporting the termination of Peters. However, the
trial court held the commissioner’s decision was void because of the violation of the open
meetings act by the school board. Dallas ISD and the commissioner appealed the trial court’s
decision to be appellate court.
The issue was whether the trial court erred in determining the termination vote was void
due to the open meetings violation by the school board. The second issue was whether the trial
court erred in granting conditional attorney’s fees and costs to Peters. The third issue was
whether the trial court correctly determined there was substantial evidence to support Peters’
termination. The holding of the appellate court was that the school board’s vote in closed session
did not lead to an erroneous decision by the commissioner. The trial court erred in ruling the
school board’s vote was void since it was made in closed session. The trial court erred in
awarding Peters’ attorney's fees and costs under the Open Meetings Act.
The reasoning of the appellate court was Peter did not use reasonable force in the
particular incident. Using the Hogenson factors, the appellate court noted S.M. was 15 years-old,
4’11” and 160 pounds. She was also two months pregnant. Peters, on the other hand, was 5’11”
and weighed approximately 189 pounds. The evidence was the incident lasted approximately 10
minutes in the hallway. It caused classes to be disrupted and several other students, parents, and
faculty witnessed the accident. S.W. never threatened or acted with intent to harm others, herself
or school property. The appellate court determined reasonable minds could have reached the
same conclusion as the commissioner when considering the use of force by Peters. Therefore,
substantial evidence exists to support the termination of Peter’s contract.
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Regarding the argument that the vote to terminate Peters’ contract was void, the appellate
court noted that the standard of review derives from the education code. A district court cannot
reverse a Commissioner decision based on a procedural error by a school board unless the court
determines the error likely led to an erroneous decision by the commissioner. Thus, the question
for the appellate court is whether a closed session vote likely led to an erroneous decision by the
school board. The appellate court determined it was not an erroneous decision because Peters
and his attorney were present and observed the vote in closed session. No objection was made at
that time. Further, there is no evidence that the vote would have differed if it occurred in open
session. The award of attorney's fees and costs to Peters by the trial court was reversed because
Peters did not have standing to pursue an open meetings claim. The appellate court could reverse
the award of attorney’s fees in this case.
The appellate court determined the vote in closed session did not cause the school board
to make an erroneous decision and there was substantial evidence supporting the termination.
Therefore, the appellate court ruled in favor of Dallas ISD in the commissioner. For the final
disposition, the appellate court reversed and rendered the trial court’s decision in favor of Dallas
ISD and the Texas Commissioner of Education. Dallas ISD could terminate Peters.
Case of Rivera v. Port Arthur Independent School District (2016)
In 2004, Trinidad Rivera filed an Equal Opportunity Employment Commission complaint
and a subsequent lawsuit asserting claims of discrimination and retaliation by his employer, Port
Arthur ISD. At the time, Rivera was a teacher at Memorial High School. Rivera and Port Arthur
ISD settled the lawsuit in October 2006. In 2009, Rivera was the head football coach at Edison
Middle School in Port Arthur ISD. An incident occurred during a football game in September
2006 wherein Rivera grabbed a player by the collar and told him to get off the field to avoid a
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penalty. When Rivera grabbed the student by his shoulder pads, it scratched the student on the
neck. The student later complained to this mother that Rivera choked him, and the mother
reported the incident to the principal of the school, Barbara Polk. Polk placed Rivera on paid
leave during the investigation, which was standard practice for the district. The investigation
included witness statements, including eyewitness testimony from an assistant coach, Johnny
Brown.
After the investigation, the board voted to terminate Rivera’s term contract and Rivera
appealed. On appeal, the board determined Rivera should be reinstated, and Rivera returned to
the district as a physical education teacher at an alternative school. Rivera no longer received the
coaching stipend of approximately $6,700. Rivera was never selected for open coaching
positions in the district, so he sued the district, the superintendent, the principal, and the assistant
coach for retaliation under the Texas Commission of Human Rights Act (THRCA). Rivera’s
lawsuit asserted the defendants retaliated against him because of his previous lawsuit. Rivera
also alleged that Cooper, the assistant coach, encouraged the student's mother to file a complaint
against Rivera because Cooper wanted to be the head football coach. Rivera claimed he heard
months before the incident that Cooper would be the new head coach. Rivera’s theory was that
Cooper and the principal conspired to remove Rivera as head coach. The jury ruled in favor of
Rivera’s retaliation claims and ordered payment of $21,100 in lost earnings and $21,100 in
compensatory earnings. The district filed a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) motion
because Rivera did not have evidence establishing a causal link between the first lawsuit in 2006
and the current lawsuit. The court noted there was no evidence that the adverse employment
action was in retaliation for the prior lawsuit in 2006. The court granted the JNOV motion and
dismissed the claims. Rivera appealed the JNOV by the trial court.
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The first issue was whether the trial court erred in granting the district’s judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The second issue was whether the trial court erred in
granting the plea to the jurisdictions filed by the superintendent, the principal, and the assistant
coach. The third issue was whether the court erred in failing to award attorneys’ fees under the
Texas Education Code §22.0511. The appellate court held that Rivera did not have any evidence
that the district retaliated against him in the adverse employment action in 2009 after he filed the
2006 lawsuit. The appellate court overruled Rivera’s claim that the trial court erred in dismissing
the claims against the individual defendants because Rivera failed to plead a cause of action
under the TCRCA against the individuals. The appellate court denied the individual defendants
were not entitled to statutory immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0511, so they did
not receive attorneys’ fees under Texas Education Code §22.0517.
The reasoning of the appellate court was that Rivera could not prove a link between the
adverse employment actions in 2006 and 2009. The court noted many areas where Rivera lacked
evidence. Particularly, Cooper did not have decision-making authority relating to Rivera’s job so
Cooper could not suspend or terminate Rivera. Rivera had no evidence that Cooper encouraged
the student’s mother to file a complaint against Rivera in order for Cooper to take Rivera’s head
coaching job. The evidence indicated that the superintendent and the principal lacked the
knowledge of Rivera’s previous lawsuit in 2006 so there could not be retaliation on their part.
There was no evidence that the district failed to follow its policies and procedures relating to the
adverse employment action, and there was no evidence that the district was inconsistent in the
treatment of Rivera.
The appellate court agreed the trial court improperly dismissed the claims against the
individual defendants under their plea to the jurisdiction. However, Rivera failed to plead a cause
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of action under the TCHRA against the individual defendants. Rivera did not argue this issue on
appeal, so the court cannot rule on this issue since it is not properly before the appellate court.
The appellate court determined the individual defendants were not entitled to payment of
attorney's fees under §22.0511 and §22.0517 since the individual defendants were dismissed by
the trial court under the election of remedies under the Texas Tort Claims Act, not under
statutory immunity.
The individual defendants did not raise the statutory immunity defense until the appeal.
The appellate court held the trial court correctly granted the plea to the jurisdiction under the
election of remedies from the Texas Civil and Practice Remedies Code §101.106, and the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not provide attorneys’ fees. The trial court was correct in
granting the plea to the jurisdiction under this statute since the individual defendants did not
plead protection under Texas Education Code §22.0511. For the final disposition, the court
upheld the trial court’s JNOV motion, and the individual defendants were not entitled to
attorneys’ fees under Texas Education Code §22.0517.
Case of McPherson v. Wylie (2016)
Matt Wylie, the father of H.W., filed suit against two Blum ISD employees after H.W.
sustained injuries during the summer athletic program held in Blum ISD’s gym. McPherson was
the supervisor and director of the program, which was not part of the district’s curriculum. Wylie
met with McPherson to discuss a prior injury of H.W. During the meeting, Wylie gave
McPherson a doctor’s notes indicating H.W. should not participate in jump drills. Langston was
a Blum ISD employee who assisted with the summer athletic program. During workouts,
Langston required H.W. to do jump training drills. He ordered H.W. to jump faster, and H.W.
severely injured her leg during the drill. Wylie sued McPherson and Langston for negligence.
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McPherson and Langston filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming the trial court lacked the
jurisdiction to hear the case since they had immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0511.
The trial court denied McPherson and Langston’s pleas to the jurisdiction stating the statutory
immunity provides immunity from liability, not immunity from suit. The court gave no other
explanation regarding the denial of the pleas, and the court did not rule on Wylie’s objection to
the plea to the jurisdiction.
McPherson and Langston appealed the denial of the pleas to the jurisdiction arguing they
have statutory immunity and official immunity. McPherson and Langston also claimed they are
entitled to attorney fees under §22.0517. Wylie’s lawsuit did not specify whether the lawsuit was
against McPherson and Langston individually or in their official capacity. The lawsuit claimed
the employees were not acting in their official capacities since the injury occurred over the
summer, and the injuries were the result of the individuals’ negligence. The first issue was
whether the trial court erred in denying the pleas to the jurisdiction because McPherson and
Langston have statutory immunity under §22.0511. The second issue was whether the trial court
erred in denying that McPherson and Langston enjoyed immunity if they are sued in their official
capacity as Blum ISD employees. The appellate court held the trial court properly overruled
McPherson and Langston’s pleas to the jurisdiction and request for attorneys’ fees. The lawsuit
was against McPherson and Langston individually, not in their official capacity as employees of
Blum ISD.
The reasoning of the appellate court was that employees of a school district can be sued
individually or in their official capacity or both. Wylie sued McPherson and Langston
individually, and they are entitled to statutory immunity as individuals. Statutory immunity
provides immunity from liability. Hence, the trial court could hear the lawsuit. Immunity from
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liability will prevent a plaintiff from recovering damages, but the court can still hear the lawsuit.
For the final disposition, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s denial of the pleas to the
jurisdiction.
Case of Edinburg Consolidated Independent School District v. Smith (2016)
Mariley ReBollar was a senior in Edinburg Consolidated ISD in 2015-2016. During the
school year, Reynaldo Garza, ReBollar’s counselor, advised her that a dual enrollment computer
science class would be weighted for class ranking purposes. The computer science class would
add an additional 10 points to ReBollar’s grade point average. The computer science class was
offered for the first time in 2014–2015, and students received an additional 10 points weight for
the class. Daniel ReBollar taught the computer science class at the high school. The class was
primarily taken by freshmen and sophomores, and ReBollar took the class as a senior and
received a 100. Upon completion of the class, school administration realized the computer class
did not constitute a core class and could not be used for ranking purposes.
On January 19, 2016, the principal of the high school, Sylvia Ledesma, sent a letter to all
the seventy to eighty students who had enrolled in the class informing them it would not be
counted towards class rankings for the 2016 graduating class. Without the weighted points,
ReBollar would lose her place as the valedictorian of her class. On February 5, 2016, ReBollar
and her parents filed a grievance alleging the counselor told ReBollar before she registered and
attended the class that it would be a weighted class for class ranking purposes. ReBollar relied on
these statements when deciding whether to take the class. The grievance asked the school district
to include the 10 point weight to the computer science class in the calculating the 2016 class
rank.
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On March 4, 2016, Ladesma wrote a decision denying the grievance. The denial stated
that the district’s board policy only allows English, languages other than English, mathematics,
science, and social studies to be part of the calculation of the class rank semester grades.
ReBollar and her parents filed a Level II appeal. On April 7, 2016, Carlos Guzman, the High
School Area Director of Edinburg Consolidated ISD, wrote a response denying the grievance for
several reasons. ReBollar and her parents again appealed the decision. The school board heard
the Level III appeal on April 22, 2016, and the board denied the appeal. On April 18, 2016, the
ReBollars filed a lawsuit against Edinburg Consolidated ISD and Ledesma. The trial court also
granted a Temporary Restraining Order in favor of the ReBollars through May 2. On April 27th,
Lydia Elizono Mount, individually and as next friend of Michael Edward Reed, filed a motion to
intervene in the lawsuit and also filed a plea to the jurisdiction. Mount asserted the additional 10
point weight would affect her son’s class rank since he would not be the valedictorian.
On May 2, 2016, the ReBollars filed their third amended lawsuit, along with an
application for a Temporary Restraining Order and a request for a temporary injunction against
the school district, Ledesma, and Guzman. The ReBollars sued Ledesma and Guzman for
fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, general negligence, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The third amended petition included ultra vires claims against
Ledesma and Guzman. The ReBollars claimed the failure to include the ten weighted points
damaged ReBollar because she would no longer be valedictorian. The valedictorian at every
school in Texas receives free tuition for the first year at a public university of their choosing.
Without the additional ten points, Michael Reed would be the class valedictorian and awarded
the first year of free tuition at a Texas public university. The school district and its employees
filed their answers, pleas to the jurisdiction, and other arguments against the lawsuit, and they
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asserted statutory immunity protection. Ledesma asserted protection under the Texas Education
Code §22.0511, claiming she was not liable for any incidents occurring within the scope of her
position and that involved exercise of judgment on her part.
On May 2, 2016, Mount filed an amended intervention and plea to the jurisdiction asking
for the trial court to dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order. The trial court held hearings on
April 25, April 27, and May 3, 2016, on the pleas to the jurisdiction and the temporary
injunction. ReBollar, ReBollar’s parents, Mount, Ledesma, Guzman, and the superintendent
provided testimony about the rationale for the ten point weights. On May 5, 2016, the trial court
denied the pleas to jurisdiction and issued a temporary injunction at 10:05 a.m. prohibiting the
district and the district’s employees from excluding the computer science course from the class
rank calculations. The temporary injunction prohibited the calculation of class rank without the
ten point weights for the computer science class until there was a trial on the merits set for
October 17, 2016. The trial court required a $500 bond in order for the temporary injunction to
become effective.
At approximately noon on May 5, 2016, the district and the individual employees
perfected their appeal and announced they would move forward with the class rankings because
they were entitled to an automatic stay of the temporary injunction by perfecting the appeal. On
May 6, 2016, the ReBollars filed a petition for writ of injunction with the appellate court. The
district proceeded with ranking the students on May 6th and informed Michael Reed he would be
the class valedictorian. Ledesma instructed him to prepare his valedictorian speech for
graduation. Administration also notified the other top ten rank students. Shortly after the
announcement of the valedictorian and top ten students, the ReBollars posted the $500 bond
required for the temporary injunction. That same afternoon, the appellate court issued a
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temporary order reinstating the temporary injunction. Any interested party was required to file a
response to the petition for writ of injunction. The school district and its individual employees
requested the appellate court dissolve the emergency order and dismiss or deny the petition for
writ of injunction. Mount filed a response contending the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to
issue injunctive relief and requested the petition be moot since the final grades were calculated
on May 6, 2016. Mount argued the injunctive relief was moot since the valedictorian and top ten
students were already named. The ReBollars argued Ledesma and Guzman acted outside the
scope of their employment, exceeded their authority, and failed to comply with district policy
regarding class ranking.
The issue was whether Edinburg Consolidated ISD, Ledesma, and Guzman possess
governmental or official immunity for their determination that a computer science class does not
count as a weighted class for the purposes of class ranking. The appellate court held Edinburg
Consolidated ISD, Ledesma, and Guzman have immunity from suit. The trial court’s order
granting the temporary injunction was reversed, so the temporary injunction was dissolved. The
trial court improperly denied the pleas to the jurisdiction filed by all the defendants so there is no
jurisdiction to sue the defendants. The petition for writ of injunction is moot.
The reasoning of the appellate court was that under the Texas Civil Practices and
Remedies Code §101.106, the election of remedies immediately and forever bars any suit or
recovery by the plaintiff against individual employees of a governmental unit regarding the same
subject matter. Therefore, the claims against Ledesma and Guzman in their individual capacities
were barred. The ReBollars brought an ultra vires claim against Ledesma and Guzman claiming
they were not protected by governmental immunity because they acted ultra vires. Ultra vires
means the individuals acted without legal authority in carrying out their duties. The ReBollar’s
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ultra vires claims are Ledesma and Guzman followed board policy in their decision to exclude
computer science as a class for purposes of class rank and acted without legal authority. The
appellate court denied the ultra vires claim stating the ReBollar’s mere assertion of legal
conclusions and labeling of Ledesma and Guzman’s actions as ultra vires does not prove they
were acting beyond their authority.
The court further noted that the district and the individual employees admitted throughout
the proceedings they made a mistake when they advised ReBollar and other students that the
computer science class would be weighted for class ranking. However, nothing in the pleadings
or the record indicate that Ledesma and Guzman made a determination in a way the law would
not allow. The appellate court also noted the school board upheld the decision not to include the
additional weight for the class in the Level III grievance decision. The ultra vires exception does
not overcome the immunity for the individual defendants in the case. For the final disposition,
the appellate court vacated the temporary order and dissolved the temporary injunction. The
appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of the pleas to the jurisdiction and dismissed the
ReBollars claims.
Case of Will v. Bambenek (2017)
S.N.W. was a sophomore student at one of the high schools in Plano ISD. Eric and
Michelle Will, the parents of S.N.W., sued Bambenek, S.N.W.’s high school chemistry teacher.
S.N.W. burned her hand during a chemistry experiment after she spilled hydraulic acid. The Will
Family sued Cathy Bambenek for negligence. The Will Family alleged Bambenek was negligent
because she failed to (a) provide protective equipment, including gloves, when handling
hydraulic acid, (b) follow the guidelines for safe chemical use in the classroom, and (c) follow
the required chemical burn protocol. Bambenek filed a motion for summary judgment claiming
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she was immune from liability under the Texas Education Code §22.0511. The trial court granted
the summary judgment, and the Will Family appealed.
The issue was whether the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment for
Bambenek. The appellate court held Bambenek was entitled to statutory immunity protection
under the Texas Education Code §22.0511. The Will Family argued Bambenek failed to follow
the nondiscretionary school safety policies for lab experiments. The appellate court disagreed.
The reasoning of the appellate court was that Bambenek demonstrated the decisions regarding
classroom safety policies involved her judgment and discretion. She also provided evidence that
safety policies were not mandatory rules in the district and that the experiment was not mandated
by the school district. Instead, Bambenek and her department chair found the experiment in a
scientific newsletter used as a resource for teachers to make learning informative and innovative.
Bambenek demonstrated she conducted the experiment personally, and she determined it
was appropriate for her students to perform. The students were required to take and receive an A
on a written safety quiz before the experiment, and the parents signed a science class safety
agreement. Before the students took the safety quiz, Bambenek reviewed in detail the safety rules
and did a demonstration of the experiment to show them how to conduct it. The demonstration
included ways to clean up spills and how to wash acid off their hands and clothing if needed.
Bambenek also noted that she had the authority to remove students from any experiment where
safety rules were violated.
The court of appeals determined Bambenek was in charge of creating and implementing
safety protocols for the classroom. She had discretion when safety goggles should be worn
during experiments, and she assisted in the preparation of the safety quiz about other laboratory
safety rules. The appellate court determined Bambenek deliberated about the manner safety
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protocols were used in her classroom, and the safety protocol decisions involved her own
judgment.
The Will Family argued these safety policies were nondiscretionary based on the passage
of the Texas Safety Standards that indicated what a student must do if they receive a chemical
burn. The appellate court disagreed with the plaintiffs because there was no evidence that the
high school or the school district used the Texas Safety Standards as mandatory standards that
teachers were required to follow. The appellate court also indicated the Wills failed to raise a fact
issue regarding Bambenek’s failure to follow mandatory safety policies. Finally, the appellate
court determined Bambenek’s affidavit testimony for the summary judgment was sufficient
evidence. Bambenek’s actions were discretionary so she was entitled to immunity under the
Texas Education Code §22.0511. For the final disposition, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s judgment.
Case of Compton v. Port Arthur Independent School District (2017)
Joann Compton began working as a Speech Language Pathologist for Port Arthur ISD in
August 2009. She provided speech therapy to students at three different campuses. During her
first year in the district, she complained to her supervisors, Emily King and Sharon Boutte,
because student reports she printed from one school were routed to a hallway printer at another
school. Compton’s concern was the printing of student reports in a hallway violated federal
student privacy rights. Compton made the complaint and worked with the district technology
department to have the printer set up correctly. Compton alleged after this incident, King created
a hostile work environment for Compton. Compton maintained that after she filed the complaint
about the printer, King created an exhausting and rigorous schedule of meetings for Compton
and initiated an investigation against Compton based on false accusations of Medicaid fraud.
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The fraud investigation centered on Compton’s documentation of services delivered to
students. There were discrepancies in the dates and times contained in Compton’s reports. The
discrepancies prohibited the district from filing claims for reimbursement from the federal
government. In October 2010, the district began an investigation into the document
inconsistencies, and Compton was placed on administrative leave during the investigation. After
the investigation, Compton requested a reassignment as a content mastery teacher, and the
district granted her request. After the district reassigned Compton to a teaching position, she filed
suit seeking a declaratory judgment that her constitutional right of free speech was violated, and
she requested an injunction against future violations, as well as cost and attorney’s fees.
Compton named Port Arthur ISD, Superintendent Johnny E. Brown, and King, as defendants in
the lawsuit. Compton’s alleged violation of free speech was based on her complaint that printing
student reports from one school resulted in documents being printed in a hallway at another
school.
The defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction or in the alternative, motions to dismiss the
claims against them. The school district sought dismissal based on governmental immunity. The
district also alleged Compton’s claims were moot since Compton requested a transfer to a
teaching position. The district argued Compton failed to allege sufficient facts in her pleading to
demonstrate constitutional claims against the district or its employees. King and Brown sought
dismissal of the claims against them based on statutory immunity under the Texas Education
Code §22.0511 and on the election of remedies doctrine under the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code §101.106. The trial court granted the defendants’ pleas to the jurisdiction. The
trial court determined Compton failed to state a viable claim under the free expression clause that
protects public employees from engaging in free speech of public concern. Compton filed a
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motion for a new trial, so the individual defendants subsequently filed an application for
attorneys’ fees under the Texas Education Code §22.0511. The trial court denied Compton’s
motion for a new trial and awarded the individual defendants their attorney’s fees. Compton
appealed the trial court’s decisions.
The first issue was whether the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against the
district. The second issue was whether the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against
Brown and King, individually. The third issue was whether the trial court erred in awarding
attorney’s fees to Brown and King. The appellate court held that Compton failed to plead a
facially valid constitutional claim against the district, so Compton was not entitled to declaratory
relief. The trial court properly dismissed the claims against Brown and King for lack of
jurisdiction. The reasoning of the appellate court was that Compton’s allegation of violation of
free speech involved the printing of student reports in the wrong location. The true content of her
speech was a complaint that the district printers were installed in a way that disclosed private
information by Compton when she printed Medicaid reports where another employee could not
retrieve the report. These matters directly concerned Compton’s official duties of creating and
submitting reports. The only people Compton spoke to were her supervisors and technology
personnel. Therefore, her pleadings do not allege facts that she engaged in any constitutionally
protected speech regarding matters of public concern.
Compton asserted she was entitled to injunctive relief on the basis that she wanted to
become a speech language pathologist again but would potentially face harassment from King if
Compton was a speech therapist for the district. The appellate court determined Compton did not
plead for reinstatement of her old position as a speech therapist in the trial court, and she did not
allege she had a contractual right to return to that position. Therefore, Compton failed to plead a
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justiciable claim since a request to return as a speech therapist is merely hypothetical by
Compton and not before the court. Compton alleged she was entitled to attorney’s fees under the
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act even if the court did not grant her declaratory relief. The
appellate court determined the declaratory judgment act does not waive immunity, and Compton
should not be awarded attorney’s fees in this situation. Compton did not cite any authority that
she was entitled to attorney’s fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Compton argued King and Brown were not entitled to immunity because they were
acting ultra vires, which meant they were acting outside the scope of their legitimate duties.
Compton pled she only sought declaratory and injunctive relief on constitutional grounds, rather
than damages for tort. The appellate court determined that it could not make a determination on
these issues because of the election of remedies doctrine. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees
to Brown and King upon granting of their pleas to the jurisdiction. The trial court record
indicated Compton argued against attorney’s fees for the individual defendants because she was
not suing for a tort claim. Compton also argued the trial court did not dismiss the individual
defendants’ claims under the Texas Education Code §22.0511.
The appellate court noted that nothing in the Texas Education Code §22.0517 has a
requirement that dismissal must be based on §22.0511 in order to recover attorney’s fees.
Instead, reading §22.0511 and §22.0517 together, these two provisions only require a finding or
determination that a defendant is immune from liability as a professional employee in order to
be entitled to receive attorney’s fees. Compton attempted to argue that King should not receive
attorney’s fees because she was motivated by spite and not acting in the furtherance of the
interests of the district. However, the trial court found the actions of the individual defendants
were within the scope of their duties. Thus, the trial court did not err in awarding King and
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Brown their attorney’s fees under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0517. For the
final disposition, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss all claims
against Port Arthur ISD, Brown, and King. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s award of
attorney’s fees to Brown and King.
Case of Van Deelen v. Spring Independent School District (2018)
Michael Van Deelen was hired as a teacher at a high school in Spring ISD in January
2016. On January 29, 2016, Van Deelen began making reports about unlawful drug use and drug
dealings on campus by students and a teacher, Bobby Scott. Van Deelen reported the drug issues
to the principal, Pamela Farinas, and various school officials, the district police department, and
several governmental entities. Van Deelen claimed Farinas failed to refer the reports to the
district's police department and the municipal police department as required under the Texas
Education Code. Farinas investigated Van Deleen’s claims and found the claims had no merit as
to the students or Mr. Scott. Van Deelen claimed that once he made the reports to the principal,
several employees at the school began taking adverse personnel actions against him, individually
and in concert with each other.
Van Deelen argued he received reprimands and warnings that he would be terminated if
he continued to make false allegations concerning the drug use and drug dealing on campus.
Farinas recommended removal of Van Deelen from her campus. On February 16, 2018, Van
Deelen filed a grievance claiming retaliation against him for whistleblowing. Two days after
filing the grievance, human resources informed Van Deelen he was suspended and prohibited
from returning to the campus. Van Deelen filed a second grievance on February 19 for
whistleblowing. After 60 days, Van Deelen terminated his grievances and filed a lawsuit against
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the district and Farinas under the Texas Whistleblowing Act for the violations listed in his
February 16 and 19 grievances.
Van Deelen amended his pleadings numerous times, and he ended up suing the district
for violating the Texas Whistleblowing Act and the Texas Constitution. He also alleged several
district employees took a refrigerator and chair from him while he was on leave. Finally, he sued
Farinas and the assistant principal, Corey LeDay, for defamation. Farinas and LeDay filed a
motion to dismiss and a plea to the jurisdiction pursuant to the Texas Tort Claims Act and for
statutory immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0511. The trial court granted the
motions to dismiss filed by Farinas and LeDay and motions for summary judgment filed by the
district for the Texas Whistleblower Act claims and the constitutional takings claim. The final
judgment of the court was signed on May 30, 2017. Van Deelen appealed the trial court
decisions. The first issue was whether the trial court erred in granting the pleas to the jurisdiction
filed by Farinas and LeDay. The second issue was whether the trial court erred in granting the
district’s motion for summary judgment. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s granting of
the pleas to the jurisdiction filed by Farinas and LeDay.
The reasoning of the appellate court was that Van Deelen did not negate any of the
arguments made by Farinas and LeDay that led to the granting of their pleas to the jurisdiction.
The school district argued Van Deelen’s whistleblower claims were moot based on Van Deelen’s
termination. The court of appeals noted that none of the claims by Van Deelen for
whistleblowing violations occurred after February 2016. The court noted it is unclear why the
termination of Van Deelen makes the whistleblower claims moot. Therefore, the appellate court
determined Van Deelen’s whistleblowing claims for the suspension were not moot. The district
also alleged the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the whistleblowing claims because of the

188
vagueness of Van Deelen’s grievances and pleadings. The appellate court disagreed since the
grievances said Van Deelen was retaliated against for complaining about suspected drug dealing
taking place in the school parking lot. The appellate court determined Van Deelen’s grievances
that drug dealing was occurring in the school parking lot were broad enough to put the district on
notice that he was referring to the many complaints about Scott providing drugs to students in the
parking lot, as well as the alleged failure of Farinas to notify law enforcement about Van
Deelen’s allegations. Since the trial court record did not contain the grievance procedures, the
appellate court could not rule on the district's claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction based
on Van Deelen’s failure to follow the proper grievance procedures.
Under the Texas Whistleblowing Act, an employee must prove a report was made to the
appropriate law enforcement authority or that the employee had a good faith belief that there was
a violation of law. The district argued Van Deelen failed to prove he made a report to law
enforcement. Van Deelen declared he reported Farinas’ failure to report drug use and drug
dealing to the school district chief of police, the Harris County district attorney’s office, the
Texas Education Agency, a state senator, an assistant superintendent in the district, and the
human resources director. The Texas Education Code §37.015 requires a principal to notify
agencies if there is a reasonable belief that certain conduct has occurred on campus. The
appellate court noted that this section of the Texas Education Code does not have a consequence
for failing to report. Therefore, Van Deelen did not have any law enforcement authority to whom
he could report, so he could not reasonably believe any of the entities he reported to could
investigate Farinas’ failure to report.
The district claimed Van Deelen did not prove he made a good faith report and causation,
two elements necessary for the whistleblower claims. The appellate court noted that
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whistleblower protection does not require hard evidence to prove the violation of law. Instead,
the plaintiff must have a reasonable belief that the facts as reported were in violation of law. Van
Deelen did have a reasonable belief of a violation of law based on what he personally saw in the
teacher parking lot. Particularly, he saw a student unlock Scott’s car and open the console where
20 to 30 pill bottles were located. He witnessed the student put the pills in a plastic bag and put
the bag in his pocket. Van Deelen also saw Scott retrieve pill bottles from the console and take
them into the school.
The appellate court determined a reasonably prudent person could have believed Scott
used, and possibly dealt, illegal drugs. The appellate court also determined there is a material fact
issue whether Van Deelen’s report of Scott’s drug dealing led to the suspension of Van Deelen.
Van Deelen raised a material fact to defeat the district’s summary judgment. For the final
disposition, the appellate court determined the trial court erred in granting the district’s summary
judgment regarding the whistleblower claims. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s
decision to grant LeDay and Farinas pleas to the jurisdiction.
Case of Burgi v. Hartman (2018)
Mary Jo Hartman was a high school EMT teacher. One of her students, W.B., discussed a
hunting trip with his father, Ronald Burgi, during a class related puncture wounds, gunshot
wounds, and stab wounds. W.B. told the class he was hit with four pieces of birdshot during the
hunting trip. W.B. stated that his father asked if he wanted to go to the hospital, but W.B. said he
wanted to finish the day hunting. Burgi eventually took W.B. to the hospital where the doctors
did not remove the birdshot since surgery would be more invasive than leaving the birdshot in
place. Hartman, after hearing W.B.’s story, began to question him about the incident. CPS
subsequently received a report about W.B. shotgun incident and that he had to wait over an hour
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before receiving medical treatment. Burgi sued Hartman for defamation and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Burgi worked with Hartman’s husband, Daniel Hartman, at Laughlin Air
Force Base. Burgi claimed Daniel Hartman had a personal vendetta against Burgi since Burgi is
a union representative who represented an employee who accused Daniel Hartman of
wrongdoing.
Hartman filed summary judgment motions to have Burgi’s claims dismissed under the
Texas Education Code §22.0511, and Hartman requested attorneys’ fees under the Texas
Education Code §22.0517. The trial court granted Hartman’s summary judgment motions and
ordered Burgi pay Hartman’s attorney’s fees. Burgi appealed the trial court’s judgment.
The issue was whether the summary judgment motions granted in favor of Hartman should be
overturned. The appellate court upheld that the trial court’s ruling in favor of Hartman. Burgi’s
claims against Hartman were dismissed, and Burgi had to pay Hartman attorney’s fees. When
educators make a report to CPS, this is incident to or within the scope of their duties.
The reasoning of the appellate court was that Burgi failed to present any evidence that
Hartman either filed the CPS report or that Daniel Hartman filed the CPS report. Burgi alleged
that if Hartman did not file the CPS report, then she told her husband about W.B.’s incident
which led to Daniel Hartman filing the CPS report. The appellate court indicated that a factfinder
would have to guess who made the CPS report, so Burgi raised mere suspicions that Hartman or
her husband filed the CPS report. The appellate court held that this evidence was too
circumstantial; thus, the trial court ruled properly. Burgi argued that questioning W.B. about the
hunting trip was outside the scope of Hartman's duties. Hartman provided evidence that a
teacher’s duties include reporting any suspected child abuse to CPS even if the abuse is simply
suspected. The appellate court ruled the summary judgment evidence established Hartman
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questioning W.B. about the hunting trip and reporting any suspected child abuse were incident to
or within the scope of her duties as a teacher.
Burgi had to pay Hartman’s attorney’s fees since Hartman prevailed on her affirmative
defense of statutory immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0511. Burgi argued that
Hartman provided evidence that she did not make the CPS report; therefore, she should not
receive attorney's fees. The court indicated that Hartman prevailed on her affirmative defense so
she received attorney’s fees. For the final disposition, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s ruling in favor of Hartman.
Data Analysis
After completing the case brief method, the 15 Texas appellate court cases were analyzed
and then compared to find similarities and differences. In the sample of 15 appellate courts cases,
plaintiffs appealed six of the lower court rulings while defendants appealed the remaining nine
cases. Of the 15 cases, educators that sought immunity protection included five (33%) educators
at the secondary level, two (13%) at the middle school level, none (0%) at the elementary level,
and the school level for eight (54%) educators was either unknown or inapplicable. The sample
included six (40%) cases where males were named as defendants in the lower courts, six (40%)
cases where females were named as defendants, and three (20%) cases where both males and
females were named as defendants. On appeal, ten (67%) of the decisions were affirmed, two
(13%) of the rulings were affirmed in part and remanded in part, three (20%) of the rulings were
reversed. Table 2 highlights all the appellate court cases in the sample in terms of the appeals
granted or denied when an educator invokes statutory immunity protection.
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Table 2
Texas Appellate Court Cases
Year

Name of Case

2007

Lane v. Young

Plaintiff
Board,

Defendant

Outcome

Supt.

Reversed

Vendor
2009

Ward v. Theret

Teacher

Principal, Supt.

Affirmed

2010

Robinson v. Brannon

Teacher

Director, Employee

Affirmed/Reversed

2012

Moore v. Miller

Parent

Aide

Affirmed

2014

La Joya ISD v. Villarreal

Vendor

Board Members

Affirmed

2014

Madden v. SBEC

Principal

State Agency

Affirmed

2015

Dallas ISD v. Peters

Teacher

Asst. Principal

Reversed

2015

Gonzalez v. Grimm

Parent

Principal

Affirmed

2016

McPherson v. Wylie

Parent

AD, Coach

Affirmed

2016

Rivera v. Port Arthur ISD

Teacher

Principal, Coach

Affirmed

2016

Edinburg ISD v. Smith

Parent

Principal, Admin.

Reversed

Compton v. Port Arthur
2016

Supt.,
Teacher

ISD

Affirmed
Administrator

2017

Will v. Bambenek

Parent

Teacher

Affirmed

2018

Van Deelen v. Spring ISD

Teacher

Principal, AP

Affirmed/Remand

2018

Burgi v. Hartman

Parent

Teacher

Affirmed
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Thirteen (87%) out of 15 appellate court cases addressed immunity from liability under
the Texas Education Code §22.0511. The statutory language of the Texas Education Code
§22.0511 states educators are not personally liable for acts that are incident to or within the
scope of the educator’s duties that involve the exercise of judgment or discretion. The language
in the statute is clear that districts cannot require educators to waive their statutory immunity
from liability. Even more, the statute clearly states that the statutory immunity from liability is in
addition to immunity provided to educators under state and federal law. The only time educators
are not provided immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 is in circumstances when
an educator uses excessive force in the discipline of a student or when negligence results in
bodily injury to the student. The appellate court determined in nine out of the 15 cases that
educators had statutory immunity protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0511.
Two of the 15 appellate court cases addressed an educator’s use of force and the statutory
immunity protection given to educators under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. Educators
appealed these two cases after an unfavorable decision from a Texas state agency. The statutory
wording of the Texas Education Code §22.0512 requires the commissioner to determine whether
the use of force by an educator was privileged. If the use of force was privileged under the Texas
Education Code §22.0512, the district is prohibited from subjecting an educator to disciplinary
proceedings for the use of physical force against a student to the extent that the force is justified
under the Texas Penal Code §9.62. The Texas Education Code §22.0512 defines a disciplinary
proceeding as an action brought by the school district employing a professional employee of a
school district to discharge or suspend the employee or terminate or not renew the employee's
contract. The appellate courts determined the two educators did not have statutory immunity
protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0512.
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Research Question 1
The first research question was what were the legal questions in cases decided by Texas
appellate courts where educators invoked statutory immunity protections? The analysis focused
on answering what the legal questions were in cases decided by the Texas appellate courts where
educators invoked statutory immunity protections. The appellate courts considered various legal
issues when determining whether an educator had immunity protection under the Texas
Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512. Six categories emerged involving the legal questions
consistently addressed by the appellate courts when determining whether an educator had
statutory immunity, including: (a) actions incident to or within the scope of the educator’s duties,
(b) exercise of judgement or discretion, (c) dispositive motions, (d) appeals of a Texas agency
decision, (e) lawsuits relating to daily operations of the district, and (f) harassment.
Actions Incident to or Within the Scope of the Educator’s Duties. In seven of the 15
decisions, the appellate court analyzed whether an educator’s conduct was incident to or within
the scope of their duties (i.e., Burgi, Edinburg, Gonzalez, La Joya, Lane, Robinson, Ward).
When analyzing whether an educator has statutory immunity under the Texas Education Code
§22.0511 the court must first determine whether the acts are incident to or within the scope of the
educator’s duties. “If the act falls neither within nor incident to the scope of the employee’s
duties, the statutory immunity does not cover the act” (Robinson, p. 866). The appellate courts
determined that educators were acting within the scope of their duties in six (86%) out of the
seven cases. In Ward v. Theret (2009), Ward, a former employee of a school district, sued the
principal, the school district, and the superintendent for various claims after the teacher was
terminated for a disagreement regarding student discipline. The court determined a principal’s
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duties, as the head campus administrator, “include decisions regarding student discipline and
employment matters” (p. 5).
The only case where the appellate court determined the educator did not act within the
scope of duties was in Gonzalez v. Grimm (2011). In Gonzalez v. Grimm, (2011), Gonzalez’s
child went to the school where Grimm served as a principal. After Gonzalez made a harassing
phone call to Grimm, Grimm reported the call to the police. The police filed a criminal
harassment charge against Gonzalez, but the district attorney subsequently dismissed the
charges. Gonzalez sued Grimm for malicious prosecution. On appeal, Gonzalez argued that
Grimm should not have statutory immunity because calling the police was not incident to or
within the scope of her duties as a principal, and the court agreed. The court noted that whether
one is acting within the scope of employment depends upon whether the “general act from which
the injury arose was in furtherance of the employer’s business and for the accomplishment of the
object for which the employee was employed” (Gonzalez, p. 274). The court determined that
filing a report to law enforcement regarding a threatening phone call was not an act incident to or
within the scope of the duties of a principal. Despite this initial ruling by the court, the appellate
court in 2011 remanded the decision back to the trial court who ultimately ruled in favor of the
principal. In 2015, the appellate court upheld the judgment in favor of the principal named as the
defendant. Even though Grimm did not prevail at the appellate court in 2011, she did ultimately
prevail when the appellate court heard the case for the second time four years later in Gonzalez v.
Grimm (2015).
In Burgi v. Harman (2018), the court determined that Hartman had a right to question a
student, Burgi’s son, after the student discussed a hunting accident. Hartman began questioning
the student about the accident after the student indicated his father, Burgi, waited several hours
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before getting his son medical attention following a hunting accident. The appellate court
determined Hartman had a right, and even an ethical duty, to report suspected child abuse or
neglect. Thus, Hartman’s questions to the student were incident to and within the scope of her
duties as a teacher. In Edinburg Consolidated ISD v. Smith (2016), the appellate court
determined determining the grade weights of courses were incident to and within the scope of
educators’ duties.
In Robinson v. Brannon (2010), Robinson claimed that two employees, Brannon and
Freeman, began a campaign to tarnish Robinson’s reputation as an educator. Robinson claimed
Brannon conducted an improper personnel investigation and improperly placed Robinson on
leave. The appellate court disagreed. The court noted that prior approval is not a requirement for
an employee to act within the scope of employment. In this instance, Brannon’s investigation and
placing Robinson on leave were within the scope of his employment as director of human
resources and risk management. Brannon had performed investigations on several employee
issues and participated in pretermination hearings as the director of human resources. Though
Brannon did not follow Alief ISD’s policy, the court still deemed his actions to be within the
scope of his duties. However, the court determined the educators' acts of harassing phone calls,
along with sending threatening and defamatory text messages and emails, were outside the scope
of employment and outside the scope of Texas Education Code §22.0511 immunity.
In Lane v. Young (2007), a school board member asked Lane, as the superintendent of the
district, to investigate a trust agreement and a $50,000 gift for a memorial scholarship in honor of
the school board president’s son. The funds for the scholarship were transferred into the board
president’s personal account to hold in trust for the scholarship. After Lane investigated the
transfer of funds, the board president, the president’s wife, a district employee, and an employee
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at the bank that deposited the money sued Lane for various causes of action. The question posed
to the court was whether the investigation done by Lane, the superintendent, falls under his
duties as a superintendent.
In determining what acts were within the scope of Lane’s duties as the superintendent,
the court cited the Texas Education Code §11.201(d)(5), (7), and (11). These provisions of the
education code state that the superintendent is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the
district. According to the appellate court, Lane’s statutory duties include (a) investigating the
transfer of money out of a district’s account without board approval and (b) pursuing an
investigation to the bank that holds the district’s account and which transferred money out of the
district’s account into a private account. The court found that “Lane was acting within his
general authority in furtherance of the district's business, and he was seeking to accomplish an
objective for which he was employed--namely the daily administration of the district” (p. 14).
Lane established that he acted within the scope of his duties as the superintendent.
Exercise of Judgment or Discretion. In three of the 15 decisions, the appellate court
analyzed whether an educator’s conduct involved the exercise of judgment or discretion (i.e.,
Gonzalez, Lane, Will). The court must determine whether the educator’s acts are ministerial or
discretionary because an educator has to be performing a discretionary task in order to have
immunity protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0511. In two (67%) of the three cases,
the appellate court determined the educator’ conduct involved the exercise of judgment or
discretion (i.e., Lane, Will).
The court determined that the principal in Gonzalez v. Grimm (2011) was not performing
discretionary tasks when she called the police for the parent’s harassment. The appellate court
noted that “because ministerial duties do not involve the exercise of judgment or discretion, they
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do not cloak the actor with immunity” (p. 274). The court recognized the “distinction between an
act that is ministerial and one that is discretionary is often one of degree” (p. 274). An assistant
superintendent’s affidavit stated that Grimm, as the administrative leader of her campus, was
responsible for ensuring the safety and security of students, staff, and other personnel at the
school. The affidavit further stated Grimm was required to “exercise judgement and discretion in
determining when a situation exists which should be reported to law enforcement officials” (p.
8). The appellate court disagreed and determined that Grimm’s report to law enforcement
regarding Gonzalez’s phone call did not involve the exercise of judgment and discretion. Thus,
Grimm did not have statutory immunity for calling law enforcement. After the appellate court
remanded the case back to the trial court in 2011, the trial court ultimately ruled in favor of
Grimm. When the case again came before the appellate court in 2015 for a second time, the
appellate court upheld the judgment in favor of Grimm.
In Will v. Bambenek (2017), the parents of a sophomore student in Bambenek’s chemistry
class sued Bambenek for negligence after hydrochloric acid spilled and burned the student’s
hand during a chemistry experiment. The district court granted Bambenek’s summary judgment
motion for immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0511. The appellate court considered
whether Bambenek was performing a discretionary task when the accident occurred. The court
held the decisions regarding the classroom safety policies involved Bambenek’s judgment and
discretion to provide her statutory immunity protection. In particular, the evidence indicated she
was in charge of creating and implementing the safety protocols in her classroom including
whether to wear safety goggles and what safety procedures to follow. Bambenek’s personal
deliberation about the manner and means of the safety protocols involved her own judgment and
provided her statutory immunity.
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In Lane v. Young (2007), a school board member asked Lane, as the superintendent of the
district, to investigate a trust agreement and a $50,000 gift for a memorial scholarship in honor of
the school board president’s son. The question posed to the court was whether his actions
involved the exercise of judgment or discretion. The appellate court determined the statute that
sets out the day-to-day responsibilities of a superintendent does not specify how the
superintendent should perform duties since such duties are not defined with such “precision as to
leave nothing to Lane’s exercise of judgment or discretion” (p. 15). In particular, Lane’s personal
judgment as to whether to investigate, the methods of investigation, who to investigate, and
employment and banking decisions all flowed from the investigation. The court further noted
“the focus is not on what Lane said, to whom he spoke, or whom he decided to investigate, but
on his exercise of judgment and discretion in pursuing the investigation” (p. 16). Therefore, Lane
was performing discretionary tasks when he investigated the transfer of funds.
Dispositive Motions. Thirteen out of the 15 of the Texas appellate court cases addressed
dispositive motions as a way to eliminate some or all of the claims in the cases against an
educator. There were three categories of dispositive motions addressed in the appellate cases: (a)
a plea to the jurisdiction, (b) a motion for summary judgment, and (c) a motion to dismiss. Only
one educator filed a motion to dismiss in addition to a plea to the jurisdiction at the trial court
level (i.e., Van Deelen). Eight of the 15 appeals were for a plea to the jurisdiction (i.e., Compton,
Edinburg Consolidated, La Joya, McPherson, Moore, Rivera, Van Deelen, Ward). Pleas to the
jurisdiction challenge a court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case. Five of the eight pleas
to the jurisdiction were in favor of the educator at the appellate court level (i.e., Compton,
Edinburg, Ward, Rivera, Van Deelen). At the appellate court level, three of the eight cases
involving a plea to the jurisdiction favored the party suing the educator (i.e., Moore, McPherson,
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La Joya). The appellate court granted attorney’s fees to educators who filed a plea to the
jurisdiction in two cases (i.e., Compton, Ward).
Five out of the 15 appeals involved a motion for summary judgment (i.e., Burgi,
Gonzalez, Lane, Robinson, Will). The appellate court ruled in favor of four of the five cases
wherein an educator filed a motion for summary judgment (i.e., Burgi, Lane, Robinson, Will).
The appellate courts granted attorney’s fees to educators in three cases involving a motion for
summary judgment (i.e., Burgi, Lane, Robinson). The one case where the appellate court ruled
against an educator who filed a motion for summary judgment was Gonzalez v. Grimm (2011),
but the appellate court ultimately ruled in favor of the educator four years later in Gonzalez v.
Grimm (2015). A judgment in favor of Grimm is significant because she ultimately prevailed
against the defendant even though she did not prevail on her initial dispositive motion in 2011.
Appeal of a State Agency’s Decision. Two cases involved an appeal of a state agency’s
decision (i.e., Dallas ISD, Madden). Dallas ISD et al. v. Peters (2015), which is also addressed in
Chapter 4, involved an appeal of a Texas Commissioner of Education decision wherein Peters
used an extremely aggressive restraint against a freshman who was two months pregnant. Peters
sought judicial review of the Texas Commissioner of Education’s decision under the Texas
Education Code §21.307. Peters challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support
termination of his term contract. Peters also argued the district violated the Open Meetings Act
when a Dallas ISD subcommittee voted on Peters’ contract in closed session instead of in open
session. The district court held the termination of Peters’ contract was void based on the
violation of the Texas Open Meetings Act, but the appellate court overturned the district court’s
decision. The appellate court also overturned the district court’s decision to conditionally award
Peters’ attorneys’ fees and costs under the Texas Education Code §22.0517.
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Madden v. State Board for Educator Certification (2014) was an appeal of a decision by
the State Board of Educator Certification (SBEC). Madden gave a seventh-grade student two
swats on his buttocks for two separate disciplinary infractions. The State Board for Educator
Certification filed a disciplinary action alleging Madden violated the Texas Educators’ Code of
Ethics and requested a one-year suspension of his certification. After a contested case hearing
where many witnesses testified, the administrative law judge determined Madden did violate the
Texas Educators’ Code of Ethics. However, the administrative law judge determined Madden
could not be sanctioned because he had statutory immunity protection under the Texas Education
Code §22.0512. SBEC then amended the administrative law judges’ findings and issued Madden
an unpublished censure, the least serious sanction an educator can receive. Madden argued
SBEC did not have the authority issue an unpublished censure since his actions were protected
under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The appellate court disagreed and determined the
Texas Education Code §22.0512 did not deprive SBEC with the authority to impose a reprimand
against Madden for his use of force.
Lawsuits Relating to Daily Operations of a District. In two of the 15 decisions,
educators invoked statutory immunity protection for their work in the day-to-day operations of
running the school district (i.e., Lane, La Joya ISD). Superintendent Brad Lane appealed a
decision by the trial court denying his motion for summary judgment under the Texas Education
Code §22.0511 after plaintiffs sued Lane for defamation, malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy,
and tortious interference with her employment. The lawsuit stemmed from Lane’s investigation
into a trust agreement in memory of the school board president’s son. A board member asked
Lane to investigate the transfer of $50,000 of district funds to the school board president’s
personal account to hold in trust for a scholarship in honor of the president’s late son. There was
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no written record from the board to transfer the funds from the district to a personal account and
four of the board members stated they never approved the transfer to the personal account.
After investigating, Lane determined there was no board approval to transfer the funds to
a private account. Lane responded to the lawsuit claiming statutory immunity protection. The
trial court denied Lane’s motion for summary judgment, and Lane appealed. The appellate court
determined the investigation regarding district funds clearly fell under the roles and
responsibilities of Lane. Thus, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling since Lane had
immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0511.
La Joya ISD v. Villareal (2014) involved a breach of contract case filed by a vendor of
the district, Ruth Villareal. La Joya ISD entered into a contract with HBS to serve as the
district’s third-party administrator of the self–funded health plan for district employees. An
exhibit to the contract listed Villareal and her company as the insurance broker of record for the
district. Shortly after Villareal became the broker of record, four new board members were
elected to La Joya ISD’s board of trustees. Once elected, the school board voted to replace Ruth
Villareal with Bob Trevino as the broker of record. Villareal alleged that Trevino gave $15,000
to the four new candidates for their school board campaigns in exchange for being named the
new insurance broker under the contract. Villareal filed suit against the district and the four
board members for breach of contract, as well as other causes of action. Even though the court
determined school boards have authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the district, the
contract claim did not fall under statutory immunity protection.
Harassment. The court of appeals heard two cases involving harassment (i.e., Gonzalez,
Robinson). In Robinson v. Brannon (2010), Robinson claimed that two employees, Brannon and
Freeman, began a campaign to tarnish Robinson’s reputation as an educator. Robinson argued
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Freeman made harassing phone calls and sent threatening texts to him. Robinson alleged an
email circulated while he was on leave to other employees that set out Robinson’s sexual
preferences and said Robinson had the AIDS virus and was attempting to spread it maliciously.
The appellate court determined Robinson failed to produce any evidence that Brannon or
Robinson were the source of the emails and phone calls, and so there was no evidence that
Brannon or Robinson participated or made the harassing phone calls, text messages or emails.
Robinson merely speculated these employees were involved, and peculation is not enough to
overcome the summary judgment in favor of Brannon and Freeman. The appellate court
determined harassing phone calls were not incident to and within the scope of employment.
Therefore, the court denied attorneys’ fees to Freeman.
In Gonzalez v. Grimm (2011), the parent, Gonzalez, sued the principal, Grimm, after
Grimm filed charges against Gonzalez for harassment using a telephone. Gonzalez called Grimm
to recite her social security number to her. Then Grimm asked Gonzalez how it made her feel
that he had her social security number knowing what he could do with the number. Grimm filed
a police report against Gonzalez. Criminal charges were later brought against Gonzalez for the
offense of harassment by use of a telephone in a manner reasonably likely to alarm Grimm by
causing her phone to ring repeatedly and making repeated telephone communications to Grimm
in a manner likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass her. The criminal
charges were ultimately dropped against Gonzalez, and Gonzalez then sued Grimm for malicious
prosecution.
Synopsis of Research Question 1. The legal questions consistently addressed by the
appellate courts when determining whether an educator had statutory immunity included: (a)
actions incident to or within the scope of the educator’s duties, (b) exercise of judgement or
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discretion, (c) dispositive motions, (d) appeals of a state agency’s decision, (e) lawsuits relating
to daily operations of the district, and (f) harassment. There were three themes that emerged from
legal questions answered by Texas appellate courts, including the duties and responsibilities of
educators, unsupported evidence against an educator is insufficient, and the type of motion used
to plead statutory immunity is insignificant to the outcome.
The duties and responsibilities of an educator was the first theme identified in the data.
The duties and responsibilities were a key determination used by appellate courts when
considering whether an educator had statutory immunity protection. Included in the duties and
responsibilities was a decision by the appellate court as to whether the educator’s actions were
incident to or within the scope of their duties and whether the educator used the exercise of
judgment or discretion. As long as the educator acted in accordance with their job description, or
pretty close to it, the appellate courts determined they were entitled to statutory immunity. The
appellate courts found that making harassing phone calls and sending harassing texts and emails
were not part of an educator's duties and responsibilities.
A second theme that emerged was unsupported evidence against an educator was not
sufficient to remove their statutory immunity protection. Appellate courts made clear that mere
speculation by the plaintiff that an educator reported a parent to CPS or sent harassing text
messages did not constitute supportable evidence to revoke an educator’s statutory immunity
protection. As noted in Burgi v. Hartman (2018), “an inference is not reasonable if it is premised
on mere suspicion, as some suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only more suspicion,
which is not the same as some evidence” (p. 6). The Burgi court noted that “based on the
circumstantial evidence Burgi produced, a factfinder would be required to guess from at least
four possibilities that Hartman made a false statement about Burgi to CPS or to her husband” (p.
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6). Burgi only raised a suspicion that Hartman made a false report to CPS but did not provide
any evidence. Therefore, suspicion without factual evidence is not enough to overturn statutory
immunity.
Similarly, in Robinson v. Brannon (2010), Robinson, the plaintiff, claimed that Brannon
and Freeman actively participated in the harassing phone calls, text messages, and defamatory
emails. Robinson testified that he believed Freeman had participated in making the harassing
phone calls because he saw her making a phone call on the same day he received one of the
harassing calls at his workplace. The appellate court noted the claims that Freeman and Brannon
harassed Robison is based on mere speculation and as unsupported allegations. The court
determined there was no evidence that Brannon or Freeman made the harassing communications
about which Robinson.
The third theme that emerged from the data was the type of motion filed by the educator
was insignificant to the outcome in appellate courts. Educators successfully used motions for
summary judgment and pleas to the jurisdiction to invoke statutory immunity. Appellate courts
found educators were entitled to statutory immunity regardless of the type of dispositive motion
filed. The appellate courts ruled in favor of educators with both types of dispositive motions.
Research Question 2
The second research question was what were the decisions made by Texas appellate
courts in cases where educators invoked statutory immunity protections? The analysis focused on
answering what decisions were made by the Texas appellate courts where educators invoked
statutory immunity protections. The appellate courts made a broad range of decisions when
determining whether an educator had immunity protection under the Texas Education Code
§22.0511 and §22.0512. Five categories emerged involving the decisions consistently addressed

206
by the appellate courts when determining whether an educator had statutory immunity including:
(a) extensive protections for educators, (b) educators invoking statutory immunity under the
Texas Education Code §22.0511, (c) educators invoking statutory immunity under the Texas
Education Code §22.0512, (d) appealing party, and (e) attorney’s fees.
Extensive Protections for Educators. In Ward v. Theret (2009), the court emphasized
that the plain language of the Texas Education Code §22.0511 indicates that the “Legislature
intended for professional school district employees to be immune from personal liability in most
cases” (p. 5). Even more, the court went on to say that absent allegations of excessive force or
negligence resulting in physical injury, the “Legislature has provided professional school district
employees with protection from personal liability, and the ability to recover the expenses
incurred in defending the suit” (p. 5). Furthermore, in La Joya ISD v. Villarreal (2014), the court
noted that the Texas Education Code §22.0512 is “broad, protecting not only actions falling
within the scope of the employee’s duties but also those incident to the employee’s duties” (p.
23). The court further noted that other appellate courts have determined that “if an act falls
within or incident to authorize duties, then immunity applies, regardless of whether the act
otherwise violates an employer’s code of ethics” (p. 24).
The appellate courts ruled in favor of educators in nine (69%) out of the 13 cases where
an educator invoked statutory immunity protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0511
(i.e., Burgi, Compton, Edinburg, Lane, Rivera, Robinson, Van Deelen, Ward, Will). In one case,
the appellate court ruled in favor of the educator on grounds other than statutory immunity under
the Texas Education Code §22.0511 (i.e., Gonzalez). The appellate courts ruled against
educators in three (23%) of the 13 appellate cases when an educator invoked statutory immunity
protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 (i.e., Moore, McPherson, La Joya ISD).
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Interestingly, a parent was the plaintiff in two (67%) of the three cases where the courts ruled
against the educator (i.e., Moore, McPherson).
In Moore v. Miller (2012), a parent sued Moore, a teacher’s aide in a special education
classroom. The parent alleged that Moore aggressively dislodged a medically fragile special
education student from her chair as part of a disciplinary measure. Miller also stated that Moore
threw the student hard onto the ground. The appellate court determined the appellate court
properly denied the plea to the jurisdiction. In McPherson v. Wylie (2016), the parents sued two
employees of Blum ISD after his daughter sustained injuries during the summer athletic program
held in Blum ISD’s gym. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision to deny the
educators’ pleas to the jurisdiction since statutory immunity provides immunity from liability not
immunity from suit. The appellate court noted that the trial court could still hear the lawsuit since
statutory immunity provides immunity from liability not from suit. Even though the court could
hear the lawsuit against the educators, they could not be liable since immunity from liability will
prevent a plaintiff from recovering damages. It is important to note that the appellate courts ruled
against the educators in four of the 13 cases where an educator invoked statutory immunity
protection, but this does mean the educator was ultimately liable.
The appellate courts upheld the trial courts’ decision to deny dispositive motions filed by
the educators in nine of the 13 decisions involving the Texas Education Code §22.0511.
Dispositive motions automatically dismiss the claims against the educators without having to go
to trial. The appellate courts held four of the lawsuits at the lower courts could continue against
the educators in cases involving a denial of the dispositive motion (i.e., Gonzalez, La Joya,
McPherson, Moore). Only one of these cases had a final determination, and the court dismissed
the lawsuit against the principal (i.e., Gonzalez). The ultimate outcome is still unknown in three
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of the cases sent back to the trial courts by the appellate courts (i.e., La Joya, McPherson,
Moore). In these three case, the appellate court appeals were merely the first hurdle plaintiffs had
to overcome in order to sue an educator.
Educators Invoking Statutory Immunity Under the Texas Education Code §22.0511.
A total of 23 educators sought immunity from liability under the Texas Education Code
§22.0511 in the appellate court cases. As explained in McPherson v. Wylie (2016), immunity
from liability under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 “is an affirmative defense that provides
professional school employees immunity from liability for certain actions taken within the scope
of their employment,” (p. 6) and immunity from liability “prevents the recovery of damages” (p.
6). The educators had various roles and worked at all levels in the district. The sample included
four (17%) superintendents, four (17%) district administrators, four (17%) principals, (4%) one
assistant principal, two (9%) teachers, two (9%) coaches, one (4%) teacher’s aide, four (17%)
board members, and one (4%) district employee.
Appellate courts granted sixteen (70%) of these educators requests for immunity from
liability under the Texas Education Code §22.0511. Particularly, the appellate courts determined
all four (100%) superintendents and all five (100%) principals in the sample were immune from
liability. In the sample of appellate court cases, one (100%) assistant principal, two (100%)
teachers and one (100%) employee in central administration all had immunity from liability. The
appellate courts provided immunity from liability to three (75%) of four district administrators,
and one (50%) of two coaches.
The appellate courts did not provide educators immunity from liability under the Texas
Education Code §22.0511 to seven (30%) out of 23 educators. Appellate courts denied immunity
for all four (100%) board members who pled statutory immunity protection. The appellate court
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denied immunity from liability to the only (100%) teacher’s aide in the sample. One (50%) of
two coaches in the sample and one (25%) of four district administrators were not granted
statutory immunity protection by the appellate courts.
Educators Invoking Statutory Immunity Under the Texas Education Code §22.0512.
In the appellate court cases, two educators invoked statutory immunity protection for the use of
force against a student under the Texas Education Code §22.0512 (i.e., Madden, Dallas).
Madden was a principal and Peters was an assistant principal. These cases involved an appeal
from Texas state agencies, in particular the State Board of Educator Certification (SPEC) and the
Texas Commissioner of Education. In Madden v. SBEC (2014), Madden filed an appeal of a final
order from SBEC that issued the noninscribed reprimand after Madden gave swats to a student
that left bruises. In Dallas ISD v. Peters (2015), Peters appealed a decision by the Texas
Commissioner of Education to uphold the termination of Peters’ contract based on Peters’ use of
force against a fifteen year-old pregnant female student. The appellate courts ruled against both
Madden and Peters. In addition, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision that
required the district to pay Peters’ attorney’s fees under the Texas Education Code §22.0512.
Appealing Party. After a trial court makes a decision on a case, the party that did not
prevail has the opportunity to appeal the decision to the appellate court. The sample included
cases with only one plaintiff and one defendant as well as cases with multiple plaintiffs and
multiple defendants. Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed decisions regarding the Texas
Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 to the appellate courts. The appellant, the party that
appealed the lower court’s decision, included nine (60%) educators, three (20%) parents, one
(7%) district, one state agency (7%), and one (7%) vendor. Appellees, the party responding to
the appeal, consisted of five (33%) cases with districts and employees, four (27%) cases with
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educators, three (20%) cases with parents, one (7%) case with a district and board members, one
(7%) case with board members, and one (7%) case with a state agency. The majority of cases
appealed from a lower court are upheld by the appellate court. As evidenced in the sample, the
party that filed the appeal, the appellant, only won four (27%) out of the 15 cases appealed.
Stated another way, the appellate court overturned 27% of the trial court decisions. On the other
hand, the appellate court ruled in favor of the party that responded to the appeal, the appellee, in
11 (73%) of the 15 appellate cases.
All three successful appellants were defendants in the trial court (i.e., Dallas ISD,
Edinburg, Lane). While the plaintiff was initially successful in the appellate court in 2011, the
case was remanded back to the trial court for a further decision since Grimm was not successful
on her dispositive motion. In the Gonzalez v. Grimm (2011), the appellate court discussed the
defendant’s deficient affidavits as the reason for ruling in favor of the plaintiff, which leaves the
question as to whether a proper affidavit would have led to a decision in favor of the principal.
Even though Grimm did not prevail on her dispositive motion in 2011 because of the insufficient
evidence, the appellate court ultimately upheld in the judgment in favor of Grimm in 2015
(Gonzalez v. Grimm, 2015). There were 12 cases where the appellate court ruled in favor of the
appellee and upheld the decision of the trial court. Nine of these cases were in favor of
defendants in the trial courts (i.e., Brannon, Burgi, Compton, Gonzalez, Madden, Rivera, Van
Deelen, Ward, Will) and three were in favor of plaintiffs in the trial courts (i.e., La Joya ISD,
McPherson, Moore).
Attorneys’ Fees. Seven of the 15 cases dealt with an educator’s recovery of their
attorney’s fees under the Texas Education Code §22.0517 (i.e., Burgi, Compton, Dallas,
McPherson, Rivera, Robinson, Ward). This provision of the education code allows an educator
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to recover attorneys’ fees and court costs from a plaintiff if the educator is found to be immune
from liability under the Texas Education Code Chapter §22.0511. As noted in Ward v. Theret
(2009), the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0517 are meant to be read together. The
court explicitly stated that the “Legislature intended for professional school district employees to
be immune from personal liability in most cases” (Ward v. Theret, 2009, p. 677). The court went
on to say that “absent allegations of excessive force, or negligence resulting in physical injury,
the Legislature has provided professional school district employees with protection from
personal liability, and the ability to recover expenses incurred in defending the suit” (p. 676).
In Gonzalez v. Grimm (2011, 2015), Gonzalez, the principal at Grimm’s child’s school,
reported Grimm to law enforcement after Grimm called and allegedly threatened Gonzalez. The
parent told the principal he had her social security number and threatened to use it against her.
The appellate court in 2011 determined Gonzalez’s phone call did not involve the exercise of
judgment and discretion, and Grimm did not have statutory immunity for calling law
enforcement. Because the educator did not have statutory immunity protection, the appellate
court reversed and rendered a decision in favor of the parent that sued the educator for reporting
the parent to the police for harassment. The appellate court never discussed whether the educator
was entitled to attorneys’ fees. After the case was remanded back to the trial court in 2011, the
trial court granted a judgment in favor of Grimm. Gonzalez again appealed the case to the
appellate court in Gonzalez v. Grimm (2015) and the court upheld the judgment in favor of
Grimm in this appeal without any attorney’s fees for Grimm.
In Burgi v. Hartman (2018), Hartman heard one of her students discussing a hunting trip
with his father, Ronald Burgi. The student suffered gunshot wounds when hit with four pieces of
birdshot during a hunting trip with his father. Hartman, after hearing the story, began to question
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the student about the incident. CPS subsequently received a report about the student’s shotgun
incident. Burgi claimed Hartman’s husband had a personal vendetta against Burgi since Burgi is
a union representative who represented an employee who accused Hartman’s husband of
wrongdoing. Burgi sued Hartman for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The trial court granted Hartman’s summary judgment motions and ordered Burgi to pay
Hartman’s attorney’s fees. Burgi appealed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court
determined Burgi had to pay Hartman’s attorney’s fees since Hartman prevailed on her
affirmative defense of statutory immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0511.
In Compton v. Port Arthur ISD (2017), the district reassigned Compton to a teaching
position and Compton filed suit claiming her constitutional right of free speech was violated.
Compton named Port Arthur ISD, Johnny E. Brown, the district’s superintendent, and King,
Compton’s supervisor, as defendants in her lawsuit. The appellate court determined Brown and
King were entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees since they had statutory immunity under the
Texas Education Code §22.0511. Compton argued that King should not receive attorney’s fees
because she was motivated by spite and not acting in the furtherance of the interests of the
district. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees to Brown and King upon granting their pleas to
the jurisdiction. The appellate court noted in that nothing in the Texas Education Code §22.0517
has a requirement that dismissal must be based on §22.0511 in order to recover attorney’s fees.
The appellate court read §22.0511 and §22.0517 together and determined that a defendant who is
immune from liability as a professional employee is entitled to receive attorney’s fees. Since the
trial court found the actions of the individual defendants were within the scope of their duties,
the appellate court held the trial court did not err in awarding King and Brown their attorney’s
fees under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0517.
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In Robinson v. Brannon (2010), the defendant educator, Brannon, failed to request
attorney’s fees in his pleadings filed with the court. It was only after the lower court determined
Brannon had immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 that he requested the plaintiff
pay his costs and attorneys’ fees under the Texas Education Code §22.0517. Since the lower
court determined Brannon was immune from liability under the Texas Education Code §22.0511,
the lower court awarded Brannon attorney’s fees. The appellate court agreed. Even more, the
appellate court noted the lower court “had no discretion in awarding attorney’s fees” and the
“award of attorney’s fees was mandatory” under the Texas Education Code §22.0517 (p. 869).
The appellate court found Brannon properly requested the fees following the lower court’s
determination that he had statutory immunity.
Interestingly, the appellate court limited the amount of attorney’s fees Brannon could
recover since he was only entitled to attorney’s fees for his acts of investigating and suspending
the plaintiff given these were the only acts covered under the Texas Education Code §22.0512.
“Any attorney’s fees associated with defending causes of action outside of Brannon’s
professional immunity, his defenses of exhaustion of administrative remedies and no evidence of
the acts of electronic harassment, are not recoverable” under the Texas Education Code §22.0517
(p. 869). The other defendant in the lawsuit, Freeman, was not protected by professional
immunity on the alleged acts of her harassment of the plaintiff so she was not entitled to
attorney’s fees.
In Rivera v. Port Arthur ISD (2016), the appellate court did not take the same stance as
the court in Robinson v. Brannon (2010). The appellate court in Rivera held that the defendant
educators were not entitled to attorney’s fees even though they prevailed on their pleas to the
jurisdiction. Even though the defendants ultimately prevailed on their pleas to the jurisdiction,
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the trial court did not grant the defendants attorney’s fees and costs under the Texas Education
Code §22.0517. The defendants argued the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding
attorney’s fees to the defendants after they prevailed on their pleas to the jurisdiction. They
claimed they were entitled to attorney’s fees since the lawsuit by the plaintiff was frivolous. The
appellate court disagreed since the trial court granted the pleas to the jurisdiction under the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code §101.106 not the Texas Education Code §22.0511. According
to the appellate court, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award attorney’s fees.
Synopsis of Research Question 2. The decisions consistently determined by the Texas
appellate courts when determining whether an educator had statutory immunity included: (a)
extensive protections for educators, (b) educators invoking statutory immunity under the Texas
Education Code §22.0511, (c) educators invoking statutory immunity under the Texas Education
Code §22.0512, (d) appealing party, and (e) attorney’s fees. There were two themes that emerged
from the decisions made by the appellate courts when an educator sought protection under the
Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512. The two themes were that educators are likely to
have immunity from liability in Texas appellate court cases and courts are reluctant to overturn
adverse employment decisions against an educator.
The first theme which appears in the appellate cases was that educators are likely to be
granted immunity from liability in Texas appellate court cases. The data revealed that appellate
courts are likely to grant statutory immunity to educators. The appellate courts determined that
five out of the six educators’ actions were within or incident to the scope of their duties thereby
providing immunity protection to the defendant educator. The only two exceptions to the
overarching immunity protection involved a lawsuit against (a) board members relating to a
breach of contract case (i.e., La Joya) and (b) lawsuits by parents where a student suffered
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physical injury (i.e., Moore, McPherson). An appellate court ruled in favor of educators in a case
involving a student’s class ranking wherein the student lost her scholarship as the valedictorian
(i.e., Edinburg). Educators were provided statutory immunity protection under the Texas
Education Code §22.0511 for their day-to-day responsibilities in a majority of the cases in the
sample.
The second theme that emerged was that courts are reluctant to overturn adverse
employment decisions against an educator. The appellate courts consistently ruled in favor of
districts when plaintiffs argued they were wrongly terminated, reassigned, or investigated. In all
eight cases where an educator filed a lawsuit at the trial court level disputing an adverse
employment action, the courts upheld the decision of the defendant district and administrators.
Moreover, the cases appealed by educators regarding a state agency decision were 100% in favor
of the state agency (i.e., Madden, Dallas ISD).
Research Question 3
The third research question was what were the trends in the decisions made by Texas
appellate courts where educators invoked statutory immunity protections? The analysis focused
on answering what the trends were in cases decided by the Texas appellate courts where
educators invoked statutory immunity protections. Nine categories emerged involving the trends
that emerged as the appellate courts determine if an educator had statutory immunity, including:
(a) statutory immunity provisions determined by Texas appellate courts, (b) year of the appellate
court cases relating to statutory immunity, (c) grade level, (d) lawsuits filed by parents, (e)
lawsuits filed by educators, (f) lawsuits filed by outside parties, (g) causes of action against
educators, (h) location of Texas appellate courts, and (i) action by defendants that led to the
underlying lawsuit.
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Statutory Immunity Provisions Determined by Texas Appellate Courts. Thirteen
(87%) of the 15 educators sought immunity from liability under the Texas Education Code
§22.0511. The Texas appellate courts determined nine (69%) of these 13 cases provided
statutory immunity protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0511, five (38%) cases
denied statutory immunity, and one (7%) case was dismissed on other grounds. Two out of the
15 appellate cases involved an educator seeking statutory immunity under the Texas Education
Code §22.0512 which provides an educator immunity from disciplinary proceedings. If the
educator is deemed to have immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0512 the district is
prohibited from subjecting an educator to disciplinary proceedings for the use of physical force
against a student to the extent that is justified under the Texas Penal Code §9.62. Neither of the
educators in the sample were granted immunity protection for their use of force in the appellate
court cases.
Year of the Decision by the Appellate Court. The first case heard by the Texas
appellate courts where an educator invoked statutory immunity was Lane v. Young (2007). The
appellate courts heard one case per year involving statutory immunity in 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011,
2012, and 2015. In 2014, 2017, and 2018, the appellate courts heard two cases per year. In 2016,
the appellate courts heard four cases relating to statutory immunity, which was the most in any
given year. The cases in 2016 included McPherson v. Wylie, Rivera v. Port Arthur ISD, Compton
v. Port Arthur ISD, and Edinburg Consolidated ISD v. Smith. The first case where an appellate
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff in the underlying trial court cases was in 2011 (i.e.,
Gonzalez), but this decision only involved Grimm’s dispositive motion. In 2015, the appellate
court again heard the case and upheld the judgment in favor of Grimm. The other years where
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the appellate courts ruled in favor of the plaintiff were in 2012, 2014, and 2015 (i.e., Moore,
McPherson, La Joya).
Grade Level. No cases in the sample occurred at the elementary level. Five of the 15
appellate court cases decisions occurred at the high school level. In the high school cases the
defendant educators prevailed in two cases, parents prevailed in two cases, and the state agency
prevailed in one case. Two of the 15 appellate court cases decisions occurred at the middle
school level. The parent prevailed in one of the cases at the middle school level and a state
agency prevailed in one (50%) case at the middle school level. There were eight appellate cases
in the sample where the grade level was unknown or not applicable. Cases where the grade level
was inapplicable involved a lawsuit by a vendor, a central office administrator, or an educator
suing a school district and administrators for ending the contractual relationship.
Lawsuits Filed by Parents. Parents brought lawsuits in six of the 15 appellate cases.
Four of the parents filed a lawsuit on behalf of a student for negligent behavior. Two of the
parents filed suit against the educator for the actions against the parent. The appellate courts
ruled in favor of parents regarding a lawsuit relating to a student 50% of the time. These cases
involved instances where a student suffered a physical injury (i.e., McPherson, Moore). The
appellate court ruled in favor of the educator in only one case where a student suffered a physical
injury (i.e., Will). In the two cases where the parent filed suit for the wrongful actions of an
educator against the parent, the appellate court ruled in favor of one (50%) educator and one
(50%) parent. The appellate court ruled in favor of the parent that sued a principal for filing
criminal charges against the parent for harassment. The appellate court ruled in favor of the
educator in the lawsuit brought by a parent against the educator for filing a CPS report for
alleged child abuse. A report of child abuse is mandatory under Texas law.
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Lawsuits by Educators. Educators filed lawsuits in eight of the 15 cases in the sample.
Educators appealed state agency decisions in two of these cases (i.e., Madden, Dallas ISD). Five
of the eight cases involved an educator filing suit against educator defendants for the adverse
employment actions by the district. The adverse employment actions included three terminations
(i.e., Rivera, Van Deelen, Ward), one reassignment (i.e., Compton), and one wrongful
investigation (i.e., Robinson). A school board member, along with other plaintiffs sued the
superintendent for defamation, malicious prosecution, and tortious interference (i.e., Lane). The
appellate courts ruled in favor of the defendants in all eight (100%) cases where educators filed
the lawsuit.
Interestingly, the two termination cases where the appellate courts ruled in favor of the
defendants involved educators hired in the middle of the school year (i.e., Van Deelen, Ward).
The two plaintiffs that used statutory immunity to prevent their terminations had probationary
contracts, and they were both hired in January. The appellate court also ruled in favor of the
defendants in Compton v. Port Arthur ISD (2016). Compton, after being investigated for
Medicaid fraud, requested to be reassigned as a speech language pathologist to a classroom
teacher. Even though the district granted Compton’s request to reassign her to a classroom
teacher position, she sued the district and her supervisors for retaliation. The appellate court
upheld the defendants’ pleas to the jurisdiction.
In Van Deelen v. Spring ISD (2018), Van Deelen made multiple reports “about what he
believed were numerous instances of unlawful drug use and dealing” on the high school's
campus “by students and a teacher, Bobby Scott.” The principal investigated Van Deelen's
allegations at the time and found the allegations had no merit. Van Deelen claimed he soon was
the target of adverse personnel actions, including reprimands and warnings that he would be
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terminated if he continued to make false allegations concerning drug use and dealing on the
school’s campus. The appellate court noted it disagreed with the school district that Van Deelen
jumped to conclusions after he “saw 20 to 30 pill bottles in the console” of Scott’s vehicle and
that he observed a student unlock and open the car, open the console and take some of the pills
(p. 16). The appeals court found that a “reasonably prudent teacher with similar training and
experience and in similar circumstances” could have drawn the same conclusion (p. 17). Despite
the appellate court pointing out that it was reasonable for Van Deelen to think the teacher was
selling drugs, the appellate court still upheld the decision to grant the pleas to the jurisdiction
filed by the principal and assistant principal.
In Rivera v. Port Arthur ISD (2016), Rivera sued after the district for retaliation after he
was reassigned away from his coaching duties. Rivera claimed the district retaliated against him
for filing a previous lawsuit. The jury believed the district retaliated against Rivera by
reassigning him to a position outside of coaching, and the jury awarded Rivera damages.
However, the trial court overturned the jury award and ruled in favor of the defendants by
granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict due to the statutory immunity protection of the
defendant. The appellate court upheld the ruling in favor of the defendants.
Lawsuits by Outside Parties. Two cases in the sample involved outside parties filing a
lawsuit. One case involved a breach of contract case against the district and school board
members (i.e., La Joya). In the second case, a school board member and his spouse, as well as an
employee of a bank that did business with the district, sued the superintendent for defamation,
malicious prosecution, and tortious interference (i.e., Lane). The educator defendant won one
appeal (i.e., Lane) and the outside party won one (50%) appeal (i.e., La Joya).
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Causes of Action Against Educators. Out of the sample of 15 appellate court cases,
there were 28 causes of action filed against defendants in the lower courts. Torts were the most
common cause of action filed against defendants. Particularly, there were 22 (79%) tort claims
against the educators, three (11%) constitutional claims, two (7%) breach of contract claims, and
one (3%) claim for assault. The type of torts brought against educators was diverse. Plaintiffs
filed four (18%) negligence claims against educators, three (14%) intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims, three (14%) defamation claims, two (9%) tortious interference with
contract claims, two (9%) malicious prosecution claims, and two (9%) civil conspiracy claims.
Finally, there was one (5%) tort claim filed for invasion of privacy, fraudulent misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, wrongful termination, retaliation, and negligent discipline. Despite
the broad range of claims brought against educators in the 15 appellate court cases, not one of the
cases addressed the elements of the causes of action. Instead, the appellate courts focused on the
dispositive motions brought by the educators in the 13 appellate cases involving the Texas
Education Code §22.0511.
Location of Texas Appellate Courts. Since the passage of the Texas Education Code
§22.0511 and §22.0512, the following appellate courts have heard cases involving an educator’s
statutory immunity: three cases in Corpus Christi (20%), two cases in Dallas (13%), two cases in
Beaumont (13%), two cases in Waco (13%), two cases in Houston (13%), two cases in El Paso
(13%), one case in San Antonio (7%) and one case in Austin (7%). In appeals heard by the
Corpus Christi court of appeals, the educators prevailed in two of the three cases (i.e., Edinburg,
Rivera) and the vendor prevailed in one case (i.e., La Joya). In the appeals in the Dallas appellate
court, both cases were in favor of the defendants from the trial court cases. The El Paso Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of one defendant and one plaintiff parent. The two cases heard by the
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Houston Courts of Appeals were both in favor of the defendant educators. Both cases heard by
the Waco Court of Appeals were in favor of the parents against educators. The one case heard by
the San Antonio court of appeals and the one case heard by the Austin court of appeals were in
favor of the educator defendants. Both cases heard by the Beaumont court of appeals were in
favor of the educator defendants.
Action by Defendants That Led to the Lawsuit. The sample revealed four categories of
lawsuits: educator contract disputes, vendor contract disputes, parent complaints, and state
agency appeals. Out of the sample of 15 appellate cases, six (53%) cases stemmed from action
by the district regarding the educator’s contract (i.e., Compton, Peters, Rivera, Robinson, Ward,
Van Deelen). In particular, four lawsuits were for the termination of an educator’s contract (i.e.,
Peters, Robinson, Van Deelen, Ward), and two lawsuits were for an educator’s reassignment to a
different role in the district (i.e., Compton, Rivera). One lawsuit involved a vendor suing
individual board members after the board voted to replace that vendor with another company
(i.e., La Joya ISD). Six of the 15 appellate cases from the sample were brought by parents (i.e.,
Burgi, Edinburg, McPherson, Moore, Will). One educator filed suit to appeal the decision by the
State Board of Educator Certification (SBEC) after SBEC reprimanded the educator’s teaching
certificate (i.e., Madden).
Synopsis of Research Question 3. The trends consistent in the Texas appellate court
cases when determining whether an educator had statutory immunity included: (a) statutory
immunity provisions determined by Texas appellate courts, (b) year of the decision by appellate
court, (c) grade level, (d) lawsuits filed by parents, (e) lawsuits filed by educators, (f) lawsuits
filed by outside parties, (g) causes of action against educators, (h) location of Texas appellate
courts, and (i) action by defendants that led to the lawsuit. There were three themes that emerged
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from the trends in the appellate court cases were a majority of Texas appellate court cases
involved the Texas Education Code §22.0511; the educator’s actions impacted the outcome of
the case more than the position, grade level, or gender of the educator; and parents who filed a
lawsuit for physical injuries to a student had an opportunity to succeed on appeal.
The most prevalent theme that emerged from the data was a majority of the appeals to
Texas appellate courts involved the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and an educator’s immunity
from liability. Thirteen out of the 15 appellate cases involved Texas Education Code §22.0511.
The Texas appellate courts determined eight (62%) of these 13 educators had statutory immunity
protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and five (38%) educators did not have
statutory immunity. Two out of the 15 appellate cases involved an educator seeking statutory
immunity under the Texas Education Code §22.0512, which provides an educator immunity
from disciplinary proceedings.
The second theme that emerged was an educator’s actions impacted the outcome of the
case more than the position, grade level, or gender of the educator. While the data revealed
educators at the high school level were more likely to be named in a lawsuit, the findings
indicated the grade level was inconsequential to the appellate court findings. The gender of the
educator and the position was not relevant to the appellate court’s decision. Overall, the grade
level, gender, or position were not significant factors for appellate courts when determining
whether the educator had immunity protection. Instead, the appellate courts considered whether
the actions by the educator were within the scope of their duties.
The third theme that emerged was parents who filed a lawsuit for physical injuries to a
student had an opportunity to succeed on appeal. The appellate courts ruled in favor of parents in
cases relating to an injury to a student. For example, an appellate court ruled in favor of a parent
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after the daughter was injured during summer athletic conditioning. The parents argued the
injuries occurred outside of the school day and outside of the required curriculum. The court also
ruled in favor of the parent in a lawsuit where an aide injured a nonverbal special education
student. The court did not rule in favor of the parent involving a student injury that occurred
during the school day as part of a chemistry experiment. Appellate courts provide educators
statutory immunity protection when students suffer injuries that occurred as part of the regular
school day and as part of the educator’s job duties.
Research Question 4
The fourth research question was what were the legal principles in cases decided in the
Texas appellate courts where educators invoked statutory immunity protections? In Chapter 6 the
legal principles in the Texas appellate cases, along with the legal principles from commissioner
decisions in Chapter 4, will be answered.
Summary
This chapter presented a wide variety of legal issues, decisions, trends, and themes
derived from the Texas appellate court cases where educators invoked statutory immunity
protections. The final chapter will provide a summary and discussion related to the research
questions, findings and conclusion based on the analysis of the Texas Commissioner decisions
and Texas appellate court cases, recommendations, and suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 6: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to describe how the Texas Commissioner of Education and
Texas state appellate courts have attempted to apply statutory immunity protections provided to
educators under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512. A detailed analysis of the
Texas Commissioner Decisions and the Texas appellate court cases were presented in Chapters
4 and 5. This final chapter will present a summary and discussion of the research questions and
the findings and conclusions based on the analysis of the Texas Commissioner decisions and the
Texas appellate court cases. The chapter closes the study with recommendations and suggestions
for future research.
Summary and Discussion
Researchers have called for laws to balance the values of correcting and deterring
wrongful behavior with the amount of immunity protection provided to educators (Daniels &
Martin, 2018; Hendrick, 2016; Schaefer, 2013). In order to determine whether the statutory
immunity protections provided under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 are too
broad or too narrow, a study describing how rulings of statutory immunity shield Texas
educators from liability was needed (Buckley, 2017; Daniels & Martin, 2018; Maher et al., 2010;
Payne, 2012). This study assessed statutory immunity protection of educators by (a) analyzing
commissioner decisions and appellate court cases involving the Texas Education Code §22.0511
and §22.0512, (b) determining the set of norms applied in the cases, and (c) predicting the
application of norms applied in the cases to future decisions. The results of this study are
consistent with previous research showing that statutory immunity for educators is “alive and
relatively robust” in Texas (Maher et al., 2010, p. 247).
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The findings in this study provide strong evidence that the adoption of the Texas
Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 have met the Legislature’s goal of shielding educators
from liability. Since the passage of House Bill 4 in 2003, there have been 19 Texas
Commissioner of Education decisions and 15 Texas appellate court cases with rulings about
educators’ statutory immunity protections. The current findings indicated educators have
successfully used statutory immunity as a shield in more cases than determined in previous
research. Of particular importance, the findings of this study indicated educators have even
higher success rates than in previous studies in two areas, both of which involve adverse
employment decisions.
First, the reviewed case data showed the success rate of educators who appealed
decisions by a school board to end their contracts was significantly higher than past studies. The
commissioner ruled in favor of 50% of educators with a term contract that used force against a
student and sought protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. Previous studies found
educators won appeals in approximately 25% cases. Specifically, Ramirez’s (2014) analysis of
administrators’ appeals of school board decisions involving the nonrenewal of a term contract
depicted the Texas Commissioner of Education ruling in favor of 27% of educators and 73% of
school boards. Mays (2017), in a study of Alabama cases, yielded similar outcomes to those of
Ramirez, with 71% of cases favoring school boards over educators who appealed an adverse
employment decision. Clearly, the Texas educators displayed a higher rate of success.
Second, this study of Texas educator cases resulted in higher percentages of educator
defendants successfully using statutory immunity to prevail in lawsuits filed by a plaintiff for an
adverse employment decision. This study found that the appellate courts determined 100% of the
defendants had statutory immunity when sued by a plaintiff regarding an adverse employment
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decision. Previously, researchers found courts rule in favor of school boards in 72% (O’Neal,
2013) to 73% (Flatt, 2012) of the cases.
Other than the two areas where immunity protection for educators was higher than
previous studies, this study’s findings support previous findings showing the courts as favoring
educators and limiting their exposure to civil liability (Buckley, 2017; Carman, 2009; Maher et
al., 2010). Carman (2009) analyzed qualified immunity protection for Texas educators prior to
the passage of House Bill 4 and found that 24 out of 32, or 75%, of the cases provided Texas
educators immunity protection. Holben and Zirkel (2011) found educator defendants prevailed in
61% of the lawsuits against them when the lawsuit involved an intervention or nonintervention in
a student fight. This study’s findings indicate courts favored educators in 77% of the cases.
This research provides clarity about the use of statutory immunity protection for both the
use of force and educator immunity from liability since the passage of House Bill 4 in 2003. This
study revealed the adoption of the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 achieved the
Texas legislature’s goal of shielding educators from liability and adverse employment actions
based on the reasonable use of force defense. While it is impossible to eliminate all liability and
exposure, this study proved that House Bill 4 has had its intended effect of providing educators
even greater immunity protection.
Discussion for Each Research Question
The following four research questions were used to focus the study:
RQ1: What were the legal questions in cases decided by the Texas Commissioner of
Education and Texas appellate courts where educators invoked statutory immunity protections?
RQ2: What were the decisions made by the Texas Commissioner of Education and Texas
appellate courts in cases where educators invoked statutory immunity protections?
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RQ3: What were the trends in the decisions made by the Texas Commissioner of
Education and Texas appellate courts where educators invoked statutory immunity protections?
RQ4: What legal principles for Texas educators can be discovered from the decisions
made by the Texas Commissioner of Education and Texas appellate courts where educators
invoked statutory immunity protections?
Research Question 1
The first research question was what were the legal questions in cases decided by the
Texas Commissioner of Education and Texas appellate courts where educators invoked statutory
immunity protections? The research conducted in this study identified the themes of the legal
questions addressed in both the Texas Commissioner of Education decisions and the Texas
appellate court cases where an educator invoked statutory immunity protection under the Texas
Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512. The four overarching themes that answer the research
question between both groups of cases included (a) the duties and the day-to-day responsibilities
of educators, (b) due process protections of educators, (c) tenure of educators, and (d) an
educator’s belief that the use of force was reasonable.
Duties and Day-to-Day Responsibilities of Educators. The commissioner decisions and
the appellate courts both considered the duties and day-to-day responsibilities of educators when
applying statutory immunity protections provided to educators under the Texas Education Code
§22.0511 and §22.0512. The commissioner made clear educators have rights similar to parents
under in loco parentis. “As teachers stand in the place of parents, they are protected from
allegations that they have improperly used force against children in a very similar manner as
parents are protected from equivalent allegations” (Villarreal v. Edinburg Consolidated ISD,
2016, p. 6; Zarsky v. Southside ISD, 2019, p. 8). Because the duties and responsibilities of
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parents flow to educators while students are in their care, the commissioner found several
educators immune for their actions since it would have been okay for a parent to use the same
type of force.
The appellate courts found that almost all educators acted within the scope of their duties.
In 83% of the appellate cases, the actions by the educator were deemed to be within the scope of
duties or incident to the duties of the educator, which provided the educator statutory immunity
protection. The courts found:
•

A superintendent acted within the scope of his duties when he investigated a transfer of
district funds to a board president’s personal account in Lane v. Young (2007);

•

Administrators did not act outside the scope of their employment by adjusting the grade
weight of a course, even though the educators admitted they made a mistake in advising
the student about the grade weight in Edinburg Consolidated Independent School District
v. Smith (2016);

•

A teacher was protected for filing an allegation of child abuse to CPS in Burgi v Hartman
(2018);

•

A human resource director has the right to investigate an employee and to place an
employee on leave in Robinson v. Brannon (2010); and

•

A principal’s duties include decisions regarding student discipline and employment
matters in Ward v. Theret (2009).
Gonzalez v. Grimm (2011) was the only case where the court determined the incident was

not within the scope of the educator’s duties. This appellate decision in 2011 alludes to the fact
that if the principal had filed a properly sworn affidavit the court may have determined she was
operating within the scope of her duties and provided immunity. Even though Grimm lost on
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appeal in 2011 the trial court ultimately ruled in her favor. In Gonzalez v. Grimm (2015), the
appellate court upheld the judgment in favor of Grimm in 2015. The outcome of this case
emphasizes the importance of submitting proper evidence before the court. The data shows that
appellate courts uphold decisions by trial courts finding the educator’s actions were within the
scope of their duties. A properly sworn affidavit in 2011 may have saved Grimm, the principal,
four years of unnecessary litigation. Instead, four years later in Gonzalez v. Grimm (2015), the
appellate court ruled in favor of Grimm and dismissed the lawsuit.
Due Process Protections of Educators. The commissioner and the appellate courts
analyzed cases to determine whether an educator was provided due process, especially in cases
where a district moved forward on an adverse employment action against an educator. School
boards must follow the processes and procedures set out in the Texas Education Code and
district policies involving an educator’s contract. Even though the school board has a right to
accept or reject findings of fact or conclusions of law from the independent hearing examiner,
the commissioner ruled against the board in every decision a board changed the hearing
examiner's findings (i.e., Earthly, Lee). Therefore, school boards should accept the decision of
the independent hearing examiner as written to avoid the commissioner overturning their
decision.
The appellate courts provided due process to educators by granting educators’ dispositive
motions, which eliminated some or all claims. The courts granted 62% of the pleas to the
jurisdiction and 80% of the motions for summary judgment filed by educators. Plaintiffs had to
provide specific proof of the allegations brought against educators to prevail in appellate courts.
Inferences or mere speculation that an educator’s actions were negligent was not sufficient proof
to overcome a dispositive motion. For example, a court ruled in favor of educators after a
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plaintiff was unable to provide actual proof that the educators sent harassing emails and text
messages (i.e., Robinson).
Tenure of Educators. Tenure afforded educators with an increased chance of prevailing
in an appeal to the commissioner. Out of the 14 educators with term contracts, tenured educators,
meaning educators with a Chapter 21 term contract, prevailed in 50% of the cases appealed to
the commissioner regarding the use of force (i.e., Earthly, Harper, Lee, Papa, Villarreal,
Williams, Zarsky). There are no other studies to date where an educator prevailed over the
school board at such a high percentage.
An Educator’s Belief That the Use of Force Was Reasonable. All 19 commissioner
decisions involved immunity for an educator’s use of force under the Texas Education Code
§22.0512. The commissioner consistently emphasized the importance of viewing the
reasonableness of the use of force from the educator’s viewpoint (i.e., Earthly, Williams,
Villarreal, Zarsky). It is irrelevant that administrators, peers, or witnesses believed there was a
better way to handle an incident.
While one might argue that another method might also have been successful, this is not
the standard. Viewing the scene from [the educator’s] perspective and applying an
objective standard, three students who were violating school rules and were likely to start
a fight were promptly removed from the area. (Zarsky v. Southside ISD, 2019, p. 14)
Research Question 2
The second research question was what were the decisions made by the Texas
Commissioner of Education and the Texas appellate courts in cases where educators invoked
statutory immunity protections? The research conducted in this study identified the themes of
the decisions by both the Texas Commissioner of Education and the Texas appellate courts
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where an educator invoked statutory immunity protection under the Texas Education Code
§22.0511 and §22.0512. The three overarching themes that answer the research question between
both groups of cases included: (a) educators have extensive statutory immunity protection, (b)
justification for statutory immunity protection of educators, and (c) commissioner and court
reluctance to interfere with district-level decisions.
Educators Have Extensive Statutory Immunity Protection. The commissioner ruled in
favor of educators in seven (37%) out of 19 cases where an educator invoked statutory immunity
protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. While educators prevailed at a lower
percentage, the percentage of educators who prevailed is a significant finding. Specifically,
seven out of fourteen educators with a term contract prevailed. The seven prevailing educators
used the following force:
•

Restraining a student to prohibit a fight between students in Earthly v. Fort Bend
Independent School District (2009);

•

Grabbing the student’s face to have her look at reading materials on the teacher’s
computer in Harper v. Alvarado Independent School District (2010);

•

Forcing a student into the hallway in Lee v. Dallas Independent School District (2016);

•

Forcing the student out of the classroom while grabbing his hands, twisting his arm
behind his back, and pushing the student against the door in Papa v. Presidio
Independent School District (2006);

•

Restraining the student by bending and applying pressure to his wrist to keep the student
from hitting a female student in Villarreal v. Edinburg Consolidated Independent School
District (2016);
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•

Grabbing the student’s wrist to keep him from walking away after the teacher walked up
on two students fighting in Williams v. Spring Independent School District (2017); and

•

Blocking three students from entering the in-school suspension room to prohibit a fight,
followed by pushing the students out of a restricted hallway towards the office in Zarsky
v. Southside Independent School District (2019).
The appellate courts ruled in favor of ten (77%) educators, nine wherein an educator

invoked statutory immunity protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and one on
other grounds. Educators had statutory protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 for
the following allegations:
•

Making an alleged false report to CPS based on a personal vendetta from outside the
school setting involving the reporting educator’s spouse and the plaintiff in Burgi v
Hartman (2018);

•

Retaliating for the alleged use of free speech in Compton v. Port Arthur Independent
School District (2017);

•

Changing the grade weights of a course causing the student to move from valedictorian to
salutatorian in Edinburg Consolidated Independent School District v. Smith (2016);

•

Investigating a $50,000 transfer from the district to a board member’s personal account in
Lane v. Young (2007);

•

Retaliating after the plaintiff filed an EEOC lawsuit against the district in Rivera Port
Arthur Independent School District (2016);

•

Tarnishing an educator’s reputation by sending harassing texts and emails and making
harassing phone calls in Robinson v. Brannon (2010);
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•

Ignoring the plaintiff’s reports about unlawful drug use and drug dealing on campus by
another educator n Van Deelen v. Spring Independent School District (2018);

•

Terminating a probationary contract based on the plaintiff’s discipline over a cheerleader
incident in Ward v. Theret (2009); and

•

Creating, implementing, and assigning a chemistry experiment where a student
inadvertently burned herself after spilling hydraulic acid in Will v. Bambenek (2017).

The one case where an appellate court ruled in favor of an educator on grounds other than
statutory immunity involved a principal reporting a parent to the police for harassment over the
phone (i.e., Gonzalez).
One notable finding is the three educators who did not prevail at the appellate court level
still may prevail at the conclusion of the case. When the appellate courts denied the dispositive
motions of some educators, the court sent the cases back to the trial court for a decision.
Dispositive motions are procedural tools used in litigation to dismiss the claims against the
educators without having to go to trial. Therefore, a denial of a dispositive motion by the
appellate courts simply allows the case to continue against the educator at the trial court level.
Similar to the findings by Zirkel and Holben (2017) where the ultimate relief obtained by the
plaintiff was unavailable, the ultimate outcomes in three of the four cases sent back to the trial
courts is unknown since there is no record of the final determination of these cases. It is unclear
if there was a settlement between the parties or if the trial court ruled in favor of one party or
another.
Without an appeal of a trial court’s ruling to an appellate court, it is difficult to know the
ultimate outcome given subsequent conclusive rulings may not be in public records. The
educator may ultimately have prevailed in these three cases at the conclusion of the lawsuit. The
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ultimate outcome of a case was only known in Gonzalez v. Grimm (2015). While Grimm did not
prevail on her dispositive motion she ultimately prevailed at trial. The trial court ultimately
awarded a judgment in favor of Grimm after the trial.
Justification for Statutory Immunity Protection. The commissioner emphasized
educators have to be allowed to use reasonable force when they stand in the place of parents
during the school day (i.e., Gracia, Harper, Papa, Peters, Villarreal, Williams, Zarsky). Teachers
are similar to parents in that they have the right to prescribe reasonable rules for the “government
of children under their charge, and to enforce, by moderate restraint or correction, obedience to
such rules” (Williams v. Spring ISD, 2017, p. 8). The most recent commissioner decision
expressly said the board’s decision to terminate Zarsky, who was “conscientiously doing his job
when he intervened to prevent a fight” and “he did not lose control of himself or the situation” is
the exact reason educators need statutory immunity (Zarsky v. Southside ISD, 2019, p. 15). If
Zarsky’s termination were to stand, “Texas teachers would have to carefully think whether they
should intervene to prevent or stop fights” (p. 15).
While the justification for immunity protection for educators was not clearly discussed in
the appellate court cases as in the commissioner decisions, the appellate court's rulings indicated
they are not inclined to overturn decisions by administrators and school districts. For instance,
courts ruled in favor of defendants in every case where an employee sued for an adverse
employment action. The refusal to overturn any decisions where a plaintiff sued an educator
defendant for an adverse employment decision demonstrates the courts’ hesitation in inserting
themselves in school district decisions, and particularly personnel decisions.
Commissioner and Court Reluctance to Interfere With District-Level Decisions.
Both the commissioner and the appellate courts demonstrated their reluctance to interfere with
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decisions by school systems and state agencies. Courts consistently demonstrated the reluctance
to interfere with a school district’s decision making. As noted in Edinburg Consolidated ISD v.
Smith (2016), “courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts that arise in the
daily operations of school systems and which did not directly and sharply implicate basic
constitutional values” (p. 43). Courts were also reluctant to question a decision by a state agency
since “it is the general rule in Texas that courts do not interfere with the statutorily conferred
duties and functions of an administrative agency” (Edinburg Consolidated ISD v. Smith, 2016, p.
43).
Research Question 3
The third research question was what were the trends in the decisions made by the Texas
Commissioner of Education and the Texas appellate courts where educators invoked statutory
immunity protections? The research conducted in this study identified the themes found in both
the Texas Commissioner of Education decisions and the Texas appellate court cases where an
educator invoked statutory immunity protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and
§22.0512. The four overarching themes that answer the research question between both groups
of cases included (a) the types of statutory immunity protection in the cases, (b) the role of
educators, (c) the difference in grade levels in commissioner decisions and appellate court cases,
and (d) the causes of action against educators.
Types of Statutory Immunity Protection in the Cases. All 19 commissioner decisions
involved an educator’s protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0512. The Texas
Education Code §22.0512 provides educator immunity from disciplinary proceedings for
professional employees, including the use of justified physical force against a student. The
commissioner had to determine in these cases whether the educator had statutory immunity for
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the use of force against a student. Thirteen out of 15 cases in the Texas appellate courts involved
the Texas Education Code §22.0511, which provides educator’s immunity from liability. The
other two appellate cases involved the Texas Education Code §22.0512 and an educator’s use of
force.
Role of Educators. Nineteen educators used the Texas Education Code §22.0512 as the
basis of the appeal to the commissioner for an adverse employment decision by a school board.
Classroom teachers made up the majority of educators who appealed cases to the Texas
Commissioner of Education. Out of 13 appeals by classroom teachers, the teachers prevailed in
six (46%) cases and the school district prevailed in six (46%) cases, and one (8%) appeal was
remanded back to the district. School districts won every appeal filed by a teacher’s aide,
principal, and assistant principal. The one librarian in the sample prevailed and was reinstated by
the commissioner.
A total of 23 educators sought immunity from liability under the Texas Education Code
§22.0511 in the appellate court cases. Appellate courts granted sixteen (70%) of these educators
immunity from liability, and all but one of these educators had immunity under the Texas
Education Code §22.0511. The one prevailing educator without statutory immunity was in
Gonzalez v. Grimm (2015), and the educator prevailed at trial even though the appellate court
initially denied her statutory immunity protection. Superintendents were one of the most
frequently named defendants in the cases. Even though superintendents usually were not
involved personally, they were likely named as a defendant due to their visibility in the district
and their higher compensation. The same could be said for principals and district administrators.
Principals, the most frequently named defendant in the sample, prevailed in all claims against
them. The appellate courts granted principals statutory immunity in 80% of the cases and the
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20% prevailed on other grounds at trial. Courts also provided superintendents and central
administrators statutory immunity in 100% of the cases. The assistant principals, two teachers,
and one central office employee all had statutory immunity. Finally, the courts determined that
all but one district administrator and one coach had statutory immunity.
Difference in Grade Levels in Commissioner Decisions and Appellate Court Cases.
Six of the 19 commissioner decisions occurred at the elementary level. Four school districts and
two educators prevailed in the elementary cases. Nine decisions occurred at the secondary level.
School districts prevailed in four cases at the secondary level, and educators prevailed in five
cases. Grade levels were unknown in four of the cases, and four districts prevailed, with the other
case was remanded back to the trial court. No appellate cases occurred at the elementary level. In
the five high school cases, the defendant educators prevailed in two cases, parents prevailed in
two cases, and the state agency prevailed in one case. Two of the 15 appellate court cases
decisions occurred at the middle school level, and one parent and one state agency prevailed. Out
of the five cases where the grade level was unknown, the district prevailed in five cases. The
grade level was irrelevant in five cases as these cases since defendants were school board
members or central administration employees.
Causes of Action Against Educators. The 19 decisions appealed to the commissioner
included one appeal of a grievance where the commissioner ruled in favor of the district; four
decisions involved a nonrenewal of educator’s contract wherein three (75%) school districts
prevailed and one (25%) educator prevailed; and 14 decisions involving the termination of an
educators’ contracts wherein seven (50%) school districts prevailed, six (43%) educators
prevailed, and one (7%) case was remanded back to the district. In the 15 appellate court cases,
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28 causes of action were pled against defendants, including 22 (79%) tort claims, three (11%) for
constitutional issues, two (7%) claims for breach of contract, and one (3%) claim for assault.
The type of tort claims brought against educators was diverse. The findings aligned with
previous studies that negligence was the most predominant tort claim brought against educators
(Buckley, 2017; Eckes et al., 2012; Holben & Zirkel, 2011). Out of the 22 tort claims filed,
plaintiffs filed:
•

Four (18%) negligence claims,

•

Three (14%) intentional infliction of emotional distress claims,

•

Three (14%) defamation claims,

•

Two (9%) claims for tortious interference with a contract,

•

Two (9%) claims for malicious prosecution,

•

Two (9%) claims for civil conspiracy,

•

One (5%) claim for invasion of privacy,

•

One (5%) claim for fraudulent misrepresentation,

•

One (5%) claim for negligent misrepresentation,

•

One (5%) claim for wrongful termination,

•

One (5%) claim for retaliation, and

•

One (5%) claim for negligent discipline.

Research Question 4
The fourth research question was what legal principles for Texas educators can be
discovered from the decisions made by the Texas Commissioner of Education and Texas
appellate courts where educators invoked statutory immunity protections? This research question
is a synthesis of the Texas commissioner decisions and the Texas appellate cases. The research
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conducted in this study identified the legal principles found in both the Texas Commissioner of
Education decisions and the Texas appellate court cases where an educator invoked statutory
immunity protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512. The two
overarching themes that answer the research question between both groups of cases included (a)
overcoming procedural requirements and (b) submitting admissible evidence in all pleadings.
Overcoming Procedural Requirements. Appeals to the commissioner of education and
to the courts have specific requirements and timelines that have to be met. Parties on both sides
of the appeals encountered issues with procedural requirements. The board of trustees lost every
appeal to the commissioner after they changed the findings of fact or conclusions of law of an
independent hearing examiner. The commissioner repeatedly stated the procedural requirements
were an issue in the case. The districts often cited the failure to exhaust administrative remedies
as a defense. Even though districts are not always successful in the argument on exhaustion of
remedies, the educator still had to overcome the district’s argument in their pleadings. In the
appellate courts, both plaintiffs and defendants used the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies as a defense so all parties need an understanding of procedural requirements.
Another procedural hurdle addressed by the appellate courts involved recovery of
attorney’s fees under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0517. In several instances, the
educator did not plead for attorney’s fees for having to defend a claim against them. While
educators had numerous defenses they used to defeat claims by plaintiffs, the appellate court was
not always clear in their decisions which defense it used to rule in favor of the educator. Several
courts determined educators had the right to recover their attorney’s fees just by requesting them
in their pleadings to the court, but 47% of educators failed to request them.

240
Submitting Admissible Evidence. The commissioner and the appellate courts discussed
the submission of inadmissible evidence by the parties. From a lack of a proper attestation on an
affidavit to the failure to attach proper exhibits, the commissioner decisions and court cases both
addressed problems with evidence. The failure to attach a properly sworn-affidavit to a motion
for summary judgment may have led to one educator having to defend a lawsuit for an additional
four years. In Gonzalez v. Grimm (2011, 2015), the principal who was named as a defendant in a
lawsuit failed to submit a sworn-affidavit of her testimony indicating that calling the police was
part of her duties as a principal. The appellate court noted that the other affidavits attached to the
principal’s motion for summary judgment were not enough to demonstrate the principal acted
within her duties when she reported a parent’s harassment to the police. By failing to attach a
properly sworn-affidavit, the appellate court ruled against the principal and sent the case back to
the trial court where the case was tried. Even though the defendant educator ultimately prevailed
in the trial court, it added an additional four years to the lawsuit. If the educator had initially
attached a properly sworn-affidavit, the court may have dismissed the case in 2011.
Findings and Conclusions
This study revealed the following findings and conclusions derived from an analysis of
the Texas Commissioner of Education decisions and Texas appellate court cases where educators
invoked statutory immunity protections under the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and
§22.0512:
1. The passage of the Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0512 achieved the
legislature’s goal of providing additional immunity protections to educators.
2. The Texas Education Code §22.0511 protections are too broad. There has to be a
threshold where educators are legally responsible for their egregious actions. The
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development of a bright-line test by the Texas Legislature could bring more balance
needed to correct and deter wrongful behavior as called for by Buckley (2017). For
example, the data revealed plaintiffs were often responsible for the defendant’s attorneys’
fees under the Texas Education Code §22.0511. A bright-line test for the reimbursement
of attorney’s fees could differentiate between a lawsuit brought by a plaintiff for
harassment purposes only and a lawsuit for physical injuries to a student.
3. The Texas Education Code §22.0512 protections are balanced. Educators must have the
ability to use reasonable force to control students and maintain discipline in their
classrooms. The data revealed districts are quick to terminate an educator for their use of
force even when the use of force was reasonable. Thus, protections available under the
Texas Education Code §22.0512 are necessary to protect educators from unlawful
dismissals and to incentivize educators to remain in the education field.
4. Disgruntled employees cannot ignore the outcome of lawsuits in favor of administrators
named as defendants in adverse employment cases. As with previous studies, appellate
courts in this study consistently provided school administrators statutory immunity
protection against claims by disgruntled employees, which illustrates the judicial
system’s hesitancy to interfere with district personnel decisions. Disgruntled employees
must weigh the costs with the rewards of bringing a lawsuit against administrators.
Disgruntled employees not only face procedural hurdles that are time consuming and
difficult, but they could also be required to pay the attorney’s fees of administrators
found to have statutory immunity protection under the Texas Education Code §22.0511
and §22.0517.
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5. Educators can legally touch their students to control, train, educate, or punish for
prohibited conduct. Educators have significant immunity for the reasonable use of force
because they need protection to do their jobs without the fear of discipline. The results
prove educators have statutory immunity for: (a) placing a hand on a student’s shoulder
to keep the student in line, (b) using force to break up a fight, (c) self-defense, (d) holding
a student’s hand to comfort or direct a student, and (e) pushing a student out of a
classroom or down a hallway for the protection of other people or property and grabbing
property out of a student’s hand. Educators do not have to use a verbal command before
using reasonable force. The commissioner provided immunity to educators when they
demonstrated: (a) the force used was purposeful to protect people or property, (b) a
physical restraint did not present a danger of injury, (c) they maintained emotional
control of themselves, and (d) they were conscientiously doing their job. Force is likely to
be deemed excessive if used by a male educator against a female student or if force is
used against a smaller, younger student. This study contradicted the belief that educators
cannot touch students.
6. In cases where an educator appeals a decision by a school district to end the educator’s
contract for the physical use of force against a student, the educator is likely to prevail as
long as (a) the educator is under a term contract, (b) the educator does not have previous
written reprimands for the same type of behavior within a three-year timeframe, (c) it is
the first time the educator used force against a student, and (d) a reasonable person would
agree that a parent could use the same force against their child without the action being
considered abusive.
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Recommendations
The following recommendations bring awareness to teachers, school district employees,
school administrators, school boards, parents, attorneys, and legislators. I compiled these
recommendations from the data and my viewpoints as a school administrator, a previous
litigator, and general counsel for school districts, a former legislative aide in the Texas House of
Representatives that covered the education committee, a parent, and a wife of a school
administrator and coach. The recommendations regarding the application of statutory immunity
apply to administrators, educators, parents, lawyers, school boards, and legislators. Each group
of stakeholders could have agendas that conflict with another. Nonetheless, the recommendations
are the following:
1. Administrators must fully understand the Texas Education Code Chapter 21 contractual
protections and the Texas Education Code §22.0512 before disciplining an educator for
the use of force against a student. The administrator must consider whether: (a) the
student has physical injuries, (b) if the student is significantly smaller than the educator,
(c) does the gender of the student and the educator differ, (d) is a special needs student or
an elementary student involved, (e) if video footage exists, does it benefit the district or
the educator, (f) is this the first time the educator has used force against a student, (g) has
the educator had a reprimand for similar behavior in the past three years, and (h) is the
educator on a term, probationary, or at-will contract. If an educator has an excellent work
history and reputation, the administrator should carefully consider moving forward with a
written reprimand instead of a more severe punishment.
2. If educators do use force against a student, they need to articulate the reasons they
believed the force was necessary. They also should ask for any copies of video footage
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where the incident occurred. For additional protection, educators need to join a teachers’
representative group that provides legal representation for its members. They should ask
the district for training on proper restraint techniques and de-escalation tactics so know
how to deal with emotional, physical, disobedient, and erratic students. Educators should
purchase a separate insurance policy when they oversee a summer extracurricular
program since these programs could be outside the scope of their duties since it is not
during the school year or part of the required curriculum. Finally, educators must have
enough self-awareness to step away from situations where their own emotions are rising.
If an educator reacts emotionally against a student, they need to fight the urge to
immediately apologize for their behavior since the commissioner deemed an apology as
an admission that the use of force to be unreasonable. Therefore, school districts might
institute emotional intelligence training for their educators and provide policies that
enable educators to understand the boundaries of emotional behavior in the presence of
children.
3. Parents must advocate for their children, including having regular contact with school
officials. If the parent believes inappropriate behavior occurred at school, they have to
report it to administration, especially if it involved a younger child or child with special
needs. Parents need to advocate for their children by reporting to administrators any
incidents where an educator used force that was not reasonable. It is important for parents
to track any changes in their children’s behavior after an alleged incident occurred as part
of making the case for an educator’s actions having adverse effects on their children.
4. Lawyers defending educators must specifically plead for attorney’s fees under the Texas
Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0517. This study proved courts are willing to grant

245
defendants their attorneys’ fees for their statutory immunity defense, yet defendants
failed to request their fees in 47% of the cases. Since defendants used a variety of
defenses, court decisions were not always clear on which statute the court relied on to
dismiss the claims against educators. Pleadings must request attorney fees under the
Texas Education Code §22.0511 and §22.0517 because courts interpreted these
provisions together to mean educators who are immune from liability are entitled to
receive attorney’s fees.
5. School boards should adopt the full recommendation of the independent hearing
examiner when determining whether to terminate or not to renew an educator’s contract
under Chapter 21 of the Texas Education Code. The commissioner ruled in favor of the
educator in every appeal where the school board made changes to the independent
hearing examiner’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.
6. Legislators need to reevaluate the statutory immunity protections for educators. While
educators need some protection against litigious plaintiffs, there has to be a way to hold
educators accountable when an educator causes serious injuries. The legislature should
consider requiring educators to purchase personal liability insurance up to a certain policy
limit for coverage in situations when an educator causes serious physical injuries. There
may only be a few circumstances where the insurance policy is necessary, but at least
parents could have some remedy in extreme situations.
Suggestions for Further Research
Based on the findings and conclusions of this study, the following suggestions for further
research are:
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1. This study can be duplicated using trial court cases and independent hearing examiner
decisions to determine whether the lower level decisions provide the same statutory
immunity protections for educators as at the appellate level.
2. A similar study can be done in other states can be that provide educators statutory
immunity protections in order to compare and contrast the protections provided to
educators in Texas.
3. An expansion of this study could be done with other governmental employees who enjoy
statutory immunity protection to determine whether the state agencies and appellate
courts provide the various governmental employees the same immunity protections as
educators.
4. Due to the changing nature of state law, this study should be repeated in 10 years to
determine if the decisions by the Texas Commissioner of Education or the Texas
appellate courts have continued being sustained.
Final Reflection
As a licensed attorney and a member of the State Bar of Texas since 2002, I have
represented governmental entities as well as parties suing governmental entities in litigation. I
have also served as a school district administrator in a Texas school district. I found the cases to
be intriguing from that professional perspective, and I maintained my awareness of my
experiences to avoid any biases affecting my analysis of the data. With these aspects of my
positionality in mind, I will carry the knowledge that the findings imparted with me throughout
my practice of law within the public education system of Texas. I think the legislature of Texas
was right to protect teachers when they must use force, especially with the litigiousness found in
today’s society.
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Summary
This final chapter provided a summary and discussion related to the research questions,
findings and conclusion where educators invoked statutory immunity protections. This chapter
provided recommendations for teachers, school district employees, school administrators, school
boards, parents, attorneys, and legislators. The chapter concluded with suggestions for future
research.
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